Iranian sleeper cells
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Iranian sleeper cells are a threat John Kiriakou treats as real but widely misplaced. He confirms the basic fact, the IRGC and the Ministry of Intelligence and Security "have sleeper cells all over the world", and then narrows the map considerably.

Where they are

His doubt about the domestic threat is explicit: "I doubt that they have any in the United States, or Canada, or the UK."

Where he does place them: "They absolutely have them in places like Pakistan, Afghanistan, Thailand, Indonesia, Argentina even."

The lone wolf

The category he considers "just as dangerous" is the attacker with no organisation behind him. His example is a man who, waving an Iranian flag, opened fire on bar patrons in Austin, Texas, killing four people and wounding seven before being shot and killed.

Consistently poor operatives

On the quality of Iranian clandestine work, Kiriakou is dismissive and consistent with his assessment elsewhere of Iranian intelligence: "It's all good. It's never been good. And it's because they don't get good training." Russia and China help "a little bit," but not enough to change the picture.

The target that would actually matter

The vulnerability he identifies in the Gulf is not military. If Iran were to attack an American military installation in Abu Dhabi or Dubai, "nobody's going to really care."

What would register is a landmark, he names the Burj Al Arab, the sail-shaped hotel, as the kind of target whose destruction would carry a wholly different weight.

The 2026 claim of cells inside the United States

Asked in June 2026 whether he feared Iranian retaliation on the American homeland, Kiriakou said he did not, and identified the fear itself as manufactured: "That was another lie perpetuated by Benjamin Netanyahu."

The claim he is answering is specific and dated, that in the days around the attack on Iran, Netanyahu alleged there were Iranian terrorist cells in cities all across the United States. Kiriakou's rejection is categorical in both tenses: "that was made up out of whole cloth. It was a bald-faced lie. No such cells existed. No such cells ever existed." The purpose he assigns it is domestic American opinion, "just to try to propagandize the American people and to sway them into supporting this illegal attack on Iran."

This sits alongside, rather than against, his assessment elsewhere that the IRGC and the Ministry of Intelligence and Security do maintain clandestine networks abroad. The distinction he draws here is not about Iranian capability in general but about a particular allegation of cells inside American cities, which he says was invented.

Asked again, in March 2026

Put to him a second time within a week, alongside a suggestion that the reports pointed to a false-flag operation, Kiriakou rejected both. On the false flag: "No, I don't think so." On the cells, he noted the repetition and declined to move: "somebody asked me just a week ago if there were Iranian sleeper cells in the United States and I said no. I still believe the answer is no."

His account of why the claim circulates is about purpose rather than error: "I think that the administration's lying to us. It's trying to scare us and it's trying to bring people into line to support this war. There's never been any evidence that there were Iranian sleeper cells."

What he allows is narrower, and he corrects himself downward mid-sentence, Iranian intelligence officers are "often times", then "sometimes", able to enter the country, and twice he adds "usually not". They find it easier to reach Canada. When they do arrive, the ending is the same: "they invariably get caught before they're even able to do their operation. So, I'm not worried about the Iranians."

See also

- John Kiriakou
- 2026 Iran war
