Watching naval movements
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Watching naval movements is, John Kiriakou says, one of the very first lessons he learned at the CIA: "if you want to determine American military intentions, watch naval movements." Troops can be flown anywhere, but sending an entire aircraft carrier strike group "means business," and sending two "means war." He used the rule, together with a tip from a friend at the White House, to publicly predict, days in advance, that the U.S. would strike Iran: two carrier groups had been sent.

The lesson, and how to apply it

Kiriakou states the rule as one of the most important things he learned at the agency: "if you want to know if there's going to be a real war, not just little pinprick strikes one at the other, a real war, watch naval moves. And when I say naval moves, I mean carrier battle groups."

He supplies the scale that makes the indicator readable. The first Gulf War was prosecuted with six carrier battle groups; the 2003 invasion of Iraq with three or four.

Applying it in August 2025, amid reports that Russia had pulled diplomats out and the United States was drawing down in Iraq, his reading was that nothing was imminent. Three carrier battle groups were in the region, but the movement was routine, one in the Arabian Sea being replaced by another arriving from the Pacific while the first returned to San Diego. "If we were preparing for an honest to god hot war, we would be moving large numbers of warships to the region, and we're not doing that yet."

He applied the same discipline to the Iraq drawdown itself, declining to read intent into it: it could be a result of the long-running talks with the Iraqis about troop numbers, "or it could be just regular scheduled turnover."

The earliest statement of the rule in the record dates from 2018, when he offered it unprompted as the thing to watch on Iran. Asked what would signal an attack, he said to keep an eye out for movement of carrier battle groups, and gave the reason: you cannot launch a war or an attack without a great deal of air support in the region.

That telling also supplies the composition behind the unit he counts in. A carrier battle group, he says, is an aircraft carrier and twelve associated ships.

The indicator, used in real time

In December 2025 Kiriakou described applying the rule to Venezuela and being proved right in the least welcome way. "I said a month ago or so: we're not going to attack Venezuela, because we haven't sent an aircraft carrier battle group. And sure enough, we sent the USS Gerald R. Ford and its associated 11 battleships and supply ships. And I said: oh, dang it. Now we're serious."

He restated the origin of the rule at the same time: "if you want to know if the US government is serious about attacking a country, always watch for naval movements. This was something I learned early on at the CIA, that if we're really going to attack a country, we need aircraft carrier battle groups in place."

The scale that makes it readable

Asked how the Venezuelan build-up compared with earlier operations, he gave the counts: six carrier battle groups in the Persian Gulf plus one in the eastern Mediterranean to push Iraq out of Kuwait; four for the invasion of Iraq; four in the region for Afghanistan in 2001. Against Venezuela, one, "not enough," he said, "especially for such a large country," and one that is "mountain and jungle."

He had applied the same arithmetic to Iran a decade earlier and reached a negative reading. In 2018 there was one carrier battle group in the Persian Gulf, against a requirement he put at roughly six, three or four in the Gulf, one in the Mediterranean, one in the Indian Ocean, perhaps one in the Red Sea, because an attack needs lots and lots of missiles and bombers in the region. His conclusion was that the United States was not going to fight, and his forward test was procedural: "if the Pentagon announces that we're going to start moving naval assets closer and closer to Iran, that means we're gonna fight."

He also allows that the movement itself can be theatre: asked whether a build-up can be a bluff, he said "sure, we do this all the time in the South China Sea," and that making Maduro run would be "the preferred end to this thing."

See also

- Iran strike factions (2026)
- Veteran Intelligence Professionals for Sanity
