MOSSAD
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The Mossad is the primary external intelligence service of the State of Israel. In John Kiriakou's account, drawn from his fifteen years at the Central Intelligence Agency and his subsequent decades as a commentator, the Mossad is operationally formidable, organizationally distinctive in its near-total focus on operations rather than analysis, and uniformly hostile in its professional dealings with U.S. counterparts:

> My experience is universally negative. Universally negative. I've never had a positive encounter with Mossad. I have never met a CIA officer who has had a positive encounter with Mossad. Because the Mossad doesn't give two shits what you think or what you are trying to focus on in your job. They care only about Israel. And if that means shoving their fists up your ass or trying to recruit you or telling you to go fuck yourself while they try to recruit the guy sitting next to you or the guy in the defense contractor's office, they don't care what you think of them because for them it's an issue of survival.

Organizational character

Kiriakou draws the basic organizational distinction as: Shin Bet is Israel's domestic security service, the equivalent of the FBI or Britain's MI5, while Mossad is its foreign intelligence arm, equivalent to the CIA or MI6. Mossad itself he describes as nearly exclusively operational rather than analytical, "It's all about ops", a posture conditioned by the need to manage the heterogeneous Palestinian political environment in Israel's immediate neighborhood (the Palestinian Authority, Hamas, the Quds Force, Islamic Jihad, and others). The requirements of "allowing a simmer" among these factions without permitting it to boil compel constant infiltration and active management.

His professional assessment of their capability is high and consistently separated from his assessment of their conduct. Of all the intelligence services he encountered during his CIA career, he says the Israelis were the most impressive, specifically because they have no rules: "They'll kill anybody." He calls Israeli intelligence probably the best in the world, crediting cutting-edge technology and a bureaucracy far thinner than the CIA's own, and considers Mossad and Shin Bet among the most sophisticated services anywhere. He has framed the same judgment more starkly: Israel is the best simply because it has nowhere to go, with its back to the Mediterranean, it is a matter of win or die, while separately rating Cuban intelligence as especially accomplished at counterintelligence.

That same siege mentality is, in his reading, what produces the conduct: "The Israelis really believe that they're alone in the world, even though they're not. And because they've convinced themselves that they're alone in the world, they treat everybody else with disrespect."

The liaison relationship with the CIA

The bugged gifts and the Israel safe house

A documented practice of Mossad liaison delegations to CIA headquarters, recounted by Kiriakou on numerous occasions, with the rate of bugged gifts always put at 100 percent, was to bring gifts at the start of each visit that, on X-ray inspection, routinely turned out to contain listening devices and batteries. Per Kiriakou:

> Every time they would come, they'd say, 'Hey, we brought gifts. Here's a gift for you.' And it's all packed full of listening devices and batteries, every one of them. ... And we'd say, 'You guys, you can't come back here every single time and try to bug our conference rooms.' What'd they say to that? 'Oh, sorry. We're not sure how that happened.'

He has retold the exchange with the Israeli response given as a shrug, "We knew you'd find it. We're just kidding." The concrete example he was given as a new officer was an agency seal, the CIA has them in every room, so another one attracts no attention, packed with enough batteries to run a microphone for eighteen months.

The agency's response, by the 1990s, was to relocate all U.S.,Israeli liaison meetings off the CIA campus to a rented external office, eventually, Kiriakou says, a safe house in Virginia, after a director finally banned Israeli officers from CIA buildings entirely. "So we rent an office where we meet the Israelis off campus. Yeah, 'cuz you just can't trust them." The officers called the off-campus property "the Israel safe house."

The recruitment-attempt protocol

A separate documented pattern is Mossad's, and Shin Bet's, institutional practice of attempting recruitment of every CIA officer they encounter in a liaison setting. Kiriakou records this happening to him at his own first liaison briefing, held within two and a half months of his joining the agency, and dated elsewhere to March 1990. His boss had explained in advance that the meeting would not be at headquarters because Israeli officers were barred from entering CIA buildings over the gift-bugging. During the briefing a Mossad officer and a Shin Bet officer wrote down every word he said; the Shin Bet man asked him to spell his surname, noted it down, looked at him over his glasses, and said: "You are uh Jewish." Kiriakou's response: "I am not recruitable. Don't even think about trying to recruit me."

On returning to the office, his furious report to his boss was met with general laughter and the observation that "they've done that to every single one of us. It's like they can't help themselves." His boss's explanation was that Mossad and Shin Bet try it on every single CIA officer, on the theory that if they pitch a thousand people, one will eventually say yes. Kiriakou has said the officers that day were "so offensive and so aggressive" that he returned to headquarters and told his boss, "Never again. I will never work with the Israelis ever again", a resolution he says he kept for the rest of his career. He deliberately avoided assignments involving Israel for the remainder of his career, declining the annual U.S.,Israel officer exchange programme and working in Arab countries instead, where he felt more comfortable and built his career.

"CIA equals Mossad" is false

Kiriakou pushes back on the online claim that "CIA equals Mossad." While the operational relationship is close, Mossad actively spies on the United States and was ranked at the CIA as a "critical threat" for counterintelligence, alongside Russia, China, Cuba and North Korea, recruiting Americans to betray their country. That, he says, is unlike the Five Eyes relationship of genuine sharing; the tie with Israel is "fraternal" at the political top but "not so nice" at the working level, even under a director as pro-Israel as Mike Pompeo. He has made the same "critical threat" comparison elsewhere, naming Israel alongside Russia, China, Cuba, and Iran, a grouping he calls bizarre given Israel's public status as one of America's closest friends, and noting Five Eyes relations, by contrast, were always smooth sailing, with genuine information sharing rather than merely "not spying on" one another; Israeli officers, unlike Five Eyes counterparts, are barred from CIA headquarters entirely and met off-site instead. Asked the question again, he is blunter about the equivalence claim itself: "That's a statement made out of ignorance." He grants that political appointees create pockets of overlap, naming Mike Pompeo, of whom he says it is "not possible to be more pro-Israel", while insisting the rank and file "don't really like each other," and that administrations come and go while the working-level relationship stays cold.

The one-way rule

A categorical CIA prohibition on intelligence operations against Israel was in effect during Kiriakou's tenure: "We're not permitted to spy on the Israelis. We're not permitted. The potential for blowback is outrageous. Can you imagine if we spied on the Israelis and got caught? Every member of Congress would be demanding the CIA director's head." The prohibition reflects AIPAC's political reach and is treated by Kiriakou as the structural exception in the U.S. intelligence community's posture toward other states. He dates it specifically to the Nixon administration, the CIA has not spied on Israel since Nixon was president, he says, and if the agency's interest in a Mossad-linked figure like Jeffrey Epstein ever existed, it would be limited to "doubling him back" as a source, never to collecting against Israel itself. He is emphatic that CIA and Mossad cooperate only on foreign operations in foreign countries, on anything touching Epstein, or any other matter involving American citizens or American soil, he says there would be "zero" chance of cooperation.

He states the rule flatly: "It's written in stone. The United States does not spy on Israel. But Israel actively, consistently has spied on the United States." He adds that people dispute the claim every time he makes it. He describes the resulting relationship as asymmetric and, in his word, "one-way": Mossad spies on the CIA, but the CIA has been barred from spying on Israel since Nixon, while Israel actively spies on the CIA, FBI, NSA, and Department of Defense, especially its contractors, and gives relatively little useful intelligence in return, beyond material Kiriakou says is meant mainly to encourage the U.S. to bomb Iran. He calls the overall relationship "always ... just a terrible relationship," and treats the Pollard case not as an isolated incident but as "indicative of the broader problem," saying there are "lots of Jonathan Pollards out there." The relationship has never been close, he says, dating back to the start of his own career, because Mossad constantly tries to recruit CIA officers, plant bugs in CIA headquarters, and harass CIA officers as a matter of policy, even as, on pure operational competence, there is deep and genuine CIA respect for Mossad's abilities, a respect heightened further by the pager-and-cell-phone operation against Hezbollah.

In a Piers Morgan appearance in approximately 2024 Kiriakou debated a former Mossad director who denied any post-1985 Israeli espionage against the United States. Kiriakou's response was that Jonathan Pollard had been caught in 1985, "and you were spying on the United States in 1998, you know, or 2004." The former director declined to comment.

Espionage inside the United States

Kiriakou has stated that Mossad actively conducts espionage operations inside the United States, placing hundreds of intelligence officers primarily within American defense contractors, with the specific goal of stealing American defense secrets. The proportions he gives vary between retellings but the structure does not: the United States shares the overwhelming majority of its defense-industry technology with Israel through official channels, and Mossad's domestic effort is directed at the remainder Washington withholds. "We give 99% of what we have in the defense industry to Israel. And they are out there stealing that last 1% that we're withholding from them." Elsewhere he has put the same paradox at 95% given and 5% stolen, F-35 designs, advanced missile systems. He gives the F-35 avionics dispute as a concrete case: refused the undegraded avionics given to no other export customer, Israel worked through American defense contractors to steal the upgrade instead.

The figure he cites for the scale of that presence comes from his own new-hire counterintelligence briefing: the CIA's director of security told his class that the FBI had identified 187 undeclared Israeli intelligence officers operating across the United States, concentrated at defense contractors. He notes when repeating it that this is now roughly 35-year-old information, delivered in the same briefing as a warning never to eat at a specific steakhouse near CIA headquarters, the nearest restaurant to the building, because the KGB was believed to monitor it for CIA employees who forgot to remove their badges.

Asked why American officials spy for or cooperate with Israel, Kiriakou cites the counterintelligence community's standard assessment: for 85% of spies the motivation is money, a straightforward cash transaction. A small number act for ideological reasons; a small number act out of revenge, having been passed over for promotion or angered at a boss or government: "For the most part, this is a cash transaction."

Harassment of U.S. officers

The Jerusalem couple

Kiriakou has repeatedly described the same harassment campaign, conducted by Mossad against a married couple of declared CIA officers posted to Israel, one on rotation doing legitimate State Department work, the other ostensibly studying Arab studies at the University of Tel Aviv, with no secrets and nothing being run against the Israelis. In his tellings each incident follows one of the ambassador's hail-and-farewell parties.

After a welcome reception at the ambassador's residence in Tel Aviv, the couple came home to find all of their living-room furniture rearranged, Mossad's way, Kiriakou says, of sending the message "we're watching you and we can do whatever we want and there's nothing you can do about it." At Christmas, the couple attended the ambassador's holiday party; when they got home, someone had defecated in every toilet in the house and left them unflushed, the houses being large, he notes, because declared officers are expected to entertain.

As they were preparing to leave after roughly two years at the posting, the ambassador hosted a farewell party for them. When they returned home, someone had broken into the house and cut off the dog's tail, wrapping the stump in gauze and medical tape; the dog was found whimpering under the dining-room table. Kiriakou's characterization: "We're supposed to be allies. God knows the Israelis ask us for everything under the sun, and then that's how you treat our people." He has told the same story elsewhere with the summary line "That's the relationship we have with the Israelis", messages, he says, that "we can do whatever we want", and, on another occasion, with the question he says it raises: "Why? You're supposed to be our best friends in the world. Why would they do something like this? It's because they're not our friends."

The ambassador's briefcase

Kiriakou has described a story he said he had never told before. The U.S. Ambassador to Israel was being driven from the embassy to his residence when the car appeared to suffer a blowout. As the driver pulled over, two Israelis pulled up offering to help change the tire; while the ambassador stepped out to watch, they stole his briefcase, which contained classified documents. Subsequent investigation found the tire had not blown out at all, it had been deflated by a precisely placed small-caliber shot. Kiriakou's framing: had Spain or the UK done this, the relationship would be "damaged for a generation"; with Israel, there were no consequences.

Stolen Christmas presents, and the response protocol

A colleague of Kiriakou's who was excited to visit Israel went to Mossad for a standard intelligence exchange, sharing what the CIA was doing on a particular issue, receiving an update on what Mossad was doing. It was the Christmas season and the officer had spent approximately $1,000 on Christmas presents. When he returned to his hotel room, all of the presents had been stolen. His suitcase was empty.

The CIA's response protocol when Mossad harassed U.S. officers, Kiriakou says, produced nothing durable: a senior CIA officer would go to Mossad and say "Hey, cut it out, come on, why are you harassing our people?" Mossad would say "Oh, okay, sorry." Things would be good for a year or two, and then it would happen again.

Operational record

Dubai, 2010

Kiriakou describes the 2010 assassination of Mahmoud al-Mabhouh in a Dubai hotel room as technically remarkable on two counts. After killing the target, the team was somehow able to lock the hotel room door from the inside despite having exited; the CIA studied this at length and could not immediately replicate the technique. Twenty-six people were identified on Dubai CCTV footage from the operation; none were apprehended. Asked about the cameras at the facility, Kiriakou noted they were German, not Israeli-made.

The Hezbollah pager operation

Knowing Hezbollah had switched to pagers to avoid cell-phone interception, the Israelis purchased a pager-manufacturing company in Hungary, ensured Hezbollah ordered pagers from that company, inserted explosives into the devices during manufacturing, and allowed the pagers to route through Taiwan, Thailand, and Syria before reaching Lebanon. The Israelis then simultaneously activated all the explosives, killing every Hezbollah official of consequence. Those not killed in the pager explosions were killed when the Israelis bombed the apartment buildings where they lived.

Kiriakou's characterization: "totally illegal" and "a work of genius." He has described receiving a call from a Russian television network the day after the operation asking whether it constituted a war crime. His response: "It might be, because innocent people were killed. But I said it was freaking brilliant." He added: "Even after fifteen years at the CIA, nobody at the CIA would have come up with an operation that was this incredible and outside the box. Deep respect to the Israelis, whether it was legal or illegal." His conclusion: "Somebody at Mossad's getting promoted today, because that's the most incredible operation I've ever seen in my life. Kudos to them."

Iran: the Afghan-refugee network

Kiriakou has described Mossad's operation against Iranian military and scientific leadership during what he called "the 12-day war." Iran housed more than two million Afghan refugees who, as undocumented residents, could not access medical care or the welfare system and survived by begging. The Israelis approached these refugees and offered $200 a month in exchange for information: the home addresses and cell-phone numbers of Iranian generals and nuclear scientists. The Israelis killed the top twelve generals across the entire Iranian military and nearly every nuclear scientist by geolocating their cell phones and firing missiles at the coordinates. When Iran ordered senior military officials and scientists to stop carrying cell phones, the Israelis began tracking the bodyguards instead, who had not received the same order, and killed them alongside the principals. During the same Iran 12-Day War, Iranian-Jewish Mossad and Shin Bet officers ran a Farsi-language phone-call campaign against Iranian nuclear scientists, followed by apartment-block strikes that killed fourteen scientists and their families.

Other operations

- The 1997 attempted assassination of Khaled Mashal by poison in Jordan.
- A false-flag recruitment in Benghazi, Libya, in which a Mossad officer posed by phone as a wealthy French businessman representing a consortium of European interests to recruit the Benghazi harbor master as an unwitting intelligence source; the harbor master reported shipping manifests to Mossad for years, never learning he had been recruited by Israel.
- A long record of false flag operations that Kiriakou says dates to the founding of the state of Israel, and which he was taught about at the CIA as "legendary" tradecraft.
- In the days before the United States attacked Iraq in 2003, Israel asked to join the U.S.-led coalition; the U.S. refused, knowing the Arab members would withdraw if Israel participated, and asked Israel to stay out. Shortly after, 150 miles of Iraqi electrical-transmission towers in the Western Desert were toppled one at a time, explosives placed on a single leg of each distinctive three-legged Iraqi tower, unlike American four-legged designs, was enough to bring each down. Kiriakou's supervisor's reaction: "These damn Israelis. They just can't leave well enough alone. They just don't ever do as they're told."

Methods and morality

Unlike the CIA, which Kiriakou describes as having moved away from coercive recruitment methods in the 1970s, Mossad uses coercion as a standard tool. In the context of the Jeffrey Epstein operation: "The Israelis do use coercion. Then you wire every room including the bathrooms for both audio and video. Just in case you need to smash somebody over the head."

His assessment of where the limits fall: "I think for the most part, most intelligence agencies have zero morals. I think that most intelligence agencies also will draw the line somewhere. Like with child sex, for example. That would never happen at the CIA or at any other intelligence service that I'm aware of. And I think the Israelis were comfortable with it."

On communications tradecraft, he says Mossad and Shin Bet communicate with their agents through the chat functions built into ordinary gaming apps, such as backgammon apps, because intelligence services do not monitor gaming chat traffic and, even if intercepted, no human analyst is likely to review it.

He draws a sharp distinction between two categories of intelligence Mossad provides the CIA on Iran. On targeting intelligence he describes Mossad as highly effective, recruiting Afghan refugees inside Iran at approximately ten dollars per month to report the residential and operational locations of Iranian generals and nuclear scientists, the granular location intelligence that enables cruise-missile targeting. On policy intelligence, the day-to-day operations and decision-making of the Iranian government, he says the information comes largely from Iranian Jews living in the West and from the Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK), a group with a direct vested interest in the United States going to war with Iran, since its ultimate objective is to govern the country. Their intelligence, he argues, should be understood as motivated rather than objective.

Glenn-Symington and the nuclear fiction

Kiriakou has described the Glenn-Symington Act, co-authored by Senators John Glenn and Stuart Symington, which prohibits the United States from providing aid of any kind to any country that has a nuclear weapons program and has not signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Israel is the only country in the world meeting both criteria.

Neither Israel nor the United States officially acknowledges that Israel has a nuclear program. As long as both governments maintain this fiction, American law does not formally apply and billions in U.S. aid can continue to flow. Kiriakou has described a former CIA boss who wrote a historical book on 1950s American foreign policy; the only phrase the CIA redacted from the manuscript was "Israeli nuclear program." His assessment: "We need to clean up our act because this is not just disgraceful, it's dishonest and it's unfair to the American taxpayer."

The Epstein connection

Kiriakou cites the cases of Peter Mandelson, former British ambassador to the United States, and former Prince Andrew as evidence that Jeffrey Epstein was collecting classified defense material on Mossad's behalf. Mandelson initially denied ever meeting Epstein, then said he may have met him once at a party, and was subsequently shown a photograph of himself in his underwear with a sixteen-year-old girl on Epstein's island. Kiriakou states that Mandelson gave Epstein classified documents from the UK's Defense Ministry, and adds that it was revealed shortly before the interview that Prince Andrew had also given Epstein classified Defense Ministry documents. He has separately cited reporting that former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak had a monthly check-in with Epstein at Epstein's Manhattan property, that an Israeli intelligence figure named Yoni Corin also paid regular visits, and that Epstein introduced Benjamin Netanyahu to Chase Bank for financial relations.

On the surveillance installation at that Manhattan building, Kiriakou first noted reporting that an Israeli UN security team had fitted the systems, comparing it to Jonathan Pollard, whose spying was "managed from the Israeli defense minister's office." He has since read the underlying emails rather than the reporting, and describes the arrangement in detail: from 2016 the Israeli mission to the UN coordinated with Epstein's staff to fit alarm sensors and surveillance equipment at the building where he housed underage models, with the former head of security to Ehud Barak personally controlling access to the apartment, running background checks on the cleaners, and remotely disabling the alarms when someone needed to enter. Epstein approved it all himself. Kiriakou also notes Netanyahu's response, that the revelation proved Israeli innocence because Barak had long operated as a political opponent of the Israeli order, and dismisses it: "he's flailing around."

The documents nobody could use

Kiriakou has advanced a specific evidentiary argument for the foreign-power reading, drawn from the 2026 British prosecutions. Prince Andrew was arrested for allegedly giving Jeffrey Epstein classified Ministry of Defence documents, and Peter Mandelson was charged over classified British trade-negotiation positions.

The argument turns on the uselessness of the material to Epstein himself. "Why in blazes would Jeffrey Epstein want classified UK defence ministry documents unless he's spying for a foreign power?" He makes the point again about the trade documents, Epstein did not care about trade negotiations. "It was for a foreign power."

"Written in stone"

Kiriakou's summary of why the relationship has always been bad is a single asymmetry, which he states as an absolute and acknowledges people dispute: "Mossad actively spies on the United States. The United States does not spy on Israel. That's written in stone. People poo poo this every time I say it. I'm telling them it's written in stone."

The Jerusalem couple

His illustration is a husband-and-wife team of close colleagues, posted to Jerusalem and formally declared to Mossad, the station chief having identified them as his officers, one working ordinary political business at the embassy and the other studying Arabic at the university.

What followed was a sequence of escalating messages, each timed to an evening they were known to be out. After a dinner party at the ambassador's residence they came home to find all their living-room furniture rearranged. A year later, after the ambassador's Christmas party in Tel Aviv and the forty-five-minute drive back to Jerusalem, they found that people had defecated in all of their toilets and left them unflushed. Kiriakou reads both as the same statement: "we can come into your home anytime we want and there's nothing you can do about it."

The last came at the end of the tour. After a farewell party given by the ambassador they returned home to find the dog under the dining room table whimpering; somebody had cut its tail off and wrapped the stump in gauze and medical tape.

Kiriakou's response to the sequence is a question rather than an explanation: "Why mess with us like that when we're your only lifeline?", the only friend at the United Nations, and the source of billions of dollars of American taxpayers' money.

Made redundant by statute

In a 2026 interview the point was put to Kiriakou directly: he had talked extensively about Mossad infiltrating American agencies, and the proposed permanent intelligence-sharing provisions appeared to make that unnecessary. His answer was unqualified, "Yeah, it does. It makes it unnecessary."

The framing he accepted for it came from his interviewer, who observed that the policy amounted to mitigating a threat by becoming it. Kiriakou: "That's exactly right. How sick is that?"

See Israel's counterintelligence threat ranking for the classification he cites in support.

The Iranian networks

The operation Kiriakou treats as Mossad's most impressive recent achievement is its human-intelligence penetration of Iran, described at length in Mossad networks in Iran. His professional verdict is unusually warm for a service he otherwise describes as uniformly hostile: "kudos first to the Israelis for this counterintelligence network that they had in Iran. By all accounts it was thousands, literally thousands of people reporting clandestinely back to the Mossad."

Beyond the recruited locals, he notes a category of officer the Iranians will find hardest to detect: Mossad officers who are ethnic Persians, speak Farsi without an accent, and can blend into Iranian society. The analytic technique that made the whole thing pay he names the mosaic concept.

'Because they're all dicks'

Asked in August 2025 why the CIA does not trust Mossad, Kiriakou gave the reason without diplomatic packaging: "forgive my language, but the CIA hates Mossad because they're all dicks." Liaison cooperation is one thing, and a political decision taken at the start of the Nixon administration committed the United States to guaranteeing Israeli security "in any way possible", but "be that as it may, the Israelis continue to spy on the United States, actively recruiting American citizens to steal defense secrets for them."

The fullest telling of the Jerusalem couple comes here. In 1993 Kiriakou and two colleagues entered Arabic training together; he went to Bahrain, the other two married and were posted to Jerusalem. Both were declared to Mossad by the station chief as analysts, the husband to study Arabic at the university, the wife to collect biographic information on Palestinian leaders, with the assurance "no threat to you guys."

What followed was calibrated to the embassy social calendar. After the ambassador's welcome party at the residence in Tel Aviv, they came home to find all their living room furniture rearranged, "now, that's just a dick move." After the ambassador's Christmas party, they came home to find that people "had taken shits in all of their toilets and left it." After the farewell party, "the dog was under the dining room table and it was whimpering, because someone had cut off its tail and wrapped the stump in gauze and medical tape."

A second declared officer went to the old city in December to do his Christmas shopping; just before he left for the airport, someone entered his hotel room and stole every one of the presents.

The pattern is cyclical rather than escalating. The station chief goes to Mossad and says "stop screwing around with my people. It's rude. It's bad for relations," they agree, "and then they'll back off for a year or two. And then they start doing it again. And they do it just to screw with us, not for any other reason. No other service does that. No other service."

No bureaucracy in the way

Asked in March 2026 to explain the Israeli appetite for assassination, Kiriakou dated it to the founding period, "going back to the fifties, the Israelis were very happy to assassinate anybody that they deemed to be a potential threat to the stability of the State of Israel", and gave the Munich reprisals as the pattern: after the 1972 Olympic massacre "it took them years to track down, hunt down every single Palestinian terrorist who was involved in that operation, and kill them one at a time."

The Iranian nuclear programme he describes as an unusually easy target because its scientists travelled to academic seminars abroad. "The Israelis would knock on the hotel door, say: we're with Mossad. You're going to either work for us, or you're going to die. And I'm going to assume some said, okay, I'll take the deal. But most others died."

The difference he identifies is procedural rather than moral. "They don't have a bureaucracy that the United States has. There's no gang of four, gang of eight that you have to inform. There's no Executive Order 12333. You just do it. You want to kill somebody? You just go out and kill them."

See also

- Sleeper Agent
- Havana Syndrome
- AIPAC
- Jonathan Pollard
- Mahmoud al-Mabhouh
- Khaled Mashal
- Iran 12-Day War
- Black Cube
