Learned Helplessness
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Learned helplessness in the context of the CIA enhanced interrogation program refers to a deliberately induced psychological state in which a prisoner is broken to the point of total compliance. John Kiriakou described the concept as the CIA's own framing for the purpose of techniques like waterboarding: "The idea is to instill the feeling of learned helplessness in the prisoner so that the prisoner is so terrified of you, so terrified of what you can do to him, that he'll whimper as soon as you walk into the room and just confess everything that you want him to confess to." The goal, in his shorter formulation, is to make the prisoner conclude that he is utterly helpless so that he simply breaks, they want to make you crazy.

The mechanism

The design was Pavlovian, and its architects said so. Kiriakou, having read James Mitchell's own book, notes that the towel placed around a prisoner's neck was conditioning: after enough repetitions, interrogators needed only to roll up the towel and the prisoner would crumple. The public justification for reaching for any of it was the ticking time bomb scenario.

Applied to Abu Zubaydah

Abu Zubaydah is the case Kiriakou returns to. The waterboarding nearly killed him: his heart stopped and he had to be revived, and he had convulsions and seizures for weeks afterwards.

Beyond the ten catalogued techniques, the interrogators worked from what the prisoner had told them about himself. Somewhere in the interrogations Abu Zubaydah mentioned an irrational fear of insects, Kiriakou does not know why he said it, and the CIA built a regime around it. He was put in a diaper and shut in a coffin-like box, a box of cockroaches was emptied in on top of him, and the lid was closed; it was opened once a day, long enough to change the diaper and throw in food, and he was left in it for weeks. He was also held for three weeks in a dog cage too small to stand, lie down or stretch his legs in.

It is the cage that supplies Kiriakou's clearest illustration of the concept. By the end, the interrogators had only to open its door and Abu Zubaydah would whimper and climb in by himself. They broke him mentally in a matter of weeks and made him insane, knowing that the cockroach box would do it.

Kiriakou's account of the sequence undercuts the intelligence rationale entirely. The CIA began torturing Abu Zubaydah on 1 August; he immediately clammed up and gave nothing further, for months. Ali Soufan then went back out, re-established the rapport, and the prisoner started talking again, at which point Mitchell and Jessen did the whole thing over again. What followed, Kiriakou says, was torture for its own sake: "far less about gathering intelligence than it was about just ruining this guy's life."

Why it produces bad intelligence

Kiriakou identified the fundamental flaw in this doctrine: the confessions produced are calibrated to what the prisoner believes the interrogator wants to hear, not to what is actually true: "The prisoner will tell you what he thinks you want to know just to get you to stop torturing him." He cited American POWs in North Vietnam who, under torture, recited sports rosters and invented names rather than provide real intelligence.

Beyond the black sites

The state does not require a black site to produce. Kiriakou applies the same term to indefinite detention at Guantánamo, where a prisoner cannot defend himself and cannot even receive a sentence, no light at the end of the tunnel, not even the certainty a twenty-year term would give, which is precisely the condition the technique was designed to manufacture.

See also

- Waterboarding
- Enhanced interrogation techniques
- Abu Zubaydah
- Mitchell and Jessen
- Ticking time bomb
- Cold cell
- Sleep deprivation
