F-35 avionics dispute with Israel
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The F-35 avionics dispute with Israel is John Kiriakou's account of how the U.S. deliberately degrades the avionics on exported F-35 fighters, designating Israel's the F-35I and the United Arab Emirates' the F-35E, so that a downed aircraft cannot yield its full capabilities to the Iranians, Russians or Chinese. The Emirates accepted the degraded model without objection; Israel demanded the undegraded version, "we want the F-35 ... we want the same one you have", was refused, and, Kiriakou says, instead worked through Northrop Grumman, Lockheed Martin, Boeing and other contractors to steal the upgrade. "The Israelis are not our friends, period," he concludes. Kiriakou says Israel's attempt to steal the avionics by infiltrating Lockheed Martin and its subcontractors is the reason Israel is excluded from the Five Eyes intelligence alliance.

He uses the episode as his standing answer to the argument for closer military integration with Israel. In that telling the sequence is symmetrical and the contrast is the point: Israel came first, was offered the F-35I with slightly degraded avionics for the same stated reason, and answered "No, we want your F-35. We don't want any I with degraded avionics." The Emiratis, offered the identical arrangement as the F-35E, "gladly took" it. Israel then "sent their spies all over the defense sector to steal the avionics so that when they finally got the F-35I, they could upgrade them on their own." The rhetorical question he closes on is about placement rather than aircraft: "that's the country that we want side by side with our people in the Pentagon and the CIA and, god forbid, NSA or DIA?", at a moment when, he notes, the DIA director was warning every employee that Mossad was unusually aggressive against them.

The Emirati control case

John Kiriakou uses a side-by-side comparison to make the point that the avionics episode was a choice rather than a necessity. Israel came to the United States first and asked for the F-35; the offer was the aircraft with slightly degraded avionics, designated F-35I, on the reasoning that if one were shot down over Syria or Iran the Russians or Chinese might recover it. Israel refused the degraded version outright.

The Emirates then asked for the same aircraft and were made the same offer, the F-35E, with the same degraded avionics for the same reason. "The Emirates gladly took the F-35E."

What Israel did instead, in Kiriakou's account, was send "their spies all over the defense sector to steal the avionics so that when they finally got the F-35i, they could upgrade them on their own." He offers the episode as the direct argument against Section 219: "that's the country that we want side by side with our people in the Pentagon and the CIA and god forbid NSA or DIA", at a moment when the DIA director was warning every employee that Israeli recruitment was unusually aggressive.

"With no letter afterwards"

Kiriakou's 2026 keynote version puts the two offers side by side in the order they were made and turns on the designation itself. The Americans described the aircraft to the Israelis as stealth, a bomber, "our best plane", and offered the first one, the F-35I, with the avionics very slightly degraded, in case of a dog fight or a mechanical failure that put the airframe in Iranian, Russian, Chinese or Syrian hands. Israel objected to the distinction rather than to the capability. When the Emirates asked for the same aircraft and were told they would receive the F-35E on identical terms, their answer was "Fine, we'll take it." Israel wanted "the F-35, period. With no letter afterwards", and, refused, "decided to steal the avionics."

The two export variants

Kiriakou uses the F-35 as his standard illustration of the alliance's one-way character. When the aircraft was in development, "the Israelis were the first ones to come to us and they said, we want this new F-35. And we said, okay, we'll give it to you first. We're going to call it the F-35I for Israel and we're going to degrade the avionics just barely just in case, God forbid, one of them gets shot down and the Russians or the Chinese get it, they're not going to have our our top most secrets." Israel refused: "nope, not good enough. We want the F-35 as is, as you have it. We want the same one you have."

The Emirati request came in at the same time and was handled identically, an F-35E with slightly degraded avionics against the risk of a shoot-down over Iran, "They said fine, we'll take it." The contrast is the point of the story: "The Israelis sent out hundreds of spies all across America and our defense contractors to steal that 2% of the avionics that we wouldn't give them."

His conclusion is that the 2027 NDAA provisions render the espionage obsolete: "they don't need the spies to steal it cuz we're just going to fork it over."

Separately, the aircraft is at the centre of the F-35 sale to Turkey dispute, where Greek and Israeli objections converge.

The two export variants

Kiriakou offers the aircraft as his standing illustration of why he ranks Israel first among services recruiting Americans. "We developed the F-35, and the Israelis were the first ones, they said, ''we want the F-35.'' We said, ''sure, we''ll give you the F-35. We''re going to slightly degrade the avionics, just slightly, just so that God forbid if one gets shot down, the Russians or the Chinese can''t take it and reverse-engineer it. We''re going to call it the F-35I, for Israel.'' They said, ''no, no, we want the F-35, the same one you have.'' We said, ''no, we''ll give you the F-35I.''"

The contrast is the point: "In the meantime the Emiratis came to us and they said, ''we want this F-35.'' We said, ''great, we''re going to slightly degrade the avionics, we''ll call it the F-35E for Emirates, and we''ll sell you that.'' They said, ''great, we''ll take it.''" Israel, on his account, has been "out there trying to steal the F-35 avionics ever since we said the word F-35", and he attributes the persistence to a settled belief rather than to opportunism: "they really believe that at the end of the day they stand alone against the rest of the world. And if we''re not going to give them literally everything that they say they want, then by God they''re going to recruit spies and they''re going to steal it from us."

Hit over Iran

During the 2026 Iran war, John Kiriakou reported footage of an F-35 struck by Iranian ground fire, initially dismissed online as artificial, and confirmed by a Pentagon statement that the wounded pilot had reached an airbase in the Middle East.

His explanation for the decision not to eject turned on what the airframe is worth to an adversary: the Iranians "would turn it over immediately to the Russians and the Chinese and then we're screwed." The episode is treated at the F-35 shootdown.

See also

- MOSSAD
- AIPAC
- Israeli integration into U.S. agencies
