Marriott double-agent trap
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John Kiriakou described a double agent operation in which he posed as a CIA station chief in a Middle East posting, handled the target across eight months, and executed an arrest inside a Marriott Hotel room, then used a hand-drawn map to locate a hidden weapons cache that allowed the CIA to destroy an entire terrorist network.

The setup

In spring 2001, a CIA station-chief friend in the Middle East asked Kiriakou for a favor: the station had recruited a double agent, an engineer employed by an American defense contractor, who did not know the CIA had discovered he was secretly working for one of its greatest enemies, and who had been instructed to insist on meeting only with the chief himself. Because it was too dangerous for the real chief to keep meeting him, he asked Kiriakou to fly out each month and impersonate him.

Kiriakou operated under the alias "Nick." He gave the agent a triband cell phone that rang with a local number regardless of where Kiriakou actually was in the world, meaning the agent always believed Kiriakou was in-country. He also required the agent to rent a PO box for emergency communications. At their very first meeting, he trained the agent on a surveillance detection route and set up a standing "mad minute" check-in protocol for future meetings, greeting the agent with a bear hug that doubled as a pat-down for weapons.

The agent, who had driven directly to the enemy embassy after their very first meeting, rather than running the surveillance detection route he had been taught, had been under CIA surveillance the whole time, confirming his double status.

The order to kill

After eight months, the actual chief called: the hostile service had given the double agent orders to kill Kiriakou in their next meeting, a warning Kiriakou says also came directly from NSA. Kiriakou refused to abort the operation. He proposed the trap: use the Marriott Hotel, where all Marriotts worldwide share the same floor plan, with adjacent rooms connected by a pass-through door he planned to prop open. Kiriakou would be in the bathroom. The double would knock, enter, and be taken down simultaneously by the room-service team and a liaison entry from the connecting room.

The enemy service anticipated the move: when Kiriakou arrived at the hotel, surveillance reported three enemy teams already in the lobby (per a later retelling, four of the CIA's people against four of theirs). If the double failed, the teams outside would shoot Kiriakou as he tried to leave through the front entrance. The CIA team shifted to an exit through the back of the building.

The arrest

When the double called from downstairs, Kiriakou told him to come to the eighth floor, the top floor, and then to the roof. The double refused, repeatedly: "I don't want to go up to the roof. I don't like this." Kiriakou kept insisting. The double finally followed him to the roof. Kiriakou said: "Stay here five minutes and meet me in room 515." Five minutes later the double knocked. Kiriakou emerged from the bathroom and tackled him as he entered; the man, fumbling to draw a gun from his waistband, never managed to get a grip on it before Kiriakou wrestled it away and sat on his chest. Liaison partners and security personnel entered from the connecting room simultaneously. The double shouted "Allahu akbar" and "I'll kill you." Kiriakou's response: "Did you think I didn't know you were a double agent? Did you think I'm so unprofessional that I didn't know you came here to kill me tonight?"

Demerol, the ambulance, and the children's map

The double was given a Demerol injection, placed on a gurney under a sheet, hotels have deaths regularly, and the team used the hotel's standard body-removal procedure to avoid alerting the enemy security detail still waiting in the lobby, and removed via the service elevator to an ambulance waiting at the loading dock. The enemy service teams in the lobby waited for a result that never came. He was delivered to the host intelligence service's headquarters and placed in a cell. Kiriakou has said the man was the founder of a terrorist group that had been causing the host government significant problems, and that interrogators pressed him specifically for the location of the group's weapons cache.

He refused to speak. To search his house without alerting his live-in maid, who never left the property, the team staged a fake propane gas leak, bringing in an 18-wheeler tanker, to force an evacuation of his cul-de-sac: fire department called, all the houses cleared, team broke in. The safe, some six feet high, like a deep gun safe, contained only a hand-drawn map, "like a cartoon," marked with an X and an arrow reading "the weapons are here." Following the map, the team drove off-road and found a dugout desert bunker containing the terrorist group's entire arsenal, every weapon, explosive, landmine, and round of ammunition it owned, putting the group permanently out of business. The double agent received life without parole.

An alternate retelling of the capture and its aftermath gives the lobby standoff as fourteen armed CIA-aligned officers against seven of the enemy's, and otherwise matches: a liaison partner's Demerol injection, the freight-elevator removal disguised as a body, and the same hand-drawn map leading to the weapons cache.

Tradecraft: reading a walk-in, and being followed in Pakistan

Kiriakou has used the double-agent case to illustrate broader counterintelligence tradecraft. He says a "walk-in" who claims, for example, to be a Hezbollah member sent to assassinate the U.S. ambassador is more likely a hostile-intelligence probe testing embassy security, cover identities, and personnel than a genuine defector, and he identifies Iranian intelligence as especially aggressive in running this kind of probe worldwide.

He has separately described being on the other end of surveillance himself: in Pakistan, he noticed a motorcyclist in a red helmet working hard to stay in his blind spot across two consecutive commutes, and reported the suspected surveillance to embassy security, telling them he was "100 percent sure" he was being followed. He confronted his Pakistani ISI counterpart, a brigadier general, directly, asking if Pakistani intelligence was following him. The general denied it, but Kiriakou learned weeks later that Pakistani intelligence officers had been discussing him, concluded he was too friendly to be trusted, and had assigned their worst surveillance officer to tail him on the theory that his affability was itself a cover for working against them.

See also

- John Kiriakou
- Double-Agent Capture
- Surveillance detection route
- CIA
