Israeli espionage in the United States
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Israeli espionage in the United States is a subject John Kiriakou approaches from institutional memory rather than from documents: he was taught it as a new officer, and he argues the picture has since been politically reversed without the underlying facts changing.

What he was told in 1990

Kiriakou's first week at the CIA, in January 1990, was spent in an auditorium receiving briefings. The director of security gave practical pointers, never eat at a particular steakhouse down the street, because the KGB assumed agency staff ate there and had taken every table, and then gave the counterintelligence picture. There were two official Israeli intelligence representatives in Washington, based at the embassy: one from Mossad and one from Shin Bet, both conducting liaison. Against those two, the FBI had identified 187 Israeli spies spread across America, mostly infiltrating American defence contractors to steal secrets, and, as the security director put it, it had not ended with the arrest of Jonathan Pollard. Israel was ranked a critical threat for counterintelligence alongside Russia, China, Cuba and North Korea, and possibly Iran.

Barred from the building

When Kiriakou joined, he says, "we did not like the Israelis at all. They were spying on us. They made it clear. They openly spied on us." They brought gifts with listening devices embedded in them, to the point that they were not allowed into the headquarters building at all, and the agency had to rent space elsewhere to hold liaison meetings with them.

2026

Kiriakou sets that history against two contemporaneous developments. A provision of the National Defense Authorization Act for 2027 would co-locate Israeli personnel with the Pentagon and permit Five Eyes-style liaison with the CIA. At the same time, the director of the Defense Intelligence Agency sent an all-hands email warning that the Israelis were being unusually aggressive in trying to recruit assets inside the agency and that all employees needed to be extra careful.

His objection is to holding both positions at once: "Either the Israelis are ranked as critical threat for counter intelligence ... or we're joined at the hip. But it can't be both." Asked whether an ally stealing sensitive technology repeatedly is normal, his answer was that if it were any other country in the world "we would be on the brink of war with them right now."

Asked what changed, he attributes it to politics rather than blackmail: a succession of presidents he characterises as Zionist in policy terms, and an incremental campaign on Capitol Hill through AIPAC that has reached the point where disagreeing with Benjamin Netanyahu as a person gets a person labelled antisemitic.

The last one per cent

Kiriakou has given the same counterintelligence briefing with the figure at 189 rather than 187 undeclared Israeli officers fanned out across the United States to steal American defence secrets, the number reached him in the same session in which new officers were warned off the steakhouse on Route 123, the restaurant closest to headquarters, on the grounds that the Russians assumed it was the only place agency staff ate and had taken every table. Israel was ranked critical threat, the highest counterintelligence threat level.

He answers the obvious objection, that the United States gives Israel everything, so there is nothing left to steal, with an arithmetic he returns to often: "Actually, cuz we don't give them everything. We give them only 99% of everything. And they want that last 1%." The F-35 is the worked example he offers for it, and the Emirates the control case: offered the same deliberately degraded export model, designated F-35E rather than F-35I, they said "Fine, we'll take it." Israel wanted the F-35 "with no letter afterwards", and, refused, decided to steal the avionics.

The first-day briefing

Kiriakou dates his knowledge of the scale to his first day at the CIA, sitting in the auditorium with three hundred other new hires for a briefing from the agency's director of security.

The figures given were these: at the Israeli embassy in Washington there were two declared intelligence officers, one from Mossad and one from Shin Bet. Against that, the FBI had identified 187 undeclared Israeli intelligence officers spread across the United States, mostly trying to infiltrate American defence contractors.

Kiriakou poses the obvious question himself, why not arrest them, and gives the answer he was given: because of the closeness of the political relationship, and because Congress would not stand for it.

He treats Jonathan Pollard as indicative of the broader problem rather than exceptional, and is precise about the classification involved: Pollard was a Navy intelligence officer who stole thousands and thousands of pages of documents that were not merely secret but top secret, and sold them to Israel for money, "not for ideology or because he was Jewish or loved Israel."

Ninety-eight and two

Kiriakou states the relationship as an asymmetry with a number attached. "Israel actively spies on the United States. The United States does not spy on Israel. We are not permitted to do that. We have not done that in many many many decades." Against that, he says, Mossad and Shin Bet run undercover officers "spread all around the country, mostly in American defense contractors, stealing secrets to pass back to Israel."

The proportion is what makes it absurd to him rather than merely hostile: "we give the Israelis 98% of what we have. And they're out there trying to steal that last 2%." His conclusion follows from the counterintelligence file rather than from politics, "Israel was a hostile country. It remains a hostile country."

What he calls the disconnect is that this assessment never reaches the legislature that funds it. He points at members of Congress wearing IDF uniforms on the floor of the House, and at senators, naming Tom Cotton as chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, along with Lindsey Graham and Ted Cruz, flying Israeli flags outside their offices. "Well, where is your loyalty? Is your loyalty to the United States or is it to this foreign nation? Because it can't be to both."

The all-hands warning (2026)

In August 2026 Kiriakou dated a fresh warning precisely: three weeks earlier, "the Defense Intelligence Agency sent out an all hands email warning every single employee of DIA that Israeli espionage against the US government is at an all-time high right now", with the same instruction he had been given on his own first day, not to discuss work outside the building. His objection is not to the warning but to what follows it: "we just accept that."

The scale he attaches to it is unchanged from his other tellings, "there are Israeli spies everywhere, hundreds of them, all over Washington", and so is the placement: embedded in the defence contractors, on Capitol Hill, and attempting to get inside the CIA, the FBI and the DIA. What has changed, in his account, is only that no politician will now say it aloud.

The episode he offers as his own first evidence, a colleague's encrypted call dropping to reveal Israeli listeners on the line, is treated separately under Israeli interception of US secure calls.

See also

- NDAA Section 219
- Jonathan Pollard
- F-35 avionics dispute with Israel
- MOSSAD
