[00:02] You were involved in the capture of Abu Zuba. >> I was. Uh and tell me about that. How it happened. >> It was quite a long process. Uh we had information that Abu Zubedo was somewhere in Pakistan uh in either Fisabad or Lahore. And we undertook a uh a weeksl long month-long uh investigation. We were able to narrow his location down to more than a dozen possibilities. and working with the Pakistani government and with the FBI, we we raided each one of those sites and
[00:33] found him in one of the in one of the houses. >> And how were you able to focus in on where he was? >> It was very difficult, but it was it was really a combination of of things. It was it was a wide variety of sources reporting on possibilities of where either he might be located or where uh others might be located who would know of his whereabouts. We decided not to take the chance and and just hit one or two sites, fearing that uh word would get back to him and he'd have a chance to to run off and and go deeper
[01:05] underground. So, we elected to hit all the sites at the same time at the same night. And we're lucky enough that he was in one of them. >> And how many uh people did that involve? A big operation, I think. >> Yeah, just on the American side, it was about three dozen people. There were a lot of uh there were a lot of heroes that night. People worked hard and worked closely together and it worked. And why were you uh focused on him? >> We were told at the time, well, we had a lot of information on Abu Zuba going back into the 90s. He was one of the financiers of the September 11th attacks. He was a logistics chief uh of
[01:38] al-Qaeda and we knew that he was close to Bin Laden, although not colllocated. Obviously, we know that we knew at the time that he had aligned to Mid Laden and we thought that if we could capture him, it would deal a significant blow to the al-Qaeda leadership. And he was in Pakistan. >> He was in Feist Labad, Pakistan. Correct. >> And how long had he been there? >> We're not sure. It it seemed to us he admitted to having been there a week. We thought he was probably there more like 2 or 3 weeks. >> And when was this? >> This was in March of 2002.
[02:08] >> So you'd been looking for him since September 11th essentially. >> We had We had indeed. >> And uh when when the catch was made, when you caught up with him, he hit the right place. What happened there? Did he resist? >> He resisted. There was a shootout. The Pakistanis were the first uh inside the door and he stabbed a Pakistani policeman in the neck. Uh we feared at the time that he that he had died. Things were happening so quickly it was confusing and uh the Pakistani authorities told us initially that the man had died. He turned out to just have
[02:38] been wounded. But then Abu Zubeda uh went up to the roof of his house and tried to jump to the roof of the neighboring house. He exchanged in a in a gun battle with the Pakistani police down below and he was shot three times and then dropped from the roof of the house onto the ground. He was almost killed. And later that night, one of the doctors, the Pakistani doctors who was treating him told me that he had never seen wounds so severe where the patient had lived. >> And what happened to him after you caught up with him on? >> Well, we took him to a hospital for for
[03:08] emergency uh treatment. The hospital in Vice Labad was uh was just a a terrible place. So we evacuated him to a military hospital in Lahore and uh the director of central intelligence George Tennant immediately got on the phone to John's Hopkins University and asked if they could send a trauma surgeon to Pakistan. So that trauma surgeon got on a plane, a private plane, flew directly to the base and uh I guess it was about 24 hours
[03:40] after the shooting uh he was able to begin treating Abu Zabeta. >> And what was the nature of his wounds? >> He was shot in the thigh, the groin, and the stomach with an AK-47 >> and barely survived. >> Barely survived. One of the things that sticks in my mind uh from those those days and nights was how much blood he lost. There was blood everywhere. It was all over him. It was all over the bed. It pulled underneath the bed. It was all over us every time we had to move him. It was really an incredible amount of blood that he lost.
[04:10] >> After you captured him, what was your security like to keep him under uh lock and key? >> The security was I tore up a sheet and tied him to the bed. >> You did? >> Yeah. That was about all we could do in those initial hours. Um the idea was we wanted to get him to a to a place where he would be safe, where he could recover from his wounds and where we could begin interviewing him. But uh the idea was uh just to keep everybody not with us or his medical team away from him. And that's what we did. There was a group of
[04:42] nurses and he had the Pakistani military doctor uh doing everything he could to help him. But otherwise, it was me and it was a small group of uh of CIA and FBI people who just kept 24/7 eyes on him. >> So, you were in the room that whole time? >> Yeah. And in fact, I was the first person that spoke to him when he came out of his coma. >> And what did you say? >> He asked me, well, first I went up to him and I I asked him in Arabic what his name was and he shook his head and I asked him again in Arabic and then he answered me in English and he said that he would not speak to me in God's language. Uh, and then I said, "That's okay. We know who you are." And then he
[05:14] asked me to smother him with a pillow and I said, "No, no, we have we have plans for you." Um, and I encouraged him from the very beginning to cooperate and to tell us what he knew. Frankly, there were lives at stake and we knew that he was the biggest fish that we had caught. We knew he was full of information and uh and we wanted to get it. One of the reasons why it was of such uh importance to us that night is the room where where he was when the raid began had a table in it and on the table Abu Zuba and two
[05:44] other men were building a bomb. The soldering iron was still hot and they had the plans for uh for a school on the table. So we knew that there were u immediate threats that he could uh he could help us with. A school where >> in Lahore in Lahore Pakistan >> a Pakistani school >> we think it was the American school or the British school I guess it was not the American school. >> So you felt that he was he was very current. He knew what was going on. >> Very current on top of of the current threat information. He he was so well
[06:16] tied into the al-Qaeda leadership and he was he was highly thought of in al-Qaeda and he was very very good at logistics. um that we knew that he knew everybody who was worth knowing in al-Qaeda. He knew cell leaders, he knew logistics people, he knew finance people. We knew that he was really one of the intellectual leaders of the group. And when you began to speak with him then did you uh revert to Arabic? >> No, he would never speak to me in Arabic. And frankly, he was very polite about it. We never exchanged a harsh
[06:46] word. He was a he was an interesting person to sit and have a conversation with, but he would never speak to me in Arabic. And his English was quite good. >> It was fluent. >> He was fluent in English. >> He was. >> And what was his demeanor? >> He was a very, it's funny to have to say it like this, but he was a very friendly guy. Um, later on he did things like he wrote poetry or he would debate uh the merits of Islam or he would want to talk about the differences or similarities between Islam and Christianity. Uh he
[07:18] wanted to talk about current events. He he told us a couple of times that he had nothing personal. There was nothing personal against the United States. It was Israel that he wanted to fight and that the United States was close to Israel and we had been caught up in whatever it was that that bothered him and uh he he he regretted having to help plan attacks against Americans. But because these were in the end attacks against Jews and Israelis, it was something that he felt he had to do. So
[07:50] there was no attempt on his part to deny involvement. >> Oh no, not at all. Not at all. He was quite open. >> And did he talk about 911? >> Yeah. He said that um that 9/11 was necessary that although he didn't think that there would be such a massive loss of life, his view was that 911 911 rather was supposed to be a wake-up call to the United States. It wasn't supposed to be something that so shook the United States that it led the US to attack uh
[08:21] al-Qaeda's bases in Afghanistan. Um in previous attacks, the USS Cole, the embassy bombings in in East Africa, the US government responded with missile strikes against alleged al-Qaeda sites, and they truly believed that that's how we were going to respond to September 11th. They didn't think that there would be an all-out attack. So they didn't anticipate the death toll being so uh large. >> They didn't they didn't think the buildings would collapse. >> And that's what he told me. >> As you began to talk to him, was time of
[08:52] the essence? Did you feel you had to get him to talk? >> Yes. Because in the beginning, while like I say, he was friendly uh and he was willing to talk about philosophy, he was unwilling to give us any any actionable intelligence. And what in your mind was your way you were going to get him to give that up? We had a group of folks uh at the agency who were trained in uh what have been reported in the press to be called enhanced techniques. Um I came back to the to the United States to headquarters to move on to a
[09:23] different job. But we had these trained interrogators who were sent to his location um to use the enhanced techniques as necessary to get him to open up uh and to report some threat information. And can you describe them >> in in generalities? I suppose I can say that that my understanding is that what's been reported in the press uh has been correct in that these enhanced techniques included everything from uh what was called an attention shake where
[09:54] you grab the person by the lapels and shake them uh all the way up to the other end which was waterboarding. >> And that was one of the techniques. >> Waterboarding was one of the techniques. Yes. >> And was it used on Zeta? It was. >> And was it successful? >> It was. >> What happened as a result of that? >> He resisted. He he was able to withstand the water boarding for quite some time. And by that I mean probably 30 35 seconds. That's quite some time. >> Which was quite some time. Um and a short time afterwards in the next day or so he told his interrogator that Allah
[16:38] torture? >> Um, you know, at the time, no. At the time, I thought this was something that we we really needed to do. I I had heard stories of of captured German prisoners from the Second World War playing chess with their interrogators and over the course of many weeks and months of playing chess, they develop a rapport and the German ended up giving information. Al-Qaeda is not like a World War II German P. It's a different world. These guys hate us more than they
[17:10] love life. And so they're not you're not going to convince them that because you're a nice guy and they can trust you and they have a rapport with you that they're going to confess and give you their operations. It's it's different. >> You're not going to be able to slowly seduce them to talk. >> Not these guys. And at the time I I felt that water boarding was something that we needed to do. And as time has passed and has as September 11th has has, you know, has moved farther and farther back into history, um I think I've changed my mind. And I think that uh waterboarding
[17:42] is probably something that we shouldn't be in the business of doing. >> Why do you say that now? >> Because we're Americans and we're better than that. >> But at the time, you didn't feel that way. >> At the time, I was so angry and I wanted so much to help disrupt future attacks on the United States that I felt it was the only thing we could do. >> And with Zaba, you think that was successful? >> It was. >> And we have reported that Khaled Shik Muhammad was also waterboarded. I was out of it by then, but it's my understanding that he was that he was also water. >> But those were really the only two
[18:13] >> to the best of my knowledge. Yes. >> And bottom line, as you sit here now, do you think that was worth it? >> Yes. >> Did it compromise American principles or did it save American lives or both? >> It it I think both. It may have compromised our principles, at least in the short term. And I think it's good that we're having a national debate about this. We should be debating this and Congress should be talking about it because I think as a country, we have to decide if this is something that we want to do as a matter of policy. I'm not saying now that we should, but at the very least, we should be talking about it. It shouldn't be secret. It should be out there as part of the national
[18:44] debate. >> It's been revealed now that the CIA had tapes of the interrogation underway. Were you involved in the taping process? >> No. In fact, I first learned about it in the press yesterday. Do you were not you did not see cameras? We had cameras everywhere, but it was our understanding at the time that they were closed circuit cameras so that other interrogators and medical personnel and security officers could watch the interviews uh taking place. >> You didn't see it being recorded anywhere? >> No, I never saw it being recorded. >> And now that you know it was recorded and the tapes were destroyed afterwards,
[19:15] >> what do you make of that? >> I'm disappointed, frankly. I understand that the AY's explanation was they wanted to make sure that everything was being done legally and within the uh the guidelines that that the organization had set forth, but it makes me wonder instead if they simply didn't trust the interrogators and if they wanted to catch somebody doing something that was unauthorized. So, frankly, I'm a little disappointed that they didn't have that trust in us. Having already been polygraphed, having undergone, not me, but other interrogators, having
[19:46] undergone uh the training, they still didn't trust us enough to uh to let us do do our jobs. >> You never saw tapes coming out of a machine or being sent off to Washington? >> No, never saw tapes. >> And never reviewed them when you were back in Washington? >> No, never heard about them even. >> Really? So, they were very closely held. >> Very closely held. >> Should they have been destroyed, do you think? Uh, I think not. I think they're a matter of uh of historical record, at least within the agency. Uh, they may have uh some legal import, and they
[20:18] probably should not have been destroyed. >> If we were able to look at those tapes with Abu Zuba, what would we see? >> I think you'll see a lot of very long and very boring conversations about the minutia surrounding the leadership of al-Qaeda. I think you'll see a couple of incidents where uh at least in the beginning where he was um very tough and uncooperative and then the rest of it I think you'll see just a lot of open conversations. >> Will you see him being slapped? >> You know, I have no idea if that kind of
[20:50] thing was was taped. I would assume that it was. So, you might you might see something like that. If they tape the enhanced interrogation, >> we would see what >> an open-handed belly slap maybe or somebody who's very tired because he's been up for 48 hours and not allowed to sit down, >> but kept much more than that. >> Kept him standing for 48 hours >> and do you suppose they taped the waterboarding? >> Gosh. Uh, I honestly don't know. >> I don't know. If the American public was
[21:20] to see somebody even Abu Zaba being waterboarded, what would you guess would >> I think it would be objectionable. It it's it's sort of a violent thing to to see or to go through. You may be of, you know, one persuasion of the other where you think it's a necessary thing or or you think it's torture, but either way you dice it, uh it it's not something that's pretty to watch. >> How does the body react? >> Uh violently. To me, it's almost like being shocked where you tense up because you want to
[21:51] you want to wiggle out of the way of the water and you can't because you're strapped down and and your head is immobilized and you just have to lay there and take it until the interrogator stops pouring water on you >> and the water's poured and you have a kind of gag. >> Mhm. >> And you're just gagging. >> Yes. You're gagging. >> Correct. >> Shouting or you can Can you do it? >> Sure. >> Mhm. and was a beta that was really only 354 seconds that >> which was remarkable at the time because none of us were able to withstand more than 10 seconds worth 10 or 12 seconds.
[22:22] He was quite tough I recall. >> And you think that's what broke him though? >> I do. I do. I think he just didn't want to go through it again. And if the alternative is just sitting at the table across from a guy with a notepad and answering his questions, it's better just to answer the questions. >> And he decided to do that. >> Yes. And was that considered a victory inside the CIA? A big victory because once the information started coming in and we were able to corroborate it with other sources uh and able to to uh uh
[22:55] disrupt other operations, al-Qaeda operations or terrorist attacks. That was a big victory. >> And who else was present at the interrogation? >> There were always several interrogators. >> All CIA. >> Uh all CIA. uh there was a doctor and >> a CIA doctor >> a CIA doctor and then once in a while there would be um a substantive expert like an analyst who was there to ask the question somebody who really understood the the details of what needed to be asked uh who was there and just happened
[23:26] to be around and asked to to stand in. >> Were there FBI agents present at all? >> It's my understanding that later on in the process after I had moved on that FBI agents participated as well. Not necessarily in the waterboarding, but in the interrogations. >> We heard reports that the director of the FBI instructed the agents not to be involved in any >> I'm sure that's true. Interrogation. >> I'm sure that's true. Those authorities that came from the White House to to do the the enhanced techniques were solely for the CIA, not for the not for the FBI. So, it would make perfect sense to me that the FBI director wouldn't want FBI personnel around.
[23:56] >> And did you and other CIA officers feel without a doubt you had the legal right to do what you were doing? >> Absolutely. Absolutely. I remember I remember being told when uh the president signed the uh the authorities that they had been approved uh not just by the National Security Council but by the but by the justice department as well. I remember people being surprised that the authorities were granted and I remember uh one of the AY's senior most leaders saying this is this is an awesome responsibility that we have to
[24:27] act within the confines of the law. this isn't going to be something that's being done willy-nilly that people are going to be trained in it and we have to follow this to the letter >> and that was done. >> Yes. >> People were very very concerned at the time about making sure that that no one overdid it or no one overstepped the the legal authorities. People were very concerned. So when the decision was made to first do the slap of Abu Zuba, the permission for that came specifically from
[24:58] Washington. >> Yes, absolutely. There was discussion. It wasn't just a cable came in, can I slap him? And the answer is yes, and the cable goes back out saying yes. There was discussion. Should we slap him? What's to be gained if we slap him? Is there going to be any fallout to slapping him? Everybody talks about it. The deputy director for operations says, "Yes, you can slap him." The cable goes out. They slap him, send in a cable again saying, "We slapped him and this is what happened." And if that works, great. If that doesn't work, well, maybe
[25:28] we shake him by the lapels the next time. And you go through the whole process again. >> And it got to the point where you got to sleep deprivation. He was standing up for how long? >> You know, I use that as an example, but I'm I'm not sure to be honest with you if they did the sleep deprivation with him. Uh I I I don't specifically remember that being used on him, although it was one of the enhanced techniques. It's possible, you know, it's 5 and a half years after the fact now. It's possible that that that was skipped over in favor of waterboard. >> So you didn't have to go through every step? >> No. >> So if there was a time sensitive, you
[25:59] could you could go right to it. >> That's right. >> And when the sleep deprivation was used on others, uh was that effective? >> It was effective. It was effective. >> Why is why is that so effective? You know, you may not think about it, but but exhaustion is is a very difficult thing to handle. It's one thing to be tired. It's another thing to be so tired that you begin to hallucinate. Uh, and after a while, some people just can't take it anymore. And they'll tell you, if just give me an hour, give me two hours of sleep, I'll tell you anything
[26:30] you want to know. >> Really? >> Mhm. And that's after how long? Generally, >> I recall the handful of times it was used on people. It was usually 40 hours plus. They just simply couldn't take it anymore. >> And they'd be standing this whole time. >> Mhm. >> Falling over trying to >> And you do things like you play music, you talk to them, you make them walk around so they they can't get comfortable. >> After Zubeta was interrogated and really gave up all he knew, at least you all
[27:01] you thought he knew about current operations, what was his value then? His value was it allowed us to have somebody who we could pass ideas on to for his for his uh comments or analysis. For example, we would say things like uh Mr. X was arrested in some European capital and the Europeans think he was going to undertake such and such an operation. Would he be the person to do something
[27:33] like that? And Abu Zubir would say something like, "Yes, he's the perfect person." Or or yes, he had a he had a specialty in bomb making, let's say, or in weapons or in fake documents. Or conversely, he would say, "No, that doesn't make any sense. He didn't have any experience in that area." Or, "You should be looking at this other person. This other person had experience in that area." So, he was someone really to bounce ideas off of. >> He became a a resource in the sense of sort of like a a double check. >> Yes.
[28:03] And you used him a lot like that. >> Yes, we did. We used him a lot. >> And at that point, was he completely cooperative? >> Completely cooperative, >> but still hating the United States. >> Yes. But like he said, it was nothing personal. Uh he's a Muslim and a Palestinian. He's dedicated his life to the overthrow of uh of Israel, the end of the existence of Israel. The United States is on the is on the side of Israel, and it's nothing personal, but there's a war on and he's on the other side. And what happened to him? The initial interrogation was done in Pakistan.
[28:36] >> Now he was he was in such terrible physical condition in Pakistan that aside from a one or two minute conversation that we would have every four or five hours which was really about nothing. Uh he he was uh interviewed in in the uh the third country that he moved on to from there. >> Did he know where Bin Laden was? >> No. No idea. hadn't seen Bin Laden in six months, hadn't spoke to him in four months, didn't have any idea. >> And how about uh colleague Shik
[29:07] Muhammad? Did he have a sense of him? >> I was already gone by then. Um but my my guess is no. They're very stovepiped, very compartmentalized where almost no one knows where anyone else is. Uh they have this system of couriers that they use to communicate. They're never on the they're never on the phone there. It's they're they're real pros. >> He was moved from Pakistan, received medical care in a third country, and how long was he there? Was he continued to
[29:38] be moved? >> It was my understanding that that he was moved a couple of times. >> You know, I probably shouldn't really say. >> Okay. All right. One more question. Okay. >> Uh and but he continued to be and continues to be a resource. >> I've been out of the agency for a while now, for almost four years now. Um when when I left he he was still a good resource to go to >> and people were valuing what he said. >> They were. >> Was he ever caught in a lie? >> No.
[30:08] >> An exaggeration? >> No. And we we really ran down everything that he said. Obviously there are other sources to to corroborate uh things. And this is one way that you're able to vet the people that you're speaking with. And to the best of my recollection, he never led us down the wrong path. Were there any other u tricks of the trade that you used to try to get him to talk? >> No, that was it. It was pretty straightforward. And the reason why we didn't use other tricks of the trade is because those those tricks of the trade require a great deal of time uh much of
[30:40] the time and we didn't have that luxury. We were afraid that there was another major attack coming. We were afraid that there would be an attack on US soil and we felt that we really needed to get to the bottom of what he knew quickly so we could disrupt those those possible attacks. >> And were those fears realized? Do you think there was in fact another major attack? >> I do. >> I think al-Qaeda is always planning another major attack. I think that this is an ongoing battle that we're going to be fighting for the next generation at least and it's always going to be a game
[31:11] of oneupmanship. We always have to have information that is at least as good as what they're planning. It's the only way that we can that we can stop these attacks. >> Given that you felt that uh water boarding and the enhanced interrogation broke him if you if somebody else was caught today, wouldn't you want to use the same techniques? >> I think that I would be very tempted to use the same techniques. I I >> In other words, in your view, they they do work. >> I Yes, they do work. >> No doubt about that. Like a lot of
[31:43] Americans, I think I I'm involved in this this internal intellectual battle with myself, weighing the idea that waterboarding may be torture versus the quality of information that we that we often get after using the waterboarding technique. And I struggle with it, I think, like a lot of people do where, like I said earlier, we're Americans and we're better than this and we shouldn't be doing this kind of thing. But at the same time, what happens if we don't
[32:13] waterboard a person and we don't get that nugget of information and there's an attack on a on a movie theater or a shopping mall or or in Midtown Manhattan, you know, at rush hour, then then what do we do? I I would have trouble forgiving myself. >> We've reported that the director of the CIA, Michael Hayden, has banned water boarding, at least for now. Yes. >> Hasn't been used. >> Yes. and maybe since Khalishek Muhammad. Did he make the right decision? Do you think? >> I think he probably did. I I think
[32:45] >> I don't think it's permanently banned, but for the moment it is. >> For the moment it is. I think that we've we've gotten up and running to the to the extent that we're we have enough information coming in from enough different kinds of sources that we do have a handle on on al-Qaeda operations as they're being planned at least right now and that waterboarding is unnecessary. you know, the the months after September 11th were different because we were we
[33:16] were really reactive at the time, and we were we were stunned by the by the magnitude of of the attacks on September 11th, and we were afraid that something of of equal um uh scope was was in the works. And we were really trying to do anything that we could to stop another major attack from happening. And I don't think we're in that mindset right now. I think we're chasing them all over the world. I think we've had a great deal of success chasing them, not just by
[33:48] ourselves, but with other with other governments. And uh as a result, waterboarding, at least right now, is unnecessary. >> And it's your view that al-Qaeda has been foiled, that it wasn't because they couldn't do it again, but because >> efforts by the US and others stopped them from >> it disrupted them. Yes. There are hundreds and hundreds of patriotic Americans working for very little money with no vacation and no sleep and no time with their families, working in horrible parts of the world just to make
[34:19] sure that another attack doesn't occur. >> Why did you leave the CIA? >> Were you upset with yourself, what you did? >> No, I loved the CIA. I still love the CIA. Uh but I'm a middle-aged guy. I have four children and I wanted to spend more time with my family and I thought that you know there there's more to life than just running to the four corners of the earth on 6 hours notice to meet some terrorist and uh I wanted to just spend more time at