Title: John Kiriakou – US Espionage and Foreign Policy
Show: Pete A Turner
Date: 2025-12-17
URL: https://youtu.be/x6pirxcMhK8
Duration: 46:00

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[00:01] Bam. >> I'm John Kuryaku and you're watching the Break It Down Show. >> John is an awesome dude. My I was having some trouble with my jump talk and I was having a hard time getting logged in on another computer so I had to race across town and you were great to ride with me. Thank you for that. Thank you for your patience. >> Very happy to do it. >> Thank you for the work that you're doing. You know, there's a lot of us out there trying to figure this out, but I'm just kind of following your example on the media thing because you're getting important messages out and I'm always having to qualify. This is not a

[00:32] political statement. You know, this is a policy statement >> because we struggle to accept these realities as as a nation, as a people, as a political party, whatever it is, we >> struggle with nuance, I I guess. I don't know. What do we struggle with, do you think? >> We struggle with a lot. Yeah. Nuance is certainly one of those things that we struggle with. Yes. >> Yeah. You know, it's funny. There's to most Americans, >> most issues are black and white, >> right? There's a a right way or wrong way. Good thing, a bad thing. And that's just not in my experience, that's not

[01:04] real life. >> Yeah. Yeah. I was told all the time when we were deployed that farmers need this. So, you know, I'm a I'm a spy. I'm going to go talk to farmers and I get to know them, you know, oh, they need this collective or they need this other thing. >> They didn't they didn't ever say maybe they would get there, >> but they weren't there that day. >> Yeah, I agree with that. >> And that was true across every initiative that we had that there was this belief that we knew the problem, we knew the path, and we knew the outcome.

[01:34] But Iraqis have all the energy they ever need to have electricity everywhere. and they could point to they're like how how do we not fix this? And then I think about us if someone lights out the power or makes it intermittent 18 minutes at a time, none for three hours, electricity for five hours, it would drive us crazy. >> Yeah, we would. You know, I I've got a very very close friend who goes to Iran with regularity once, twice a year, and um

[02:07] she would always come back and tell me how great things are there and how smoothly things are operating there. And I would think, okay, yeah, sure. And then she started taking videos of just everyday normal life, >> right? and then showing me other people's videos on YouTube. And she's right. You know, there's no US involvement inside Iran. There hasn't been since 19, you know, 79. We've got no embassy

[02:38] there. We have no diplomatic presence. There's no business presence. There's there's nothing. And they lack for nothing. They want for nothing. They have great relations with Iran, I mean sorry, with China and with Russia. They get all the spare parts they need. They have healthy trade relationships with, >> you know, all of the the the regions powers and and larger economies. And then you look at something like

[03:09] Iraq, which is right next door, that has a a very heavy American presence. And we've wrecked that country. >> Yeah. we've we've wrecked it, which was the plan. >> But, you know, still, >> yeah, there's a you know, I built these rules learning about us, you know, and one of the things was is uh oh, Iraq is totally different than Afghanistan. Oh, that's true, but we're not. We're [clears throat] the same and we're running the same playbook. >> That was one of the first rules.

[03:40] >> The other ones are uh wherever we go, we create instability. This is the rule. And then the second rule is we refuse to accept rule number one. Yeah. >> And so we are end up becoming a net destabilizer. I'm not down on our foreign policy, but it's just very hard to get these things right. And when we are getting them wrong, we refuse to accept it. We accept responsibility or anything. >> You're exactly right. >> We we don't we don't accept responsibility. It's true. >> Yeah. [snorts] Mhm. >> You

[04:10] It's It gets frustrating fast. The illprincipled behavior of the people who are making these decisions, the choices, the people they pick and everything. Um there's no culpability for that. I'm hard on all of the secretaries of state like blinking and all this because I saw him fail his way all the way to the top. I know that's a saying, but he was awful and >> shouldn't have been given control of American foreign policy because he he had done the opposite of earning it. >> Yeah. Yeah. I agree. >> Is that fixable?

[04:40] >> I think over the long term it is. >> Okay. >> But uh but in the near term, and we're very much a near-term, you know, kind of kind of country. Uh I think no I think one of the things that we underestimate is um one of the things we underestimate is the long-term effects that our foreign policy has on um on relations >> because we change presidents every four years or eight years. We think that that

[05:11] we can just, you know, say, "Ah, our bad when we screw something up. Our bad, no problem. You know, we'll get it right now." And and that's just not that's just not the way it is. >> Yeah. We're like a drunk uncle. Here's here's a thousand bucks, kid. Sorry. >> Exactly. Exactly. >> Try going gay. That'll probably help you. Seriously. Oh my god. >> Oh my god. that that rotation of presidents and and uh in and out of

[05:43] Congress which only exacerbates that our economy runs our entire nation runs on a an annual budget. Yeah. >> That doesn't agree with itself yeartoear in a lot of ways. >> That's right. That's right. Which is another important problem that we have where for example you know we spend a trillion dollars a year on on defense really on offense but we call it defense >> right? um which year after year after year after year is more money than the Pentagon asks for

[06:15] and then we are apoplelectic that auditors can't find where the money went. >> Oh yeah. Yeah. And also apoplelectic don't you dare search for that money. >> That's right. Don't you don't you dare figure [laughter] out because >> the the real life ground truth example of this is you know in 2000 we'll just make up a year 2006 it's all about schools building schools this year Pete and so you run around the battlefield I'm building schools like hey have you asked anybody if they need a school where the schools are what curriculum they teaching yeah exactly

[06:45] >> and then the question I was asked by hire all the most was how many schools are in that area and I'm like oh man like you know whatever year it is it's past the time of that information. We never we had all this information but no way to to actually learn it and put it to work. So I would say back to our American partner I would say well um one ask the partner because the governor the Ministry of Education person likely knows that information. I am glad to go ask that person for you but now I'm partnering on someone else's partner.

[07:16] >> Yeah. >> Bad move. >> The [snorts] other thing is is that's not the question to ask. The question to ask is how many kids are going to school when we're not there? How [clears throat] are the parents feel? What curriculum is being taught? Do they have a PTA? Do they need a PT? You know, where are we in the process? We can't keep going. How many schools are in this area? But all that work and then 2007 comes in and again we're just making years up in this case and it's like talk about farming. >> Yeah. >> We did the same thing in Afghanistan. >> Yes. >> Where you know it it's all about it's

[07:47] all about uh building a new electrical grid. >> Yeah. until it's not and it was never finished and then it's all about, you know, farming and then it's not. Then it's all about heroin poppy and then it's not and and so nothing gets done and in the end after 20some years they just throw us out. >> Yeah. Yeah. Why does anybody partner with us? >> I don't know. I told the story the other day that I I've been to Yemen five times over the years starting in 1990 through

[08:19] 2011. Every time I go, it's worse than the previous time. But I went in like 2000. I'm going to say it was like [snorts] maybe it was 2000. And I went to see I paid a call on the on the Dutch ambassador and the Italian defense attaches and they were so proud because their governments had just built a new sewer system and water treatment

[08:50] facility for the capital SA and it took you know 15 years >> right >> why couldn't we do that >> you know and I've always maintained, you and I had this conversation last time we spoke, but I've always maintained that if you want to really fight terrorism, you do it through economic development. >> Sure. >> You you you develop these economies to the point where these guys have jobs and they don't need to make jihad against the Americans. They're not interested in

[09:21] making jihad against the Americans. Um, and for whatever reason, the European Union countries have that long-term view, and we don't. We don't. I last time I went to Yemen in 2011, I met with the US defense attaches and I said, "So, what are you working on?" And he said, "Oh, we have this great idea." He says, "We developed a a propaganda program modeled on NPR." >> Jesus Christ. >> That's going to play jazz on the radio

[09:53] and it's going to be call-in shows for young Yemen. And I was like, "What kind of stupid idea was that? Whose whose stupid idea was that?" >> Yeah. >> And of course, it lasted, you know, two weeks and then it shuttered because nobody's going to listen to that silliness. What a waste of money and time. >> Yeah. >> And you take all those initiatives and you put them, bolt them to the ground and have Pete run around and check what's going on. Are these things working? And this this for a lot of people doesn't sound like spying, but this is all about what we do. We

[10:23] >> Oh, yeah. Everything. >> Absolutely. So, we pro I probably have told you this story, but the um it's a brigade I'm working with and every day the electronic warfare officer comes out and he's like, "Oh, you to my slide to the north. We have radio broadcasting re they call it re rehab. Everybody radio in a box." He's drop it in, plug it on, turn the radio on. Everybody loves it. And whenever I do my Texas accent, you know, I'm mocking things. So, um big circle on the map broadcasting all this

[10:54] overlap. And so, I'm like, "All right." So, I take one of our crank radios and I go out and I listen. Nothing. Nothing. Nothing. And I compel my little remote local commander and I'll say, [snorts] "I'm told that there's going to be a rehab in that building over there. Can we go over there real quick?" And the commanders are always great. Yeah, Pete. Of course, because they they've learned that like I'm going to give them things that nobody else gives them. So, we take a fiveminute detour and no radio in that building. [snorts] So, then this is all the whole machine is broken. So from the very top, the bad idea of jazz and everything else and what I'm told people

[11:25] love. And so [laughter] go in and I talk to the electronic warfare officer and I'm like, "Hey, listen. I got some bad news coming. There are no radios where you say they are." And not only not broadcasting, but physically not present. They're like, "But that's title nine or whatever money." And they lose their minds, right? Um, but that guy does not care that those things are not there. So I'm trying to pre-brief him on what I'm going to brief. But I've purposely held my report so that he didn't get torpedoed. >> Yeah. >> And he basically gives me a middle finger because he doesn't care who I am. Has no idea. And so and I'm like,

[11:56] "Listen, I I'm begging you." And so I did I didn't I asked three times. That's what I do. All right. Here's what's going to understand. I'm going to brief this in half an hour. And [snorts] so I said across guy doesn't even care. So I brief, hey, uh keep So he briefs his part. I raise my hand. Uh sir, that I've been on the ground out there. None of those radios exist. None of them are squawking. There's nothing there. They haven't been there. No one knows the last time they were there. And by the way, there's this has happened more than once in these locations. And so the commander turns bright red, steam coming out of his ears. He calms

[12:26] down, looks at that guy, and that guy looks at me. And then that guy comes back up to me in the cow hall later on. He's like, "Why'd you do that to me?" What? So we have these beliefs. This is the the strategy having no linking to the ground. And it's all messed up. we're going to do radio literacy for women, you know, and all right, let me go look. Let me go look. And it we still brief that at at Naval Postgrad. We still brief the success of that program.

[12:56] >> Oh my god. I went to uh I went down to Key West when I was the senior investigator on the Senate Foreign Relations uh committee to do a study on the effectiveness or lack thereof of radio and TV. Marti, which of course is the propaganda radio and television station that we beam at um at Cuba, >> right? >> Um I've long been opposed to radio and TV

[13:27] Martin. It's a waste of the taxpayers money. And besides, the uh the Cubans jam it anyway, except when there's a baseball game on, they let that in. And so, um, I went down to Key West. We went up in the plane. They they broadcast the radio station from a plane. It just flies up and down the coast of Cuba, up and down and up and down all night long. And um, it was kind of cool. You could see the lights of Havana

[13:58] and then we would broadcast and and they would jam. They have these jammers on the tops of some of the taller buildings in in central Havana. Then I went to Cuba two years ago and a buddy of mine said, "Hey, you know, I've I've always wondered, we know that they that they jam Radio Marti and TV Marty. They they can't get TV Marti except in the waiting room at the American Embassy when people are waiting for their visas. We we play TV

[14:29] Marty." So, um, he said, "Do me a favor and just see if you can pick up radio stations from Miami. I'm curious." >> Yeah. >> My god. Miami radio stations. Atlanta, Dallas, Chicago. You could get 50 radio stations from the United States every night. You don't need to propagandize the Cuban people. They're already propagandized just by listening to regular American radio stations. So we didn't need to spend

[15:01] millions and millions of dollars broadcasting radio and TV Marti from a freaking cargo plane >> going up and down the coast all night long every night. >> Ridiculous. >> This and this is the playbook, right? And so when Pete gets to a place, I'm going to immediately look into SCOPS because I know they're broken, you know, and I'm not talking bad about anybody individually, but they're just it doesn't work. And so >> I target these things, you know, like um for the wa anybody watching, like what you would hand me is a list of questions. They call them information

[15:32] requirements. There's different levels of how important they are. And I'm like, what a bunch of adorable little babies with their little questions. Where are the bombs? Oh, let me go around town and ask that question. How about I tell you where you're losing and getting your ass kicked and do you want? And every commander wants to know that. And so there's the radio is this is just one area of failure that I could reliably find every mist because we were the same people. It wasn't about them. So I would be told all the time, oh the Afghans love this. Okay. Well, let me go do

[16:02] Scop's job and ask. And I'm using this one particularly for you because I know you're going to appreciate this. [snorts] And so I go talk to the farmers and I'll just say the farmers, it's the people, whatever it is. I'm like, "What do you think about that radio?" And then they'll say things like, "Yeah, I don't understand what you guys are doing. What are you talking about?" Because um your Quranic messages, those are city folks. I don't even understand what they're talking about. I don't understand the words. I don't understand the message. It's not even accurate. So, of course, I take this

[16:32] back to the boss like, "Hey, uh that doesn't work." I was like, "Oh, yeah. Well, they don't understand the Quran." Like, okay, [laughter] that's the message. >> Yeah. But you do. >> Yeah. Yeah. And it wasn't the commander that says this, but this is the message that comes back. And so, by the way, it's all recorded at like, you know, the So, everybody uh Afghanistan is divided into commands. And so, the main command here in the making, it's like gathering a bunch of states together. So, imagine like the western state command or the southwestern state command. And that's where [snorts] these messages generate from is these large areas. And again,

[17:04] it's city folks with city folk accent. So, they got actual Afghans recording these messages, but they're not holy men. they're uh they have, you know, a Kandahar accent and so it's supposed to be uniting people and I can't prove that it's doing the opposite more than would even be possible. >> Well, it it it's very much it's very much like our efforts to combat u corruption in Afghanistan. Afghanistan is very very heavily tribal. And so what what we decided to do, some genius in in

[17:36] the Pentagon decided to um make the regional chiefs of police come from other tribes in other parts of the country. So if you were from Harat, you're going to head uh the police force in Kandahar. If you're in from Kandahar, you're going to head the police force up along the border with Tajikistan. And all that did was made people hate representatives of other tribes even more than they had previously.

[18:07] >> Yeah. >> And it did nothing to combat corruption. Nothing. >> So this and I I'm illustrating this with you because you know you're working at CIA or national levels and I'm working at the personto person level and we just see the same kind of chaos. We don't have a license. We don't have a licensing mechanism. And by the way, you and I aren't ever going to talk. >> Yeah. >> So you and I are never gonna We don't even organizationally aligned to it. If I showed up, I would have to use all of my ability that I would use in town. I

[18:38] would have to use it on you. And maybe maybe you the you that would be sitting there. Maybe you'd want to hear from me, but probably tune me out. I got to go to salsa night. No offense. I got to go to salsa night. I got other things. And and so this guy that has information you can't get anywhere else that's always filtered by the time it gets to you is completely irrelevant. And I have no idea how to help you drive me to the right place because you would be able to put me right here's what I need. I don't know where this is, but Pete, here's what I need right here. [snorts] >> We don't have that machine either. And

[19:08] and so as great as we are at Intel, we're very passive about it. We don't like to go on offense. >> No, that's right. And I think frankly we're not terribly good at Intel. I I I >> Yeah. No, I mean >> we we've we've got nothing to show for for 20 years of work. >> Yeah. >> Literally nothing to show but a bunch of dead bodies. >> I mean, they they they chose the Taliban over a western style democracy because they had no no history of Western style

[19:40] democracy. They had a system that that they used for 2,000 years and they stuck with that system and they just realized that that the stuff we were offering was not interesting to them. >> Yeah. >> And you know, I say all the time too, Pete, that the Taliban didn't come down from the moon, you know, and just land. These are the the fathers, the brothers, the sons >> Yeah. >> of Afghan women. This is what they chose. >> Yeah. Yeah. through political power, physical

[20:11] power, all the all the different things. The uh Yeah. And and I'm just going to beat on the counter intelligence people. I I came across the team, army counter intelligence team. I'm working in a contract ro I'm supporting. And they wanted me to interview all the Afghans on the camp. There weren't that many because it was really remote, really shitty out there, dangerous as hell. And then they wanted me to do one-time sources. And so I go to the contract company. I'm like, "Oh, hold on. What do you all think is a onetime source?" Yeah. Because we're we're in a legal zone. and nobody could tell me. So, I'm like, "No, we're not I'm not doing that

[20:42] at all because no one no one is going to have my back if anything happens because they don't even know what a onetime source is. So, [clears throat] [laughter] I'm effectively wasting everybody's time and money, but as long as someone's sitting in that chair, everybody's happy." So, I was I didn't have the right machine to legally screen or vet people. And so, my job was to sit there and essentially do nothing all day. Well, I'm not going to do that. I'm entrepreneurial. I'm a spy. I'm going to find work. So, I start finding work. and I and the counter intelligence team shows up as they bounce around [snorts] and what are they doing their screening

[21:13] and I'm like well that could be me doing that for you so you guys can go on offense and go see what you can do and then no um we just you're doing all these linguists and everything and we recommend them all for termination because they're all tied to the Taliban we're in coner right and I'm like I'm like and as a warrant officer everybody warn officers are are technicians these are experts right in their field at least in in position and I'm looking at him like chief what's going on here. I want every bad guy you can get. Bring all of them. Let's go. Let's bring him onto this camp and let's have him work.

[21:44] And then, you know, they're saying things like, "Well, they're going to find out where the fuel farm is." Like the fuel farm. Like, we're on the side of a mountain, man. This mountain up 10,000 ft above us. You are worried about where the They know where the fuel farm is. Guess what? They can watch helicopters come in and feel. And it was like the dumbest thing, John. The people who were supposed to protect the force, the counter intelligence people were afraid to go on offense. And when I brought this up, they kicked me off the camp, >> you know, because I was the problem.

[22:15] Like, I'm trying to work here. And I had I didn't have to work with them. And I was glad to ignore them because I I had they had some special operations guys like we'd love to have you. And I'm like, let me get myself sorted out. But [snorts] uh no, rather than fix that problem, rather than deal with it, and think about this, all these linguists are going to work no matter what. So when people talk about vetting, we're in the world of vetting now. And [snorts] it it doesn't mean anything. I'm not magic. You're not magic. We could talk to people, make a guess, but I'm telling you right now, if a person's close to being, you know, if they're not just seething with rage after they've been coached and talked to me,

[22:46] >> um I'm going to bring them on the camp because I'm going to put money in their pockets because I'm hoping like if in the beginning that they'll be like, "Hey, Americans aren't so bad." Right. Yeah. >> And if they are bad, let me find them. Let me talk to them. Let me do my job and flip that person. >> Yep. Yeah, you're exactly right. >> How many double oper double agent operations do you think we've had that were successful in Iraq or Afghanistan if you were to guess? And it's impossible number to guess, but what would you say? >> D successful doubles. >> Yeah. >> Zero or close to zero,

[23:17] >> right? >> I'm serious. Listen, I was at the CIA for 15 years. I handled I handled one double agent. Um I mean by their very nature the double double agent operations usually don't work >> right. Yeah. >> And we're besides the fact that we're just not good at it. >> We're not good at it. >> No. >> We're terrified of it. >> Yeah. >> I'm going to bring a dangerous man on this camp and I'm going to partner with that person and uh and they're going to work for us. >> Yeah. Well, you you see what happened at host. You know y deadliest day in the

[23:48] CIA's history. Yeah. So there's [laughter] this back to the overall. Is there any fix in this? Is there any should we be involved in it? Can we create a licensing program? So it's like, hey, this is how we actually do this. Like I can ask you, you went to Yemen. I know you speak Arabic. How hard is it to understand that? Because they probably don't speak the Queen's Arabic there. They probably speak. >> Oh, they do. >> That's the That's the only place where they speak pure Arabic. >> Really? >> Yeah. >> Yeah. In fact, when I was studying Arabic, it's called fussa. Uh it's high

[24:20] standard Arabic, >> right? >> The only place where that is spoken is Yemen. And when I was in Saudi Arabia, people asked me why I spoke Arabic like Shakespeare. >> Yeah. >> And I said because I was studying fuss and they were like, "Ah, okay." And then for my second year, it was uh khali, the golf dialect, >> right? Yeah. Which again, like we teach everybody modern standard that's great, but then you get to Iraq and they have totally different words for

[24:52] Yeah. Right. I mean, yeah. Right. Actually, I would use we would use um northern Iraqi words as bonafites >> because they could say things like it was watermelon then they would say dipsy instead of ruggi. I don't know e which whatever it was. It was a word that nobody understood unless you were from Mosul. And uh it was great. is a great way to do bonafites because it would not sound like we were saying anything funny thing about bonafites everybody is like it's never like the hawk flies on Monday it's never that because that makes no [ __ ] sense >> no >> it's [snorts] something like hey John

[25:23] how are you and then that's the bon it's the beginning of the thing so um yeah even the Arabic part right or the language part is we struggle with >> still after after all these years of war and occupation and we still struggle with the language [snorts] >> is it possible to operate inside of Do you think? >> Um, yeah, it's it's possible, but it's exceedingly difficult. >> Yeah, exceedingly difficult. You know, we were we were trained to do two or

[25:54] threehour SDRs, surveillance detection routes. >> Um, and in China, you're talking about an eight hour surveillance detection route. Even even then, the Chinese may have had a drone on top of you the whole time you were doing it or they're using infrared technology or heat sensing technology or, you know, it's it's very very difficult. >> Yeah. I don't even know that SDRs are even relevant anymore. >> I Yeah, I know. I know, right? >> Yeah. We teach them. You got to. I guess >> you got to. And then what you do is you

[26:25] have to you have to mix them up. So instead of just getting in your car and driving around because your car has probably got a beacon stuck on it somewhere or they've hacked into the car's computer system, you got to do it on foot. You got to do it on on um uh public transportation. You've got to switch cars out, you know, drive into a parking garage and switch to a rental car that somebody else rented in a different name. And it's very difficult. >> Yeah. Yeah. I was talking with Jack Barski. Everybody doesn't know Jack

[26:56] Barski was an agent who was inserted in America working against us and they made the show The Americans based upon his life. And I because you know because I know our world. I'm like so at what point did it just become impossible to do all the the counter this and the counter that so you weren't discovered? He's like it became just like I could never sleep, you know, because you're always worried about getting caught. The longer you're there, the more you think your heat stakes have risen. And so he's like, yeah, it became Yeah. And Jack ended up flipping and going to the FBI because he he knew that he wasn't supposed to be

[27:28] here permanently, but his girlfriend had had their daughter >> and he said looking at that child, he knew I can never go back. And so they summoned him and he just ignored it. and he got onto the subway in Queens to go into Manhattan one day and he's just standing there holding the the strap and um and there's a guy next to him and the guy whispers to him and says, "You know, if you don't go back, they'll kill you, right?"

[27:59] And so he decided that day I'm calling the FBI. >> Yeah. Yeah. Didn't he also say that he had AIDS? I guess >> that's how he got out of it. Yeah. He said he couldn't go back because he had AIDS and he was dying. Yeah. >> Which of course he just made up off the top of his head. [laughter] >> I mean that's that's >> Jack Jack's a fascinating guy. Absolutely fascinating guy. >> Yeah. >> Do we do we have the stomach to run that kind of an op an insertion op that the lifetime? Right. I don't think so. >> No. No. >> Very few countries do. This isn't a this

[28:31] isn't a diss against the United States or or the American intelligence community. But the Russians have a very very long view for what they call their illegals program. There was a an illegals network that was broken up right here in my neighborhood two or three years ago. I live in Arlington, Virginia. And right here in my neighborhood, there was a woman who was an elementary school teacher that was actually a Russian sleeper and she was here 20 years just waiting to be activated. >> Yeah. >> It's incredible. We would never do that.

[29:02] We don't have the patience for something like that. Well, also if we gave you that assignment, you would know to not trust anybody when you came back because no one would know who you were. They would have no idea what you were doing. They wouldn't believe you if you told them. And the one thing I learned from Lawrence of Arabia was that when you show up in flowing shaky robes at the the British command, they have no idea who you are. You have zero influence. And so that's what taught me like I'm always balancing the equation on our side. I'm always seeking relevance on our side because if I don't then then I

[29:32] may as well go home >> if I'm not impacting day-to-day operations because it's great to go off and do that adventure. And it was great. Wonderful things, right? But not relevant not relevant at all to anything going on dayto-day. And so the people who don't know what to worry about are not worried about you and you're not contributing to the fight. >> That's right. That's the bottom line right there. >> Yeah. Can we improve that? Can we make that better? I like the army counter intelligence is picking up more of the LEO mission that it had originally and

[30:03] we certainly need a lot of counter intelligence in this nation. Army wouldn't be the the tool inside the nation but we have so many threats that we open I mean just in China we have open more cases than we can sustain and that's the ones we find. >> Yeah. There was a revelation in the New York Times about six months ago about these um Chinese nationals who have um what appear to be ties to uh the Chinese police and they're just operating out of

[30:33] storefronts around Manhattan driving or flying around America to threaten Chinese people. Like stop talking about China or we're going to arrest your aunt and uncle in Beijing and we're going to beat the [ __ ] out of them. That kind of thing. >> Yeah. >> So, I don't know how the FBI missed it. >> Yeah. Uh but yeah, that's kind of one example of what we need to shut down. >> Well, we we all miss it. I mean, we the Epoch Times focuses on this. They've been posting this forever. The guy who runs that Chinese New York beat has been

[31:05] saying it's all going on. And I I interviewed him uh in a bar in New York City right at the very beginning of of uh co, you know, like the last time you really could get together in New York City as a big group. and he was talking about all this stuff and it was it was incredible like if half of what he said was true it was a significant problem and you and I both know China has a gigantic almost an unlimited intel asset you know anybody can be turned into somebody for the state and

[31:36] you it's very hard to com combat that. >> Yeah. Yeah. It's true. [clears throat] What when you think about building folks like us, NOCA is good at it, but are if you're going to be critical of your peers, are we good at it? Are we good at reliably getting people? And then are are we good at getting the most out of them? How do we how do we know when you have someone who's great? >> I don't think we're good at it. >> Okay. if if we were there would never

[32:06] have been a 911, you know, um or the bottom line is we've we've missed every major world event. We've gotten wrong just about every major world event from 1947 to to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. >> Yeah. >> Yeah. I I don't think we're good at it. Part of the part of the problem is we just have never taken foreign languages seriously. Hard foreign

[32:37] languages. I'm not talking about learning Spanish in high school, >> right? >> I mean, you know, speaking >> Farsy, Arabic, Dari, Pashtu, Udu, Cindi, Punjabi, Tajik, all these, you know, Mandarin, Russian, Korean, all these hard languages. We just don't we don't do it. >> Yeah. And if you're going to build that person in this just for the case of geoloccation so everybody understand if you were going to have someone operate in Switzerland you would want them to speak French German Italian and English

[33:10] because that's what everybody there does and to not do that would would make you lower than the level of the game would >> as well as the language of your target if it's yeah right right [snorts] so even if we chose to build that capacity you know, at least with the army side, it you have to be willing. You're not a maverick, but you look like a maverick to everybody in the institution. You know, I'm not going to wear gear. I'm

[33:41] going to go do this. Yes, I'm going to drink. Yes, I'm going to mistake do make mistakes about because if I'm not making mistakes, I'm making the first mistakes. So, what we do is dangerous to the institution. It causes them heartburn all the time. And it's easier to turn this off, push Pete over there, keep him in the office than it is to push Pete forward. >> Yeah. >> He might find out or you might find out that the Poppy thing isn't what we all brief, right? It's like, hey, >> oh, the Poppy thing that was pretty much

[34:12] our Poppy. I mean, when it came down to it. >> Yeah. Yeah. >> Yeah. >> Yeah. it, you know, and I I don't want to get dismayed because I want things to be positive, but I just don't know that our foreign policy it really reliably works. >> I agree. And it changes so quickly. You know, there I I complained about this on a podcast earlier today u that our our foreign policy changes as

[34:44] quickly as every four or eight years. >> Yeah. Yeah. And there there's an old saying we don't have there's no such thing as permanent friends it's permanent interests but even our interests change you know when [snorts] we complain about countries openly complain about countries that have been our friends for se two centuries >> and we disrespect them publicly >> why would they do what we want them to do when we turn around you know just

[35:16] after disrep respecting them and and order them in public to do something doesn't make sense. >> I'm not I'm not a big fan of Hillary Clinton, but uh No, not but she one time told the people of Pakistan to overthrow their leader. You got you can't you can't do that, you know, and and that's not this is just an observation. We're bad on both both sides of the aisle at this stuff. But yeah, it it's u it's frustrating. It's frustrating to see us with all this

[35:46] influence and I'm always wondering like how why why do these countries do this? Why do the Kurds ever trust us? They they never should. >> That's a great example. That's a great example. We have screwed the Kurds at every turn in history. >> Right. >> We have every opportunity. And we refuse. All these presidents talk all these big games about all these things. Just draw a circle and say that's Kurdistan. >> Do it. You know, I'm not saying it's a good good idea or bad idea. I'm just saying you all talk about this stuff, but you don't do the very thing that you

[36:17] could do. >> Yeah. You know, >> it's true. >> There was very briefly from 1946 to 1949 an independent Kurdistan. >> Right. Right. >> And and it just went away. >> The uh the Assyrians, they don't have a country, >> you know. The Yazidis don't have any real protection. And we only care about them after they've been slaughtered. No one for about 10 minutes. and cared about Yazidis as they were being ripped apart by ISIS and then we stopped caring. I interviewed a ton of Yazidis. These are the most peaceful farminist

[36:49] having a lot of kids in his people and that's it. That's what they are. >> They're simple people doing simple things and they're they're an ancient people living in a modern world. >> And then we allowed ISIS to slaughter the men and to to rape and kidnap and and sell as sex slaves the women. >> Yeah. >> Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Gosh, it's terrible. To talk about terrible. Oh my gosh. Yeah. Yeah. When you think about our profession,

[37:21] how do we how do we remain principled in a in an illprincipled world? >> You know, to me that was an that was the easy part. >> Okay. You you go into this life with your own set of moral values or if you don't then you're going to fail and you're part of the problem. >> Right? >> I knew right from wrong even if my superiors were trying to convince me otherwise. It was really as simple as that. >> [snorts] >> It is a world though where where the the

[37:53] norms the mores the ethics uh are situational >> quite often and it's uncomfortable to navigate that. Can we develop that capacity? So like we had a um I worked at a a source ops course called counter intelligence force protection source operation course so for short and we had this uh Mormon officer and I'm like hey listen you're going to have to be willing to do things that are against your religion to do this job well or or or stay out of the field because if someone offers you a shot of Rocky or whatever it's going to be you have to be

[38:25] willing to drink that. like I can't like then you should lead not go out because someone may die because you don't want to drink that drink or whatever that thing is. >> Yeah. So these there they are situational things you know like you can we we terminated a guy in Iraq and uh we didn't want him to come back so we made it very clear he was working with us and when we say terminate everybody we're not talking about >> no terminate means to fire him >> right but we did terminate him in a way that probably

[38:56] ended his life, you know, because he was becoming we weren't sure which side he was on. He was doing crazy things. And so when we terminated, we made it public, you know, and we're like, "All right, no longer working with us next time." You know, kiss on each chick. And so we never saw him again. [snorts] And in a time when a lot of Rockies got killed, but I struggled with that ever since we did it. >> Yeah. >> But I didn't know what else we could do. >> That's not good. >> Yeah. >> Wow. >> Yeah. Ah. Um, okay. We got 10 minutes left and I know you're super busy and you gave me

[39:26] this extra time in the beginning so I don't want to take any more from you, but what do you want to what do you want to what are you working on now? What do you want to talk about? >> Oh, thanks. I'm working on a bunch of stuff now. I've got three podcasts [snorts] and I I'm I'm not sure how long I can keep up this pace, but I do one every morning with my friend and colleague Ted Raw uh that's on Rumble and YouTube called uh Deep Program. We talk about the day news. Um, it's live uh from 9 to 10 every morning. And then I do one twice a week that's a much

[39:56] deeper look at the news called uh Deep Focus uh on YouTube. That one's taken off. We're we're coming up now on on a 100,000 subscribers and we just started it in March. Um >> yeah, it's it's kind of crazy. I I I'm not sure how it took off like it did, but um but uh actually I'm trying to look it up right now to see how many Yeah, here it is. to see how many uh subscribers I

[40:26] have. I'm I'm really blessed by 92,500 subscribers, which is just nuts to me. I can't believe it. And then I started one um just two months ago on Apple Podcasts. It it just now started up as well on Spotify called um John Kuryaku's Dead Drop. What Makes a Spy tick? And we're in the top 2% of all podcasts worldwide. It's just nuts.

[40:58] >> Yeah. Crazy. Um, I've got my my next book is coming out March 24th, Simon and Schustster, called Remains of the Day, a definitive guide to Washington DC's Historic Cemeteries. And um, I've I just sent my ninth book to the publisher uh, called uh, Whispers in the Dirt, a definitive guide to the Mafia Graves of New York City. >> Wow. >> Yeah. I've got I'm going to do another three after that one. And um

[41:31] yeah, I mean I'm going to start a speaking tour in February, nationwide speaking tour. I did it in the UK at in the beginning of the year, January and February all around uh um England, Wales, Scotland, Ireland, Northern Ireland. So I'm busier than than I can maintain. >> Yeah. >> But but it's a good busy. >> Well, yeah. and and we were talking offline, you know, just the ability to maintain your podcasts that are all doing well is is tough. Yeah,

[42:03] >> I put links up for as many as I could catch in the time that we had it, but there's the there's the dead drop one. >> Thank you. That's the one I'm I'm really the most surprised by. It's just really really taken off. >> What do you attribute like do you is there a moment where like this thing I mean I've been doing this for a long time and my show's grown. Wax is winged. It does everything. But that kind of multi-show jump is you've done something right. >> I a year ago a year ago and I don't know why, but a year ago I seem to have hit

[42:34] the YouTube algorithm just right. Right. >> So I I went from like literally overnight I went from my my videos getting 500 views or a thousand views >> Yeah. >> to There were two shorts I did one week. One got 30 million and the other got 38 million. >> Wow. >> And I I don't know how or why. It just happened. >> Yeah. Yeah. And [snorts] you and I both know like you've got great stories, great experiences. >> Thank you. >> Yeah, of course. But it isn't that.

[43:06] There's something else. It's not hard work. It's not quality of the of the story. There's something in between that you you hit. There's one thing that I that I hope played a role, Pete. And I I'll tell you the one thing I'm the most proud of is it's cost me a lot, but I always tell the truth. >> Same. >> And I think people have come to respect it. >> Yeah. [snorts] Yeah. It's it's unfortunately it's rare, you know, and I don't have a political motive, >> you know, so it just I'll tell and and

[43:38] like all this stuff with Venezuela, you know, I can only tell you what I know from being on the ground and combat operations going on until the boss says all clear, it is a combat operation to include shooting people that on the ground that are possibly still alive. That we'll say the whistle blows. You now go on one knee and you start rendering aid to a person you know you just killed. You know, that is that is the nature of combat. You know, if you don't like that, well, then let's not send people into harm's way. I'm all about that. But, uh, that's what combat is, and there's no getting around it.

[44:11] >> Yeah, it's true. And when we convince ourselves that we're the good guys, we we make ourselves able to commit terrible crimes, and there's never any any fallout from it. >> Yeah. Yeah. Well, I used to ask about Yemen and the conflict because that's something they've had conflict there for quite some time, everybody. And nobody cared about Yemen until it affected possibly the cost of chips coming through the Suez Canal, you know, and it's like, oh, we need to feed these people missiles. There's a lot of us very comfortable with that,

[44:42] >> you know, and Yemen is >> got no influence on us. >> Zero, >> right? >> Zero. >> Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Well, I'm excited for your success. >> Thank you. It's super awesome. You deserve it. And >> you know, as as one person who's been kicked aside by the machine to another, man, I I dig what you're doing. I dig your honesty. And yeah, [snorts] if if I can ever do anything to help you, please let me know. I'm all about it. >> Well, I appreciate that very much. Thank you. It's a pleasure to see you again. >> Yeah. Yeah. Everybody, uh, I'll have

[45:13] another show later on today, so you guys will get a chance to see more of me. And John, you can check. Look, it's not hard to find John. You just type in John Kuryaki. [laughter] Figure it out. But most importantly, support his shows. Whether you're on Rumble or YouTube, support that stuff because it's quality. And and John, I hope you're able to at least keep one or two of those shows going. I know you got big things. I have big things. >> I [snorts] sure hope so. I'm I'm gonna try hard. >> All right, cool. All right, let me wrap this up. I'll see you later.
