Title: The Deep Focus Show
Show: The Deep Focus Show
Date: 2025-09-18
URL: https://youtu.be/4OUCkluRD3g
Duration: 32:00

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[00:03] I think extracting ourselves from all of these different conflicts and recognize that most of them actually don't touch us and that we should actually learn a little bit from the Chinese who have managed to have pretty decent relations with everyone and despite all of the different turbulences in the region managed to stay out of it um and that's been dramatically successful for them. It would be for us as well if we just had the strength to pursue our own interest unapologetically. Hi, I'm John Kuryaku and welcome back to

[00:35] Deep Focus. As we enter the the fall this year, all eyes are still on the Middle East and so many people are predicting yet another Israeli attack on Iran. Why? Well, we're not really sure. Is it that the Israelis believe they haven't finished the job? Is it that they just want to see some kind of destruction that's going to result in the overthrow of the Iranian government? We're even seeing press reporting here in the United States quoting the Scoop Jackson or Henry Jackson Foundation in London as saying that the Iranian

[01:05] government is teetering on the brink of collapse. That's just simply not true. Those of us who have Iranian friends or or know people in Iran who are reporting back saying say that the country lacks for nothing and it's not teetering on the brink of anything. Anyway, what better place to go than to the acknowledged expert on these issues? Tria Parsy is an Iranian-born Swedish writer and activist. He's co-founder and executive vice president of the Quincsey Institute for Responsible Statecraft.

[01:37] That's a place that I rely on. And he's also founder and former president of the National Iranianamean Council. Trita, welcome to the show. >> Thanks so much for having me. It's great to be with you. >> The pleasure is all mine. And I've been looking forward to this for a long time. And and I'm going to start right off the bat. You have an absolutely outstanding Substack. And I'm not saying that just because you're on the show. I mean, I've been reading your Substack since you started it. And you made a very bold prediction a couple of months ago. You said that you thought that the Israelis

[02:08] were likely to attack Iran again by the end of August. It looked like they walked right up to the line and then they they didn't. Now we're seeing reporting that well the destruction the the the damage at the Iranian sites wasn't as as significant as previously thought. We're hearing that drum beat again. And now we're hearing other analysts say no. Trari may have been wrong about the timing, but he's right about the goal and the policy and another attack is coming. Is that what

[02:39] we're facing here? Should we expect to see another Iranian uh sorry, Israeli attack on Iran? So what I wrote uh and I think the substack is referencing the piece I had in foreign policy. I said that the window for the attack is most likely between end of August as the earliest and sometime in December at its latest. I put it within that window for a couple of reasons and and let me first explain why I think the Israelis are going to do it again. They had three objectives with their attack in June. The first one was

[03:12] partially successful. The other two were not. The first one was to finally get the United States into a war with Iran. This is something the Israelis have pushed for for more than 20 years. You know more about it than I do. Finally, they succeeded. Now, of course, they wanted the United States to be fully engaged in the war, take out a lot of Iran's conventional military capabilities, but instead Trump just did a one-off on the nuclear side. So, they wanted it to continue. Trump did not. The two other objectives, however, were not successful. First amongst those was to make sure that they decapitated the

[03:44] Iranian regime. They managed to have some significant intelligence successes. In the beginning, they assassinated a large number of Iranian military officials uh and their families, including nuclear scientists who are completely civilian and their families. But within 12 to 18 hours, the Iranians had replaced them and then went on the offensive and started shooting ballistic missiles at Israel, which over the course of those 12 days became increasingly effective in penetrating Israel's air defense systems. The third objective is the most important one, and

[04:16] it's the longer one, and that is to reduce Iran into another Syria or Lebanon, a country that Israel can attack at will with impunity. And most importantly, without American involvement, clearly that is not where Israel is with Iraq right now. Israel couldn't have done any of this without massive American involvement, whether that was on the offensive side that Trump provided or on the defensive side, which both Trump and Bided provided in terms of trying to shoot down the Iraqi

[04:46] missiles. Now, I do think that the Israelis expect that they would have made more advances towards that goal. I don't think they thought that this is going to be a one-off and they're going to be able to reduce Iran into Syria with one attack, but I do think that they had expected to go much further. And I think also they were taken by surprise by how effective Iran's missiles were and their capability or continue to shoot at Israel despite the many losses the Iranian. But having started this campaign, the Israelis cannot afford to stop it from

[05:18] their standpoint because the more time is given, the Iranians will be able to rebuild their air defense system, perhaps buy better ones from the Chinese. They will be able to root out the Mossad presence inside of um uh uh Iran. They uh the Israelis may lose the political window that exists with Trump uh greenlighting these things. So there's a lot of factors that are uncertain. Um and and as a result um uh and also one other important factor there is the Iranians can build

[05:49] ballistic missiles faster than the US and Israel can build missile interceptors. And they were already running out of the A3 towards the end of the 12 days. And we also now know that the United States spent 25% of its stockpile of THAAD interceptors during those 12 days and it will take the United States 3 to 5 years to replenish. That was actually what I wanted to ask you about. I apologize for interrupting, but we saw a lot of

[06:20] reports uh as the hostilities were taking place that Israeli stores were spent and that the United States had provided Israel with everything it was able to provide. We we also heard that the Israelis were surprised at how the Iron Dome didn't hold the way it was always said that it was able to. that even the slow motion drones in the in the first go uh this the first back and forth

[06:51] between the Iranians and the Israelis uh saw Iranian drones penetrate the Iron Dome. Not a lot of them, but it showed that the Iron Dome wasn't all it was cracked up to be. So, here we are months later. We know that the Iranians have good relations, healthy relations with with China, with India, with Russia and other countries. Presumably then they'll be able to replenish their supplies of whether defensive or offensive uh systems and then what uh and and I'm going to I

[07:24] want to ask a a sort sort of an addition to that if if you don't mind addressing it as well. There is a rumor, a rumor that Donald Trump didn't really want to attack Iran, but that Benjamin Netanyahu said, "If you don't do it, we're going to use nuclear weapons and that Trump did it to keep the nuclear aspect out of this." Can you can you give us your ideas on on how much of this is true? Do the Israelis really have the wherewithal to keep this up? And do you think the United States thought that maybe it was

[07:56] doing Iran some sort of a favor by keeping nuclear weapons out of this? >> So lot of questions here. So let me try them one one by one. Um um let me go first back and point out because it's related to what you just asked about. The Israelis were taken aback uh already back in October of 2024 when they saw that many of the Iranian missiles actually did penetrate their many layers of air defense system. It's not just the Iron Dome, it's David Slaying, it's the

[08:28] Patriots, it's um Arrow 1, two, and three. And then of course as a result of all of their failures, they asked the United States to provide the that um and uh the US did under Biden and they have kept it there. Uh and it's important to recognize the US has very limited amount of those and I think two out of 10 are now in Israel. >> Yes. >> So I mean the amount of support the US had to give to Israel to be able to do this and it wasn't even successful should tell us something about this narrative that is being pushed by some

[08:58] in Washington that Israel is now the US's new as are the region's new hedgeimon. Certainly I think military hegemony is something that the Israelis are pursuing. It is part of their military doctrine, but it is really not hegemony if someone else is paying for it. It is really not hegemony if someone else has to step in massively in order for Israel to be able to conduct this warfare. So rather than actually being a um a propellant or an amplifier of

[09:28] American power in the region, in my view, the Israelis are consuming American power in the region with very little return for the United States. Um, now on to your specific questions. Precisely because this penetration occurred, I think Trump only doing a one-off is a key reason as to why it only ended up becoming a 12-year war. I think the Israelis would have been happy to continue the war as long as the US was in it. They were taking hits. They would take even more hits because the interceptors were running out. But it

[09:59] was worth the price if the US was in there because with the US's firepowers obviously vast superior to what the Israelis could do. But since Trump only did a one-off, the ceasefire was something that the Israelis also saw as beneficial to them precisely because they were taking such hits. But this is also precisely the reason why they will attack again. Israel does not tolerate that there are countries in the region that actually can deter Israel and that can attack Israel and afflict the cost. So it's intolerable according to their

[10:30] military doctrine as a result it needs to be eliminated. Uh and the longer they wait the higher the likelihood that many of these different factors from Iran's military readiness to uh political windows closing in Washington uh will create a much more complicated situation. So, I put the most likely uh further end to this somewhere in December because after that, the US will enter the midterm election season. We've already seen that this was not popular with MAGA. The only reason that it

[11:00] didn't cost Trump that much is because it was a one-off from their standpoint and you know, his him blasting that this was a major success and it wasn't a long war. No Americans were killed. the next war will likely not be like this and as a result it's not I'm not saying that the Israeli wouldn't be able to do it in January or February it's just it will be much much more complicated of a political calculation so the most likely window in my view ends sometime in in December now going back to the issue of nukes I'm not sure I have not heard that

[11:31] rumor I think perhaps that rumor is seeking to reflect um um uh another notion which is that in Trump's view in the view of the White House. They did this partially because Trump initially saw this as a success and then wanted to take credit for it which we clearly saw but also uh because of the fact that uh this was seen as a political compromise between the varying uh waring factions

[12:01] within the White House. those much closer to the Israelis, the neocons that are unfortunately still there who wanted to have a full-scale uh military confrontation who of course had the support of the Israelis and the more restrained minded people who were thinking this is just a huge distraction. We were supposed to get out of the Middle East. Why are we back in the Middle East for a war with no clear and achievable military objectives? We have spent 25% of our T that interceptors in a region that both Biden, Obama, and Trump said is no longer strategically vital to the United

[12:32] States. Why are we doing this? The the compromise in between was a one-off that would end the war because once Trump had done this, he put pressure on the Israelis and we saw how angry he was at the Israelis. >> Drop the F. >> Drop the F. I think it's historically unprecedented to do so in front of camera. Um, so it was a way to end it. I personally think that nevertheless, if you really didn't want to deal with this mess, you shouldn't have supported in the first place. >> The United States is fully capable of telling the Israelis, you can't do this

[13:02] for a very simple reason. We're not going to defend you. We're not going to shoot down the missiles you completely on your own. And imagine how many hits the Israelis would have taken if the United States didn't have the fads there. Didn't use all of it intelligence capabilities and all other capabilities to shoot down or identify the missiles and provide the Israelis with the intelligence. Israelis would simply not been able to stand the chance and as a result the US has massive leverage. The question is why are we not using it for our own purposes and our own interests? I want to ask you as a as a foreign policy analyst and observer

[13:34] what does the United States get out of this? And the reason I ask is that it's common knowledge that Benjamin Netanyahu over the last 20 or 25 years, every single time he came to Washington, he would ask whoever happened to be president, help us attack Iran. Every single time. And every president said no until Donald Trump said yes. So if the end result here is going to be what everybody thinks it's going to be and that is that the Iranians leave the NPT

[14:05] and no one could blame them uh and then come to a policy decision which I think they probably have already come to that they have to build a nuclear uh weapon in order to protect themselves from another nuclear state. Then what's what's the win for the United States? Why carry out a policy like this in the first place? There is absolutely none in my view. Our interest in the region is very very limited. I'm not one of those China hawks that says

[14:35] that China is the you know we have to go to war with China. But clearly East Asia, many other areas are far more strategically vital to the United States than the region is. Everything we do should be fuel feeding into a larger effort of reducing America's military presence in the region. we have still more than 50,000 troops about 19 bases in the region. Uh it is not sustaining stability. In fact, if you compare uh the situation in 1998 to 2020, there

[15:06] were about five armed conflicts in the region in 1998. By 2020, there were about 22. That is all happening under the era of American military hijgemony in the east. And of course many of those conflicts are a direct result of the invasion of Iraq which is entirely our fault. Uh whereas you know I'm not saying the US is responsible for everything but that that is coming out of the Iraq war is on us. Uh there is no way around that. So I don't think we have been able to stabilize the region.

[15:36] Um we've not been um uh and it's not been serving our interest either. In fact, we've seen a flourishing of intra regional diplomacy once regional powers that are close to us realize that the US is no longer going to defend them. Once Trump did not go to war with Iran after the Iranians attacked Saudi Arabia over these oil disputes and the matter in which the Saudis were helping Trump uh try to eliminate all of Iran's Iran oil exports, Trump decided not to go to war with uh Iran back in 2019 that when that

[16:09] happened. Uh and then later on under Biden when the Houthis attacked UAE the Amiradis expected that uh the US would enter into the war and instead Biden only issued two two press releases that send shock waves through the region making a lot of these countries who have had a very reckless and aggressive foreign policy enabled by their belief correct up to a point that we would back them up and bail them out in whatever u uh disasters they would get themselves into. Once they realized that they

[16:40] couldn't hide behind American military power, the prediction of Washington was, oh, if the US is not there to uphold stability, we will see deterioration, instability, all of these different things. Instead, the exact opposite happened. These countries started to invest much more in diplomacy, resolving their problems with Iran. I'm not saying that they're in love with Iran in any way, shape, or form, but diplomacy suddenly became much more optimal and and attractive once you no longer could hide behind American military power, which then means our military presence and hegemony in the region has actually

[17:11] been an impediment to regional diplomacy for regional states to resolve their own uh problems by themselves and then as a result take the burden of security or fantasy of security off of America's shoulders. So I think everything we should do in the region should go towards trying to help build some sort of a security architecture in the region that enables the United States to lead and recognize that we don't have a dog in most of these different fights. Who in Washington I think Marjorie Taylor Green who has um u emerged as a quite a

[17:44] strong voice on these matters actually put it very well in one of her historic tweets a couple weeks ago and says no one in my district has ever met a hooti. They don't even know what a hooti is. say that. Yes. >> Yeah. So, so this idea that the Houthis are a major threat to the United States from Obama to Biden to Trump and now back to Trump is is really ridiculous. We don't have a dog in that fight. In fact, to the extent that originally uh we may have had one is completely false because the Houthis were the main force against al-Qaeda, which actually we do

[18:16] have a beef with uh who did kill Americans in on American soil. So, um I think extracting ourselves from all of these different complaintings and recognize that most of them actually don't touch us and that we should actually learn a little bit from the Chinese who have managed to have pretty decent relations with everyone and despite all of the different turbulences in the region managed to stay out of it. Um and that's been dramatically successful for them. It would be for us as well if we just had the strength to pursue our own interest unapologetically.

[18:46] >> Trita, let's talk about the Chinese for a minute and the Russians. We can add the Russians in there as well. Iran has increasingly close relations with both of those countries as well as with other major uh countries, for example, the BRICS countries, which include Iran and Brazil and China and India and now a half dozen other places. What does this improvement in both diplomatic and trade relations mean for Iran? Is it going to be that much harder

[19:16] for the Israelis and the Americans to wage war against Iran when they have to think or consider potential responses from the Chinese or the Russians. So we have seen in the last five or seven years that Iran has managed to break out of a political isolation that it's faced. It joined the Shanghai uh organization. It joined the bricks mindful of the fact that Iran was not part of any such regional bodies or global bodies before. That is a huge step for the Iranians.

[19:46] >> But so far it's only had a political dimension. >> Economically I don't think we're seeing a significant increase in trade between Iran and many countries within the bricks >> because they're still afraid of American sanctions outside of India indirectly Russia and China. Iran is still suffering tremendously from the fear that other countries have from trading with Iran because of extr territorial American sanctions. So economically it definitely sets the stage for a different uh situation for Iran. It is

[20:18] still not yet materialized. The same is also true militarily. We have to remember BRICS is not a military organization. It doesn't have a military dimension. It is not a military pact in any way, shape or form. It is very explicitly not such a military pack. Shanghai conference has more of a security dimension to it of course but is also not a military pack. The Iranians do have a new agreement with the Russians but that does not amount to a pact in which they're coming to each other's defenses. I would say that by and large the Iranians are quite

[20:50] disappointed that they had hoped that at least from Russia they would have gotten more support mindful of the fact that the Iranians did provide a tremendous amount of support to the Russians in Ukraine. I think their expectations on the Chinese is far less because everyone knows the Chinese are clever and disciplined enough not to get themselves dragged into other countries conflicts. But the Iranians have invested heavily just in the last couple of months. Uh and we saw that the Iranian foreign minister said after this meeting in um

[21:22] Beijing just a couple of days ago that the meeting that the Iranian president had with she was one of the most historically important in Iran's history. It's difficult to know exactly what it means, but it seems to be a pretty big deal. Now, let's say that the Iranians actually are getting Isra Chinese uh air defense systems and fighters. That would nevertheless not have much of an impact uh for the next couple of months. That will take years to implement, train, all of these

[21:52] different things, which goes back to what I said earlier on. The window for the Israelis to attack um is still open from their standpoint up until sometimes in December. After that, it gets much much more complicated. and uh both politically and militarily and this is why I think more and more people are coming to the conclusion that there might be an attack. Well, let me throw out one other thing. Uh I'm not predicting that it will exactly happen then at all but I would say that perhaps the likelihood of it happening towards

[22:22] the end of September at the end of uh the high level week at the UN General Assembly in New York because two things happen. On the one hand, you have the end of the snapback 30-day negotiation period. The Europeans have triggered snapback sanctions on Iran. Those will come into effect by I think September 26th unless there is some sort of a deal between the Iranians and the Europeans. And it doesn't seem very likely because frankly the Europeans don't seem to be actually looking for the escalation. I

[22:53] think they want escalation at this point. I can go into greater detail as to why I think that is the case. that then provides a political window for the Israelis. Not one that they necessarily need, but definitely is a political lubricant because we're talking about a chapter 7 resolution being reimposed on Iran for at the UN. Secondly, during that same week, the French and the Saudis are making a major push for a large number of countries to recognize a Palestinian state. That includes the UK, it includes Australia, Malta, and a

[23:26] growing number of European countries. were the ones who haven't recognized Palestine yet. So the snapback may provide a political lubricant. The Palestine week may provide the reason as to why Netanyahu will need a distraction. Those things coming together may increase the risk of an attack happening around that time. It doesn't mean that it will, but if I were to make it better, I would say it's probably more likely then than it is 2 weeks later or two weeks before. May I ask you about the Europeans's uh snapback uh decision? A lot of people

[23:59] thought that they would want to offer up a temporary solution, somehow postpone the decision because of their continued adherence to the JCPOA that there was this weird situation that all of us in the Western world were in where we had come to this agreement with the Iranians that was the JCPOA. the Americans unilaterally withdrew. The Europeans remained in it and it allowed them to do at least some form of trade

[24:30] with Iran. That appears now to not be the case. It appears that the Europeans are moving again to the side of the Americans. Can you explain that decision and what it means for short-term relations between Western Europe and Iran? >> Yeah, I think the geopolitical situation has changed quite dramatically. It seems to have in the last 20 years or so from the European perspective, but also Europe itself has really changed to the worst in my view. Uh particularly since

[25:01] the Russian invasion, but it started a little bit earlier than that. Um I think it's important to remember that this whole constellation of the E3 uh Germany, UK and France is something that was invented in 2002 2003. It was not a constellation that had been given a mandate by the other European states to speak for Europe on foreign policy. But it was an initiative that was taken at the time because the Iraq war was so clearly a disaster and the Europeans were very worried that after Iraq, the United States would invade Iran as well,

[25:32] which frankly was in the cards. And they decided to intervene diplomatically in order to prevent war. That was the objective at the time. They managed to convince the Ivanians to suspend enrichment um and as a result dramatically take away a pretext that the Bush administration could have used in order to launch another war in the Middle East. Now fast forward to 2025, a lot has changed. I don't think the Europeans any longer are on this issue working for deescalation. they have seen a dramatic change in

[26:03] their uh security environment and one thing that is of particular importance to them is that the Iranians have supported Russia in Ukraine which means that the Europeans who in the past did not see Iran as a threat. They saw the nuclear program as a challenge but the real threat was war with Iran. That was the danger and they tried to prevent that together with preventing a potential uh dash for a bomb in Thran. Now they see Iran actually as a threat because of its support for Russia which they define as an existential threat. We

[26:34] can have a conversation as to whether that is accurate or not but nevertheless that's how they are presenting. So the need to punish Iran I think is something that was not present in the past in the calculation or at least not as prevalent as it was then. But then there's the other fact which is that the Europeans really know that they made themselves a vessel of the United States over the course of the last couple years. They had the option of going for strategic autonomy which I think actually would have been better for the US as well to have a more balanced and positive

[27:06] relationship with Europe rather than having them become some sort of an annex. Um but they didn't and instead after 2022 they double down on being dependent on the United States. And then Trump comes in, which they of course should have been able to predict that at least there was a high likelihood that that would happen. And now there is a disaster in the transatlantic relationship within the Trump administration. There is a faction, however, that is sympathetic to the Europeans on Ukraine that has tended to be very hawkish on Russia, Rubio and many others there. Uh and they have

[27:36] another priority which is that they really want to please the Israelis and they really want to go at Iran very strong. So I think you see suddenly uh a trade-off in which the Europeans are going along with the Rubio faction and escalation with Iran uh which is you know again what Ruben wants in return for hoping I don't think there's a promise but for hoping that that will lead to a scenario in which Trump will become more amenable to Europe's perspective on Russia and uh Ukraine

[28:07] which for the Europeans is far more important than Iran. We have to remember that over the course of the last 20 years of all these different sanctions, there is no trade between Iran and Europe, there was a moment in which 20% of Spain's um oil came from Iran. A very large portion of Greece and and Italies as well. That is no longer the case since 2012 or so in which the Europeans completely wean themselves off of Iran. So there is no economic implications any longer um uh for constant escalation

[28:39] with Iran. Iran has also been weakened in the region. So I think the Europeans are less worried about it. But they're very angry about the Iranian support for Ukraine and they're very worried about Russia and this is a trade-off that from the European perspective makes sense. And you know we can debate that but I think it's important to understand where this is coming from and then at a minimum recognize do not give the Europeans the benefit of the doubt of thinking that everything they're doing with Iran is in the direction of deescalation. It no longer is. >> It's not. One last question and I know

[29:09] that you're pressed for time and I I promise to let you go. I spent years living in Bahrain, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia. Back then, and I'm talking about the the 1990s into the early 2000s, there was a deep and abiding hatred of Iran and and distrust of Iran. Um, at least diplomatically, that seems to be changed or in the process of changing. Do you believe this is a temporary situation or have we entered a new period of diplomatic relations between the the

[29:40] Gulf countries and Iran? >> I think we have entered a new diplomatic era. Um it is no by no ch by no ways um something that cannot be changed back to something much more negative. And again, I think the key factor is that once these countries realize, ooh, we can't hide behind American power. Pushing the US to take military action against Iran is no longer an option. And even if it happened, now we also know that Iran actually can uh damage these countries tremendously because it takes far I

[30:12] think it takes about 7 minutes for an Iranian missile to hit Abu Dhabi. It takes 12 to 18 minutes to reach um um u Israel. Uh, and these are shorter range missiles that are um that the Iranians have far greater amounts of, right? I may have gotten some of these numbers uh wrong, but the the portion I think is correct. The point being that they recognize Iran actually can be very painful to them. They can hide behind American power. There is a willingness in Tean for diplomatic reconciliation and it actually makes sense for everyone

[30:44] else in the region as well. So, I hope that it's long-standing because from an American perspective, it is actually better for us. let these guys get along, have stability, make sure that it we don't have all of these different uh pushes for the US to get involved in their quarrels or in their fights. Um uh let trade and other things work out. That is much better for us than to think that we have to be military present, that we have to have uh military hegemony in the region or the fear that the Iranians will have military hygemony. The Iranians clearly are not

[31:14] in a position to be able to establish hegemony in the region. they've already lost uh tremendously but even if before that they didn't have that capability in fact there is no country in the region including Turkey that has the capability of establishing hegemony and the extra regional powers Russia and China are not dumb enough to try to seek hegemony in the Middle East because what's the benefit of it there is no benefit treats such a great treat uh to have you thank you so much for this conversation and uh

[31:45] we would love to do it again I appreciate for joining us. >> Well, treat Oh, no. Fantastic. Before you go, real quickly, where can people read more of uh of your work? You're at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Trade Craft. You have an incredible Substack. Is that the best place for people to go? >> Yes, they can go to the Substack. I think it's just parcy institute is quincy nst.org. >> Fantastic. Thanks for joining us. >> Thanks so much.
