Title: A conversation with John Kiriakou
Show: Dissidentklubben
Date: 2026-07-28
URL: https://youtu.be/_cVnFagpXow
Duration: 39:00

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[00:15] [music] >> But, before you introduce yourself when we get into the topic of the CIA and it's anatomy, is it the case demon where we're trying to dissect here? Yes. >> Yes, very good. And I think we will. >> Yeah. >> So, so please John, tell us your story. I think most people have heard most lot of your story, but if you can focus on your way

[00:45] into the CIA, how you were recruited, your career in the CIA, and what you think is of uh public interest, especially about your journey. >> The way that I was recruited into the CIA is now illegal. Um it's been illegal since 1993, but in the late 1980s, I was in graduate school at George Washington University in Washington, D.C. And I was taking a class called the

[01:17] psychology of leadership. As part of this class, my professor assigned us a paper where we had to shadow or follow our bosses for a week and then write a detailed psychological profile of our boss. I worked at a labor union at the time called the United Food and Commercial Workers Union. And I worked for a man that I was actually a little afraid of. He was a mean, angry, racist,

[01:49] old-school union organizer. And in the middle of that week, we got into an argument and I called him a a racist, which he was. And he got so angry that he balled up his fists, and he set a stance, and I I put up my hands. I remember thinking, "I I went too far this time." I put up my hands, and he says to me, "My penis is bigger than yours." And I said, "What?"

[02:20] And he said, "My penis is bigger than yours." And I said, "You know what? You are insane, and I quit." And I walked out. And I went back to my apartment, and I typed my paper, and I said, "He's a psychopath with psychopathic and violent tendencies." So, I sent the paper to the professor. And a week later, he sent the paper back, and he gave me an A, and he wrote in the in the margin, "Please see me after class." So, I waited till the class was over, and I went up to him, and I said, "Dr.

[02:51] Post, you wanted to see me after class." And he said, "Come with me to my office." So, we went to the office, and he closed the door, and he said, "Listen, I'm not really a professor here. I'm a CIA officer undercover as a professor here, and I'm looking for people who I think would fit into the CIA's culture. I think you would fit into the CIA's culture. Do you want to be a CIA officer?" The truth was, I was getting married in 6 weeks, and I didn't have a job.

[03:23] So, I said, "Sure. >> [laughter] >> Why not? I wanted to see the world. I wanted to do something in public service. I thought I would probably end up in the State Department at some point or on Capitol Hill, but I said, "Sure." And so, I went through a series of tests. He made the right introductions for me. I had to pass the tests on my own. And um and then, a year later I found myself in

[03:54] the CIA. I was actually assigned to the office that he had created called the political psychology division. He liked that paper so much that they made me Saddam Hussein's classified psychologist. And that's what I did for the next uh what, 4 years. >> And then when was this? >> Uh I I started I was offered the job in 1989. I started the 1st of January 1990. >> Okay. >> I see and this was in what's called the Directorate of Intelligence. It was the

[04:25] analytic uh wing. And the funny thing is, and this is in answer to your question really, why my career moved so quickly at least at the beginning. Um I was assigned to Iraq because nothing This is not my words, this is the office director's words. Nothing ever happens there. Nothing. It was the same cabinet since the 1968 revolution. And the the exact words were, "Work

[04:57] hard, learn the writing tradecraft, and then you can transfer onto something interesting like Romania." >> Well, something really interesting >> me. >> Something really interesting happened in Iraq in 1990. >> Just as I thought that I knew what I was talking about. And I really did. I worked hard. Iraq invaded Kuwait. And so the morning of August 2nd, 1990, I walked into the office 6:00 in the morning and my boss said, "Don't take

[05:27] your jacket off. We're going to the White House." I had never been to the White House before except as a tourist. And so we drove to the White House. There was a Marine waiting for us. He walked us right into the Oval Office and I'm 25 years old and I'm there with the president, the vice president, the national security advisor, the CIA director, my boss and me. And the president at the time was George H.W. Bush, the father. And um we walked in. He was very upset.

[06:01] And he finally said, "Gentlemen, please sit down. Sit down." So we sat down. And he looks around and he says, "Well, now what do I do?" And everybody turned and looked at me. And I looked at him. And we're just looking at each other. And then I said, "Oh, well, uh as you know, Mr. President, Iraqi troops crossed the Kuwaiti border at 2:00 this morning. The ruling ruling family has fled to Saudi Arabia, etc., etc."

[06:33] And I became the go-to person for Saddam Hussein's state of mind and how to pressure him and exploit the pressure on him. >> [clears throat] >> So what So what's uh psychological weaknesses have you found? >> Um Saddam There's There's a bad habit that American leaders have, and that is calling people with whom they disagree crazy. "Oh, those ayatollahs, they're crazy." No, they're not crazy. They don't like

[07:05] you. >> [clears throat] >> That doesn't mean they're crazy. With Saddam, I felt like I made a breakthrough in our analysis when I said, "Saddam is not crazy. He's not even angry. He's a mob boss. He runs the country the way a New York City Mafia Don would run a family. And so if we anticipate his behavior

[07:35] akin to how we would anticipate the behavior of, you know, Don Corleone, I think we can figure out what the man intends to do. Every once in a while he would do something that we would deem crazy. If you spoke out against him, this is at the very end of his rule. Um he would have your tongue cut out [clears throat] and nailed to the front door of your house. So, nobody else in the neighborhood says anything about Saddam Hussein. I did that for

[08:06] the next uh 3 years. So, almost 4 years I I was on Iraq. And um I really wanted to go overseas. So, I applied for a position with the State Department. It's a rotation from the CIA to the State Department. That um sent me to Arabic language training for a full year. I have a facility for languages, so I I had a good experience with Arabic. And then I went to Bahrain for 2 years as the economic officer. And

[08:36] then back to headquarters on Iraq. By 1997, this is very boring. Uh Saddam is not going anywhere by 1997. And um I decided to do something completely different. And I saw a job opening for uh an operations officer on counterterrorism in Athens. I had zero experience in operations. Nothing.

[09:07] And back then, operations was over here and analysis over here, and the two never met. It's different now. But, I went to see the the hiring authority and I said, "Listen, I don't have any operational experience at all, but I speak fluent Greek and Arabic." And he said, "Really? Are you willing to be tested?" And I said, "Sure, I just tested recently, but I'll test again if you want me to." And I did, and I tested fluent, and I got the job. So, I went through all the operational training, and it is

[09:39] extensive. >> [clears throat] >> Everything from how to recruit a spy to steal a secret to weapons and explosives and surveillance and crashing through roadblocks. I had to have my knees replaced because they don't give you nice cars to crash. They give you trash cars to crash. And so, when you crash through the roadblock, the seat comes detached, and I broke both of my knees on the dashboard.

[10:10] So, now I have titanium knees. Yeah. Thanks. And nobody have even said, "Hey, sorry about your knees." Nothing. Anyway, I found that I had a knack for it, and so operations were for me. >> And uh then 9/11 happened. >> Yeah. I got back from Athens in the summer of 2000 only because there was a group there that tried to assassinate me. Um so, I got back to headquarters, and I was working on um

[10:42] in the counterterrorism center. And then 9/11 happened. And uh I was sent to Pakistan as the chief of counterterrorism operations. >> Okay. Um and as I understand it, was was it Cofer Black that sent you there? >> Yes. Cofer Black. >> Yeah. >> He became quite uh notorious. >> Can you tell us about Cofer Black? >> Cofer was a >> um >> career-long CIA officer. He had been station chief in multiple, many places. He made a name for himself at the CIA by

[11:13] capturing Carlos the Jackal. If I I think we're all old enough to remember Carlos the Jackal. I teach a class now at the University of Salamanca in Spain, and none of those kids have ever heard of Carlos the Jackal. None of those kids really even could pick out Osama bin Laden in a picture. But uh they're all born after 9/11. And in my mind, 9/11 was, you know, 2 weeks ago. So, Cofer made a name for himself by leading the capture of Carlos the Jackal, rose to become the director of

[11:45] counterterrorism, briefly became Ambassador Cofer Black, the special coordinator for counterterrorism at the State Department, but then he resigned and went to Blackwater and became the finally the chairman of Blackwater. And they did some very, very ugly things. >> Yeah, he he he's got kind of a strange story going. Like in the epicenter where really strange things happens. And he's always in Afghanistan and and the Ukraine war, he was sitting in the board

[12:16] of of Burisma. >> Yep, he was. >> Yeah. >> [snorts] >> Yeah, the funny thing about Cofer and a lot of those those men, and they're all men at the senior-most level, is once they make the senior intelligence service, they begin to realize just how much money is out there that's there's for the taking. All they have to do is retire. And then they find themselves on the board of Burisma or on the board of Palantir or Nvidia or, you meta or, you

[12:49] know, anything. And they're making millions and millions of dollars. George Tenet went to a venture capital firm, and he makes more money than he could count in a lifetime. >> Yeah. >> And he was just a career public servant. I make more than George ever made at the CIA. >> Yeah. >> And I don't make very much. >> And then so 9/11 happened and you went to Pakistan and you were involved with Al-Qaeda and all that stuff.

[13:20] Uh but then uh something happened and uh you got into trouble. >> Yes. Which believe me, I would gladly do it again today if I had the opportunity. People say all the time, you don't show any remorse. No, I don't. I'm not sorry for what I did. When I got back from Pakistan in May of 2002, I was approached by a senior officer in the Counterterrorism Center and he asked me if I wanted to be, his words,

[13:52] certified in the use of enhanced interrogation techniques. I had never heard that term before. I said, what does that mean? And he said, we're going to start getting rough with these guys. And I said, what does that mean? And then he listed these 10 techniques that they were going to start using. And I said, that sounds like a torture program. And he said, it's not a torture program. The the Justice Department approved it and the president signed it. I said,

[14:23] let me think about it for an hour. I walked out of the cafeteria and I went up to the seventh floor of the CIA, the executive floor. And there were there's a very very senior CIA officer up there for whom I had worked in the Middle East 10 years earlier. And and I knocked on his door and I said, sorry to bother you, but I was just asked if I wanted to be certified in these enhanced interrogation techniques. What do you think of that? And he said, first let's call a spade a

[14:55] spade. This is a torture program. They can call it whatever they want, but it's a torture program. And torture is a slippery slope. He said, you know how these guys are. They're cowboys. And somebody's going to go too far and they're going to kill a prisoner. And when that happens, there's going to be a congressional investigation and then there's going to be a Justice Department investigation and somebody's he's to go to prison. Do you want to go to prison? And I said, "No, I don't want to go to prison." As I said the other day, I was the only one who

[15:26] went to prison. But I said, "No, no, I don't want to go to prison." I went back downstairs. I found that colleague, and I said, "This is a torture program. I have a moral and ethical problem with it. I think it's illegal on top of it, and I don't want to have anything to do with it." As an aside, my promotion panel met a week later, and I was passed over for promotion. I had just returned from Pakistan, where I captured with these hands, I'm not allowed to say the number of

[15:57] Al-Qaeda prisoners, but it was the [clears throat] most It was the biggest counterterrorism capture in the history of the CIA, including Abu Zubaydah, who we believed was the number three in Al-Qaeda at the time. I got passed over for promotion. And the man who replaced Cofer, a >> [clears throat] >> dark, notorious officer named Jose Rodriguez. Um Jose said that I had demonstrated a shocking lack of commitment to counterterrorism because I wouldn't be

[16:29] trained in this torture program. I didn't care. The uh the officer that I went to talk to that day, he promoted me with a stroke of his pen. But he said, "You know, you're you're senior enough now where this position you've taken, it's going to hurt you." And I said, "I don't care." >> But you got into problem when you were interviewed. >> The The big problem came later. The The I was I was called behind my back the

[17:01] human rights guy. And um one of my colleagues said, "You know, they talk about you behind your back. They call you the human rights guy." And I said, "Yeah, I know. I've heard that." He said, "You know, that's not a compliment." And I said, "I know. I don't care." I said, "I'm right and they're wrong and it's just as simple as that. So, I left the CIA in 2004. I went into the private sector. And then in 2007, December, uh I got a call from a very important,

[17:32] prominent American journalist, Brian Ross from ABC News. And he said that he had a source who said that I had tortured Abu Zubaydah. I said, it's absolutely not true. I was the only person who was kind to Abu Zubaydah. And he said, well, you're welcome to come on the show and defend yourself. I didn't know that that was a reporter's trick because I had never met a reporter before. I was a CIA undercover officer. I'm not going to meet with reporters.

[18:04] And so, um I said, I'll think about it. That week, that was on a Monday, on Wednesday, President George W. Bush gave a press conference in which he looked right in the camera and he went like this. We do not torture. And I said to my wife, she was a senior CIA officer, too. I said, he's a bald-faced liar. He's looking the American people in the eye and he's just

[18:35] lying right to our faces. And then 2 days later, it was Friday, he was walking out of the back, that it's called the South Portico of the White House to get on the helicopter to go to Camp David for the weekend. And a reporter shouted a question about torture. And he stopped and he said, well, if there is torture, it's because of a rogue CIA officer. And I said to my wife, Brian Ross's source is at the White House and they're going to pin this on me.

[19:06] So, I called him and I said, I'll give you your interview. And I decided in the days leading up to that interview that whatever he asked me, I was simply going to tell the truth. And then just let the cards fall. I believed that that program was illegal, that it just >> And you were right. You had the whole world on your side and they framed you later on. Yeah? >> They did. >> Yeah. Yeah. But, you know what? My my now ex-wife um

[19:37] gave me some very good advice and she said, "You have to keep telling your story over and over again because eventually they're going to move on to their next victim." And they did. It was at Snowden. And she said, "If you keep talking about this, your side of the story will be the side of record and nobody will remember what their side of the story was." And she was right. >> [snorts] >> And now thanks to John McCain and Dianne

[20:08] Feinstein, uh torture is illegal in the United States. It's punishable by 20 years in prison. And in fact, 6 weeks before I was released from prison, um I was I was allowed to call my wife every other day for 15 minutes. So, I called her 6 weeks before I left and um and I said, "How was your day?" She said, "It was great." I said, "Really? Why was it great?" And she said, "Because the Senate torture report came out today and it proved that everything you said was

[20:39] true." And John McCain, God bless him, John McCain and I disagreed on 99% of the issues. But, he stood on the floor of the Senate that day and he he said that the that the country owed me a debt of thanks because if I had not told the American people what the CIA was doing in their name, they would never have known that the George W. Bush regime was a terrorist regime.

[21:12] John John McCain was really a lovely man. Like I say, we disagreed on 99% of the issues, but his office was next door to John Kerry's office, and I was John Kerry's um intelligence adviser, and I was the senior investigator on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee from 2009 to the middle of 2011. And their offices were next door to each other. So, when there would be a vote, I would walk out with Kerry, and invariably we would see McCain, and McCain would

[21:43] always come over to shake my hand. And he would always say, "How are you today, John?" And I'd say, "I'm doing great, Senator. Thank you. How are you doing?" "I'm doing great." And then finally Kerry said one day, "Why don't you and McCain get a hotel room?" And I said, "You know, I said this this is like a serious thing. It's not It's not funny games for him. It was because he was tortured for 7 years. He knows what this is like." And he respected me. And then when I got out of prison, the week I got out of prison, I think I'd been home about 4

[22:14] days, his legislative director called me and said, "Senator McCain says welcome home, and he wants to know what he can do to be helpful." And I said, "These damn Obama people, they took my pension. I'm going to have to work until the day I die." And so McCain worked to get my pension back. I'm sorry to say that he got sick. He got brain cancer and and died before we could do it, but

[22:44] but there was no way that I could help John McCain. He was only helping me because he was a good man. >> Okay, but but let's get to to the CIA now. So, while we have some time, >> Yes. >> could you just lay out what what what is the CIA? You were talking about you got the analytics department and you got the operations department. I been listening to Ray McGovern. >> Yeah. >> So, I I know that Yeah, I know it was built that way to keep the the operational part from

[23:16] independent so they won't influence the analytics part. >> It was so so uh specific that we used to wear these badges. You have a blue badge with your picture on it and [snorts] a letter H. A letter H says you have top secret special [snorts] intelligence special compartmented compartmented information um talent keyhole gamma clearance. The highest clearance in government.

[23:47] But you were not allowed on the sixth floor because that's where the operations directorate was and they had HR on their badge. Which meant they had all those clearances, too, but they also had operational clearances that you were not allowed to know about. Now, since 9/11, everybody just sits in one giant room and reads everything, but it was very very different back then. And and in addition, there was also a directorate of science and technology and a directorate of administration, the

[24:17] paper pushers, and then besides that there was an independent group um called the office of the director that included security, medical you know, these guys all the extra people that don't quite fit in in the other directorates. >> If if you look at the like what the CIA does, the the operational part uh [clears throat] >> It's actually quite so >> Kennedy's uh chief of special operations

[24:50] uh Fletcher Prouty, he wrote a very interesting book. Uh The Secret Team. >> Mhm. >> [clears throat] >> And he he's he's uh he describes a system as functioning like you got this secret team that's like an elite performance team that traveled the world and do different covert operations, false flags, and stuff like that to sort of massage reality and create a narrative like Karl Rove. He spoke about

[25:22] now we're an empire, we create reality and you are left to study it and when you've studied we have already created a new reality that you can study. >> Yeah. >> So it paints a picture that you got the covert part sort of tricking the intelligence part, making up stories like the Northwood uh Operation Northwood. >> Mhm. >> What do you think about that idea? I think that's true. >> Yeah. >> And this is that's a pretty scary

[25:53] picture, right? Because >> And we're back at that again. Yeah. There was this period Well, the CIA was founded in 1947 with passage of the National Security Act of 1947. It also created the National Security Council. And >> With a little loophole in that. >> Absolutely right. And then in 1949 the CIA uh carried out its first covert action program. It stole the Italian elections.

[26:26] And it did that in a very unsophisticated way. Um [snorts] it bribed journalists with $150,000 to write pro um conservative Christian Democratic Party articles and to write anti-communist articles. The communists were ahead in the polls, the CIA spent this money and recruited all these journalists, and the Christian Democrats won the election. That was the first first one.

[26:57] >> [snorts] >> Five short years later, the CIA is overthrowing governments in the Dominican Republic, in Guatemala, in Cyprus, and all over the world. Without any plan for what comes next. That was the policy makers problem. The CIA's job was just go in there >> Just just get rid rid of the communists or left wing. >> Patrice Lumumba, for example, wipe out the communists, and then just let the

[27:27] State Department figure out what happens next. >> Because this this tour you're you're making, it's the headline is all about how do we avoid the Third World War? How do we get peace? I mean, you study the history of of all these covert operations, and you have CIA like a short for I mean, it's military intelligence. You've got the NSA, all of these different organizations working

[27:58] in a in a way that's not really in line with with peace. So, so what what what what should people understand how this work? On what different fronts does it work? You talk about the media, and and what's more? Could you just give the different different fronts? >> This is something that almost nobody understands, including most Americans. The CIA is not a policy organization.

[28:29] The CIA is a policy support organization. So, these orders, overthrow this government, assassinate this leader, these come from the White House. It's the White House that makes these decisions. The president, the national security advisor. Sometimes they'll bring in the secretaries of state and defense. Sometimes. But, these orders come from the White House, and this is why this is such a big problem. Because it's not specifically tied to a

[29:01] Republican or to a Democrat. They're all criminals. Sometimes >> they come with sort of suggestions, shouldn't we do this? And the president says, "No." Like the Northwood operations. >> Yes. And then something funny might happen to the president. >> And this is exactly Yes, that's important. And this is exactly why This is exactly why >> A military Well, that's tragic, I would say. >> Yeah, certainly. And we could talk about that. But, this is why a military

[29:32] officer should never be the CIA director. Because military officers became generals or admirals by saying, "Yes, sir." And you don't want a a CIA director to say, "Yes, sir." You want a CIA director to say, "Mr. President, that's a terrible idea." >> Have you got Have you got an example of a good CIA director? >> John McCone. >> Okay. >> And I'll tell you the honest-to-God's truth, I can't think of another one. Maybe Stansfield Turner. So, John McCone

[30:04] was the CIA director under John F. Kennedy. And Stansfield Turner was the CIA director under Jimmy Carter. And they are both considered to be in the CIA fail directors. Because they tried to rein the organization in. And I'll give you an example. Robert F. Kennedy Jr. is a friend of mine. Please don't judge me for that. >> [laughter] >> Um He told me >> a looting good.

[30:34] >> He's trying. >> Yeah, sure. He's trying. >> But, then he says, "Oh, I have a a worm in my brain. It's like, "Stop." "Oh, I I found a dead bear in the road and I put him in the trunk of my car." Stop. Why do you say these things? Anyway, that's a different story. So, he told me a story one time that I've been thinking about ever since. He said on the day that his uncle was killed, John John Kennedy, his mother

[31:05] Bobby's mother went to pick him up at school 20 minutes after the assassination. And when he came back, they pulled into the driveway and his father, Robert Kennedy Sr., was standing there with Director McCone. Now, the McCones were very very close friends with the Kennedys, with all the Kennedys. Mrs. McCone had died of breast cancer 6 months earlier and the Kennedys were afraid that Director McCone was so depressed that he might take his own life.

[31:37] So, they invited him to dinner seven nights a week and after dinner he and Bobby Kennedy would swim in the pool. When Bobby Jr. pulls in with his mother, gets out of the car, he heard his father say to McCone, "Tell me your people didn't do this." And McCone said, "I don't know who did it." He did not say, "Of course my people didn't do it. Are you crazy?" >> That kind of fits in with Fletcher

[32:08] Prouty's uh um >> Yes. >> very much description of the whole workings of it. >> Yes. >> And he's Mr. X in in Oliver Stone's JFK. Yeah. >> So, there might have been the secret team that did that operation. >> I think there probably was. >> Yeah, but but back to how this system works. What what what different fronts do they work on apart from media or or >> It is so much more complicated now because [clears throat] when when I was there, we were just starting to think about

[32:40] technology. And now, they're up to their chins in well, Palantir. The CIA created Palantir. In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, George Tenet, who was the CIA director at the time, went to Capitol Hill and said, "We want special permission, a legal waiver, to invest in tech companies." That is crazy. There's not supposed to be any

[33:11] connection between the private sector and the CIA. But he got his waiver. In defense of the free market, right? In defense of the free market. That's the American way, >> Yes, that's of course. >> So, the CIA invested $15 million in Palantir to get them started. As soon as the CIA committed money, everybody else jumped in. And now, the CIA owns something like 40% of Palantir. >> So, you think we should be worried here

[33:42] in Sweden about Palantir? >> I would be very worried about Palantir, yes. >> When our prime minister meets Palantir and makes contracts and stuff like that. >> When you know, when I when I heard that the other day for the first time, it made the hair on the back of my neck stand up. >> Well, come to the club. >> Wow. And it's not just Palantir. We used to we used to kind of joke around. People would say, "Oh, is it cool you have so many gadgets?" And I'd say, "Actually, we buy most of those gadgets on Amazon." We do. Because it doesn't you why would

[34:13] you spend a million dollars making a gadget from scratch when you can just buy it on Amazon for $100? My first day at the CIA, um my boss was taking me around the building to give me a tour. And there's a uh there's a grassy area. The the the building is a square, and in the center is a grassy area that nobody has access to. And I looked out the window, and there was a robot cutting the grass. And I said, "Oh my gosh, that there's a robot

[34:44] out there cutting the grass." And he said, "Yeah, you know, we we invent a lot of things, and then we just can't figure out an operational use for them. So, we made this one cut the grass. Five years later, I see the Roomba advertised on television, and I said, "That's the robot I saw cutting the grass at the CIA." Now, everybody has them. They're $150 on Amazon. So, it's different now. It's more

[35:15] it's more dangerous now. It's more of a threat to our civil liberties now than it was 20 or 25 years ago. I'm I'm deeply worried about it. Can I back up a little bit, too? So, in in the in the purest sense, the job of the CIA, very simply, is to recruit spies to steal secrets, and to analyze those secrets so that the policy maker can make the best informed policy. In a perfect world, that's what they do. >> The official story.

[35:46] >> That's the official story, yeah. Really, what they do is anything they want to do. Anything. If they don't like your face, they might just blow it off. Or they don't like the sermons that you're giving, they're going to kidnap you and send you to Egypt, and by God, you're never going to give a sermon like that again, if you make it out alive. Um so, it's it's different now. Even

[36:16] Barack Obama >> What what most is done on like country level is is managing populations, like the battle for the hearts and minds of >> That's a part of it. There's There's one one division at the CIA that does things like that. It's called active measures. It's It's propaganda. It's controlling the news media. It's controlling the national debate on XYZ issue. >> So, how often when you watch the news, do you think, "Oh, that that comes from

[36:47] from that section?" >> Every day. I don't I I can't watch the American news anymore. People ask me all the time, "Where do you get your news?" And my answer is I get it from everywhere. Because you can't trust it anybody. So, I start off you have you have to know what everybody's saying. So, I start off with The New York Times, The Washington Post, The Wall Street Journal, the Los Angeles Times. And then I go to CNN, Fox, MSNBC. That's the establishment, the the pro-CIA media.

[37:20] >> And when you want to get the real stuff? >> Then I go to Grayzone, I go to Covert Action Magazine, I go to um >> Consortium News. >> Consortium News, I'm on the board of Consortium News, which I forgot to mention Consortium News. Uh reader-supported news, then I go to Al Jazeera and the Al-Monitor and Middle East Eye and uh Electronic Intifada. >> We put in all the links in the video later. >> They're excellent. They're really excellent. Especially especially um uh the Grayzone.

[37:51] Uh they do incredible for for the the minuscule budget that they have. And and the small number of of people, they break major stories. And you know that they're on the right track because that the government will call them Russian stooges, >> [snorts] >> you know, or conspiracy theorists. >> This is a good indication when where you can find this out. >> That's exactly right. Yeah. As much as I hate The Intercept and I genuinely have hatred in my heart

[38:23] for the Intercept. They actually do some good reporting. >> It was good when Green Glenn Green worked there. >> No, it wasn't. >> Oh, okay. >> No, they outed five whistleblowers, and all five of us went to prison. >> Oh, really? >> I tweeted at Glenn. Glenn and I went to college together, and we really don't like each other very much. And I tweeted at at at Glenn when I got out of prison, and I said, "Glenn, are you guys undercover FBI agents, or

[38:56] are you just stupid?" >> [laughter] >> Because no reporter who calls himself a national security journalist outs five national security whistleblowers and sends them all to prison. But the Intercept did.
