[00:02] Welcome to Crossing the Fence. The largest multi-faith podcast out there. I'm John Penna and today I have an an old friend, John Kiriakou. So it's to come in and and we'll spend some time with me. A former CIA, now a media guru and out there, you know, I see all your assessments on all the other things that go on and you and I had operated in multiple theaters and tangentially sort of interact with each other through other people like they say. But I wanted to you know, we had I invited
[00:32] you on to to to cuz I had I sent you a my assessment of of intelligence assessment of the events surrounding the Holy Week and and we but we decided to table that for a later date because I felt compelled to ask you about the meeting between Trump and Zelensky in the Vatican and that that you mean from an intelligence perspective it's just an amazing moment in time because you and I
[01:03] espouse very similar views about how diplomacy direct diplomacy is is really gone by the wayside but now it's kind of front and center. And so maybe you could you know, let's just start off with you know, this meeting happened the two of them are sitting in the sort of famous pictures now face-to-face very intimate and and what is that from a you know, if you put your intelligence hat on and this was the this sort of picture found its way to your desk at the CIA. You know, you and and you and you were gathering you know, all the components of that event. What how would you how would you
[01:35] how would you proceed to to to gather but then on top of that assess what's going on? I think you have to assess assess it based on what we already know about interactions between Zelensky and Trump. Everybody saw that Oval Office performance when Zelensky went to meet with Trump and JD Vance and received a dressing down that was really unprecedented in the last generation or two. And it was an unprecedented not just
[02:06] because Donald Trump humiliated Zelensky um in that in that venue which was public because this was this was the part of the of the Oval Office photo op where they're supposed to be chatting about the weather. As as the media take their pictures and then the media is escorted out and then they can really go at each other. Trump went after Zelensky with the media there. He did it on purpose. One of the things that really struck me
[02:38] you know, and like you I I have long experience. I was 15 years at the CIA. I was another 3 years at the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. I've gone through many of these kinds of events and they're always pro forma. Yeah. But not only did Trump lash out at Zelensky. He allowed Vance to lash out at Zelensky and I got to tell you since the 1980s when I was privy to this kind of information I've never seen a vice president speak
[03:10] in an event like this. It's not their position to speak. It's their position to sit quietly and nod. Yeah, I was shocked when that happened and I go I I don't even know how Vance wandered into the conversation and wandered out. I go how was that possible? >> Which then should tell us and this is my analysis that I I think you would agree with. This was a setup from the get-go and Vance was playing the role that he was assigned by Trump. Yeah. So they they ganged up on him. So with that as background
[03:42] the Pope dies. Trump initially won't confirm who is going to make up the US delegation. He ends up leading the US delegation which frankly kind of surprised me. I just assumed that Vance would because he was already there and he's Catholic but Trump went and had this private meeting with Zelensky. Now private here is the operative word. Because what was supposed to be a private meeting at the Oval Office really never took place.
[04:13] Remember Zelensky was thrown out of the Oval Office and summoned his his limo and and took off. This was actually a private meeting and all we really know about it is that you know, they sat there and talked. We don't know what they said because we aren't privy to it. That also was done on purpose but I think and and please feel free to disagree with me. I think that Zelensky was so
[04:44] cowed by his treatment in the Oval Office that he probably assumed this subservient position even in the private conversation. I think he's a little bit afraid of Trump. You know, we we know for example that Vladimir Putin um has said both privately and and publicly to the Russian media that he prefers to deal with Trump because they're closer
[05:17] on these issues than Putin has been with Democrats but Trump is so unpredictable Right. that it makes the whole thing just a guessing game. I think Zelensky probably has come to the same conclusion. Like do you risk pissing him off? Do you risk disagreeing with him? Do you risk what little aid he has vowed to continue to your country or do you just nod and say yes, Mr. President? Yeah, I think that you know, you have
[05:48] Putin who has a country behind him. Zelensky has a country behind him but Putin is very he's he's very open. He's like listen I stay the course. Presidents change and we have to maintain our policy. And you know, you know, that that's you know, you know, in the halls of the intelligence community I see you have you know, that that sort of mantra is on the wall. It's like the Russians going to stay their course. They're going to plan 25 years out. They're just that's who they are, you know. And then you have Zelensky. He's got the country behind him but he's relying on the US aid. He also there's there's the
[06:21] there's Trump 1.0 which he interacted with then Biden and now Trump 2.0 and I think that that that transition has been very difficult for him to navigate. Mhm. You know, and you had a lot of shenanigans with you know, the the the laptop and Biden's son and and and I don't think I think Zelensky navigated that in a in a probably a really good way with the Biden administration but he wasn't thinking about the change in guard if that happened. Agreed. How do
[06:53] you see that sort of the personal sort of vignettes That's that's a great question. That's a great question because we we see pretty clearly now where Zelensky dropped the ball. Zelensky dropped the ball because he either didn't think Trump was going to win again or he discounted the change in in opinion among Republican elected officials. You know, it's most Americans are neocons or neoliberals whether they even realize it
[07:24] or not whether they know what those words mean or not. When our government tells us we have to send troops overseas or we have to send arms overseas or weapon systems because we're the good guys and the other side are the bad guys. We just say, you know, USA USA. And that's changed in the Republican Party. The Republican Party is far more populist now far less interventionist. The Dick Cheneys are gone. They're out of power. John Bolton is watching from the sidelines.
[07:55] And I think that Zelensky just didn't have an appreciation for number one how the Republican Party has changed and number two the likelihood of of Donald Trump winning a second a non-consecutive second term as president. I mean that hasn't happened since 1880. Yeah. He didn't expect it to happen and now he's caught with his pants down because not only did the Republicans control the White House but they control
[08:26] both houses of Congress. And those blank checks that the that the Biden administration was sending to the Ukrainian government those are over. Yeah, and and and there's there's a muscle miscalculation of egos. There's been an elevation of Zelensky with obviously doing his world tour going out and and you know, hero and and and then you have Trump's ego, right? So you so both have an elevated egos. One is is long standing and one is has is he's sort of a nouveau, you know,
[08:58] nouveau ego, you know, so it's sort of but then you also have this our our internal politics which are is and the global politics is sort of an overlay where it's Zelensky is being cast as this good guy this hero behavior is is still a villain regardless of the fact that that you know, he's holding the purse strings, right? He's got all And so that that political mapping maybe you can pack that a little bit about you know, how how it's looked at cuz I've seen a lot of slogans floating around
[09:29] and I'm going like direct engagement is really good. You know, this is Camp David type stuff. You know, we didn't know what was going on at Camp David. I mean you Carter did all that business, you know, and and all these presidents Reagan had called Gorbachev. We'd call the premiers and say look, you know, cut your shenanigans out here and we're going to we're going to do a side deal that no one's going to really know about but you know, we won't we won't bring our subs so close to Archangel's next time or Kamchatka Peninsula. Just make sure you pull these guys out or don't you know, and and so that direct engagement is so important. You know,
[10:00] you and I both believe in that. I mean, you know, you you know, human is your business, you know, it's in our business, what we do. So so the the the importance of that direct engagement and then you have, like I said, this backdrop of these political agendas behind it. So how do you how do you how do you balance that from an intelligence perspective? Yeah, there's a there's a long history of direct engagement. And and president after president has made great use of Camp David. I mean, first of all, look at the Camp David peace accords between Egypt and Israel. It's been a success.
[10:30] It's been a tense success, but it it's been a success. Then you then you've got Uh well, let's look at at peace negotiations between the Israelis and the Palestinians in the final week of the Clinton administration. There's a a story that I've told a number of times. A a dear friend of mine uh from the CIA, my first boss at the CIA, was the senior director of the National Security Council for the Middle East, and he participated in those face-to-face talks at uh Camp David. It was Shimon Peres uh
[11:03] leading leading the Israeli side and uh and Yasser Arafat uh leading the Palestinian side. During the final week of the Clinton administration, um they had a they were at Camp David. My my boss told me that they had this enormous map of Jerusalem sitting on the conference room table, and with a Sharpie, they're dividing Jerusalem block by block, right? And then they finished. And Al Gore said,
[11:34] "We have peace." And Arafat said, "I could never sell this to the Palestinian people." And he walked out. And Gore ran after him and said, "Wait a minute, you can't just walk out if there's something that you don't like. Say it, and we'll negotiate an agreement." And he said, "I'll never be able to sell any peace deal to the Palestinian people." And he quit, and there wasn't peace. Sure. I mean, it was that close. And there's no downside to talking. Look
[12:06] at what Donald Trump did with the North Koreans. The Democrats the Democrats practically had a collective stroke over Donald Trump engaging directly with the North Koreans, saying they legitimized Kim Jong Un. They Donald Trump welcomed him into the international community. Yeah, so what? Yeah. It's better to talk than to not talk. I remember that when I was at the CIA, we used to have this this joke that during the
[12:38] George W. Bush administration, we had never seen people work so hard to not talk to our enemies. Right. Like they really worked hard leveling sanctions against other countries, never engaging in direct conversations. Right. And I want to add one other thing about Donald Trump, and I may be completely wrong on this, but I think I'm I think I'm right. Donald Trump absolutely hates that Barack Obama won the Nobel Peace Prize. Hates it. So do I, frankly.
[13:10] Yeah. Cuz he didn't deserve it. He only won it cuz he wasn't named George W. Bush. But Trump desperately wants to win the Nobel Peace Prize. Um there are no talks with North Korea. So the next best thing is talks with Iran. Sure. And so he wrote this letter to Ayatollah Khamenei, who first said, "No, I never got any letter." And then said, "Yeah, I got a letter, we're not taking it seriously." And then within days they announced
[13:42] talks in Muscat. Sure. They they've they're in the middle of the third round of talks right now. The first round with the talks were indirect. The Omani foreign minister is shuttling between two conference rooms at the Omani foreign ministry. The Iranians are in one, the Americans are in another. The first round, they ended up taking a picture together, which was a very important step. They met a week later in Rome indirectly. That was a success. Now technical experts are meeting also
[14:12] indirectly and again in Muscat. I don't pay attention to what comes out of the State Department on these issues. And and I want to talk about that a second, too. I pay attention what's coming out of the Iranian foreign ministry because I have found that the Iranians are more direct in their assessment of these kinds of meetings than the Americans are. And the Iranians are saying, "Oh my god, this may actually turn into something." The the statements coming out of the
[14:43] Iranian foreign ministry have been universally positive so far. Universally positive. And you know, JT, we used to have this phrase you're you're just about as old as I am, you'll probably remember it. In the '70s, people said, "Only Nixon could go to China." Because Nixon was the most anti-communist, the most anti-Chinese president in American history. And then he makes a trip to China. He gives Mao two buffaloes and a Lincoln
[15:14] Continental. Mao gives us two pandas, and we all live happily ever after. Yeah. Yeah. Well, maybe only Trump could go to Tehran. Yeah. Well, the open communication is so so important. >> It's like a It's like a no-brainer. Yeah, why are you so >> downside. Well, and you you know, the problem is you have diaspora in just with the Iranians, you have diaspora that's been acting in the >> important point. You know, and and these are all people that in '79 lost everything, but we're also part and
[15:44] parcel to the regime. I mean, I've been in those meetings with like people that say, you know, "We're going to restore, you know, the Shah you know, the Shah you know, the sons of you know, we're going to do this." And I'm going, you know, frozen. I I I was I was raised I think my great-grandfather died when I was 10. I was raised you know, Indo-Greek was my my first language. I was raised by my grandpa grand- grandparents. So I when I speak Indo-Greek in in in Afghanistan, I speak like like an old man because he left in 1896. I don't I don't even know the word sometimes. I spoke I spoke in 1930s era
[16:15] Greek slang when I when I went to formal, you know, Greek training. Right. And so here I am, and and and my Russian is is Soviet Russian, right? So I want to Of course. instead of my drug. I don't want to say my friend, I want to say, you know, comrade. Yeah. That's what I want to say, you know. And so the the all the diaspora here, the Iranian diaspora, is frozen in time. And they are the advisers, you know, and that's the problem is like there's if you don't have direct contact, then all we're doing is looking is is looking
[16:47] backwards into this old thinking. And so you have the you have an opportunity with direct engagement, even through enemies, just to say, "Hey, you know, what what are you thinking over here? What's going on?" Yeah. You guys got what we wanted. You guys got a flourishing pharmaceutical industry. You want to know what? Maybe we could tap into that. You know, let's not destroy these beautiful buildings. How do we figure this out? You know, and but no two people are talking like that, and we're working it's all through proxy and proxy and proxy. And you know, you know what you know that term chatter? You know,
[17:18] it it >> Oh, yeah. Too much information, and you don't know what to what to how to you know, what's the right and what's wrong. Mhm. [clears throat] That's that's a big IC term. That it is. You know, you know, FDR library is right down the road here. Oh, that's funny. Yeah, yeah. And so I and I interned there. I was a I I worked there and then and when I was in college, and then and then I did an exchange in the olden years. I was the I'm the only American that was um that worked in in Russian archives. Imagine that. You know, I asked that you know, and I said, you know, I I went to the
[17:49] guy and I said, "Could you add that? Was it Where is it?" And he goes, "What?" And I go, "Hitler, where is it?" And he goes, >> [laughter] >> He's like, "You want to see him?" And we went, too. And they they they, you know, they pulled out a box, and um but in in any event, what's that? They still have him? Well, you know, there's some controversy about >> pieces of him. skull Yeah. I've heard I've heard about the skull that it's been on various directors' desks over the years. Yeah, who knows? >> Yeah. You know, who knows, but it was one of those things where it's like, you know, they how cool is it that they have
[18:19] There's anyways, you know, the they they you know, the the spoils of war and pivotal moment. But the thing is is that there's there's always this controversy at the FDR library where they talk about FDR knew he knew he knew that the Japanese were going to attack, right? And and I would say, "Look, there's there's so much chatter, there's so much information. How do you discern what's going on?" So there is a document that says this that that the Japanese will attack at this moment, and it's sort of like a smoking gun. But when you look at all the other credible sources there, the problem is
[18:50] there's not enough to discern what is and what isn't real. Absolutely right. 22 20 There's 22 documents that say they're going to attack at this date, and if you're have your readiness up, you know, you just burn through, you know, obviously your defense spending. So the challenge is is like if you don't if you don't have direct engagement, then you're only reliant on you know, all these different sources, and what's credible and what isn't credible, it it oscillates, right? Back and forth. So this direct engagement is so important. Zelensky and like now the
[19:22] Iranians, it's really important because working on stale, antiquated information or people with agendas is going to put us in a bad position. I think you're exactly right. You know. >> you're exactly right. And you know, another thing that's funny to me, too, is it seems like like we're the ones who push back against offers to engage directly. That it's it's not the other side. You know, look look at Putin, for example. Putin's position has been um consistent on this. He's like, "Sure, we'll talk.
[19:53] We'll talk to anybody. We won't necessarily come to an Sure. But we're always willing to talk. Right. And the United States isn't. We we come up with these positions and then just on principle, we we stick with those positions irrationally. We don't talk to the Cubans. Why? Just because. That's the policy. We don't talk to the until recently the Iranians. We don't talk to the Chinese. Even Trump said the other day, um that that we were talking to the Chinese
[20:25] about about trade and tariffs and the Chinese said, "No, we're not." We offered, but we never got a message. And the the reporter yesterday said, "Well, the Chinese the Chinese deny that that we're talking." And Trump said, "They're lying." And the reporter said, "Well, who is it that's talking?" And Trump said, "I can't tell you. It's a secret." Right. What the heck is that supposed to mean? Yeah. And doggone it, I hate when they make me want to believe the Chinese.
[20:57] Well, you know, here's you know, it's it's I think the thing is it's it's about you everybody wants predictability and control, right? You know, that's kind of and I know you know, it's so you're it's very difficult. I remember So, my first sort of experience with international diplomacy was was uh the at the FDR site when when the the summit the Yeltsin Yeltsin uh Oh, sure. Clinton. Mhm. And so, you know, I was low-level staff. I was you know, I spoke Russian so they gave me the they they they paired me with a Russian guy. And
[21:27] and one of the I just remember the IC just going completely insane because Clinton wouldn't go through the prescribed doors. Ugh, for God's sake. It was just it was all there's like this door and I just remember this big blowout uh continuously because he and Yeltsin would sort of sneak out a door and then go for a walk. Yeah. They genuinely liked each other. Right. And well, and and it was just a you know, we're talking hyper security. We're talking about you know, guys in the trees, you
[21:59] know, I was like, "What what's that guy doing up?" You know, but whatever guys in the tree and so they're you know, obviously it was safe. And but the the president they were so aggravated that he was he was just making decisions on the fly and that that that that ability to be mobile and and to adapt and then create the environment, which is what that picture sort of shows of Zelensky and and Trump where it's just like, "All right, let's just pull you know, they're not sitting in the you know, thrown chairs. They're sitting in just you know, those chairs that you use for weddings, you know, and
[22:30] they just pulled them up and they got really close and they're like, "Listen, what are we going to do here?" Yeah. You know, and and even even if there's some kind of ego or power power component or all these type of things, the reality is is that there's nothing you know, if you and I are sitting face to face and we're just chatting a little bit. You know, and Yeah. you know, I remember us going to Sette the Italian restaurant that's on on Connecticut and after we had chatted a little bit and there's no substitute to just sitting there and having a bowl of pasta and being like,
[23:01] you know, oh, what what's happening here? What's going on with the kids? What's happening with you know, And I and they had that conversation at length. And so, the value is amazing, but the bureaucracy hates the control lack of control. The technocrats hate the lack of control. I mean, this is a hallmark of your career post CIA. Right. The idea of like you have this whole bulwark that is trying to create predictability and and trying to pursue policy or steer policy, right? And and
[23:32] and it's mostly asymmetrical in how it approaches elected officials cuz he can't just and then you have an elected official that says, "I'm going to go through this door. We're going to sit down and we're going to do this." And before you know it, everybody's going, "What are they doing? What is going on?" And you can imagine around them is this swirl, right? >> Yeah. You know, maybe it's I guess it what's your take on that? Like what's going on in the halls of of government right now? You know, they call it the deep state or whatever you want but I don't I don't necessarily go to terminology, but the idea it's happening in this administration right now. No one really knows what what the conversation
[24:03] was. There's no cuz no one You know what I mean? And so Yeah, you're you're right. So now they're turning they're they're they're turning their their their powers on the White House right now to go, "What do we do? How do we support this in a way that enforces US policy or our agenda?" But the reality is is like we just don't know. And we don't We don't know. And I'll tell you the answer that I'm going to give you is vastly different, probably the opposite of what it it would have been 8 years ago. Because Donald Trump 8 years ago
[24:34] for all his talk surrounded himself with neocons. Right. Right. He had he had Mike Pompeo first as CIA director and then as secretary of state. He had bloody Gina Haspel as CIA director. He had uh uh John Bolton as the longest-serving national security adviser. Yeah. The people who really were anathema to what he campaigned on in the 2016 election. So, I think he learned that lesson.
[25:04] That's why Marco Rubio has literally nothing to do with the Iran talks. This is Steve Whitcomb. Yeah. Or Wycoff. How do you say Wycoff? Um Why isn't the Secretary of State of all people in charge of these talks? It's because he's a neocon. And he got that position because he because the appointment pacified an element of the Republican
[25:35] Party that needed pacification. But >> Sure. he's also young and he's not strong enough. Um uh how how should I say? Not strong enough politically to be able to stand up to Donald Trump independently. Sure. Um So, it's kind of a great little balancing act that's going on there. Now, It's also not unique. It's not not unique. Not not at all unique. You're right. >> I got got uh hop there was a Hopkins mission to
[26:05] Russia that negotiated Lend-Lease and Hopkins was the head of the TVA the Tennessee Valley Authority. >> You are absolutely correct. But FDR could trust him. So, he said, "I'm going to pull you because I know you're going to push this you're going to you're going to follow policies." So, that's Yes. I wanted him to just make sure like that's not unique, all right? Harry Hopkins was the Hopkins mission to Russia. I mean, here's a guy with the Tennessee Valley Authority on a plane to Russia and he's and he's thinking, "What am I supposed to be doing?" He goes, "You negotiate these three things. You give him petrol. You give him Lend-Lease and doesn't matter and
[26:36] you push the second front. You don't you don't even talk about that." You know, for a while, you know, so >> That's exactly right. Yeah, right? So, it's not I just I'm sorry to interject, but that's not >> happens this happens all the time. Sure. Yeah. I I'll tell you a story, JT. Yeah. And Yeah, I think I'm okay telling this story. So, I was serving in Bahrain from 1994 to 1996 and I was the economic officer very
[27:07] tiny embassy. Um But as the economic officer, I was very busy because Bahrain at the time was the Middle East's banking center. So, um there was a a group that was active there called the Bahrain US Banking Society. Okay. Whole bunch of American bankers that were all assigned uh to Bahrain and then of course the heads of the Bahrain banks and you know, >> Yeah. they would get together and drink and have dinner and parties and stuff. It was it was nice.
[27:39] They announced one day that they're giving a lifetime achievement award to David Rockefeller. And so, the ambassador uh announces that we're going to have this big dinner. It's going to be hosted by His Highness the Emir. It's going to be at the Royal Palace. The entire cabinet's going to be there. Bring your wives and it's to honor David Rockefeller and his lifetime achievement award.
[28:09] So, a couple of weeks pass. It's the night of the dinner. We go and there's a receiving line. It's the Emir and the Prime Minister and the Crown Prince and then this one and that one and David Rockefeller and all these people. So, we shake hands. I happen to be a subscriber of Art News magazine at the time and he had just gotten this big award in the art world for, you know, 50 years of philanthropy and humanitarianism. So, I congratulated him on his on his art award. He lit right up
[34:53] White House along with them. But but Ukraine is different. You know, at the CIA and listen, I've been out for 20 years. So it's been a long time 21 years. It's it's been a long time but I can tell you institutionally that the CIA um hates Russia. They just hate they hate Russia. Even when I was there when I was still there, um I was a
[35:23] I had this like mantra that even if we have poor relations with with Russia, we can still cooperate on things like counterterrorism, counternarcotics, counterproliferation. Sure. And people are like, are you crazy? They're the gravest threat to America today. I'm like, what what newspapers are you reading? Yeah, in what what sense? Yeah, I'm not seeing it. And and in 20 years later, I'm still not seeing it. Yeah. See, this is what happens though when you refuse to engage. This is what happens when you
[35:54] turn immediately to sanctions every time another country does something that you don't like. You know, sanctions sanctions sanctions to the point where sanctions are meaningless. Yeah. I have a very [snorts] dear friend, close friend who is Iranian-American and who goes to Iran twice, three times a year. And she sends me videos, she sends me pictures. And she has shown me that the Iranians lack for nothing. They have robust trade relations with
[36:25] Russia, with India, with China. Yeah. They don't need anything from us and they've gotten around sanctions because we've had sanctions on them for 46 years. And whatever they can't buy from the Russians, Indians or Chinese, they just make themselves. Sure. And so the sanctions have come to mean nothing, nothing. You know, look at sanctions on on Venezuela. We hurt ourselves as much as we hurt the
[36:56] Venezuelans because Venezuelan oil is the dirtiest oil in the world and has the highest sulfur content and until just two years ago or so that dirty oil could only be refined in Texas. Okay? Nowhere else. Well, guess what? Because we have these these crushing sanctions on Venezuelan oil cuz we don't like their politics the Chinese built a refinery in the Caribbean and now Venezuelan oil is refined by the
[37:26] Chinese. So we've lost all that business and all that oil and all of that oil had been refined in the US. And we purchased most of it. Now it's all gone. So we only hurt ourselves. Yeah, I think that there's a you know, that that that the the path forward, you know, I is is I think that the chessboard is changing a little bit. We're at the beginning of of the Trump administration. So we've got you know, three more years. So there's an opportunity where it comes with this direct
[37:57] engagement to actually start solving some of the problems that enhances of the basic interests of the country, right? Of the Republic. The challenge is is that we're dealing with a lot of old thinking. And like we we'd love to elevate experts and we love to elevate representatives particularly in our country. And that's because where someone walks in and you're sitting there and you go All right, so this guy's the gatekeeper on this. >> Right. Right. Like you know, like that type of thing. And so we have everything has to be run by this guy?
[38:27] You know, and so the challenge is is that we get into this thing where we we we've value experts over direct engagement but Trump has turned that on its edge. And so I think that there's an opportunity there for us to to to really spearhead regardless of what you think about Trump. The idea is that there's a spirit to figure out what exactly the regime, for example, the Iranian regime wants. I mean, the Israelis aren't like aren't going to like that. Right. You know, they don't you know, they they you know, that especially Netanyahu I think wants just perpetual
[38:58] you know, his idea. He's a old a lot of old thinking. It's it's fight to win, keep winning. That's that's and there's no so what and what now from that. That's Netanyahu's plan. You know, I I when when I when I was up talking but I never really got into the Israel-Palestine deal but when I did uh when I did talk with members of the AC the the ranking members I see they would they they would always say it's a hard stop because if there's a two-state solution, there's going to be a there's going to be a warm water port for our enemies and that's the hard
[39:28] stop. There's no two-state solution. That was what I was said to me. And I don't did you >> Oh, listen, when I was when I was assigned to to the embassy in Riyadh in 1991, the Saudis approached us and asked us to pass a message to the Israelis. And they said that they were willing to spend billions and billions of dollars to build a port in Gaza, an airport, and an electrical grid. Right. And the Israelis said, "Absolutely never." Yeah. >> It'll never ever happen. Yeah, you
[40:00] can't. You know, I mean, you you're like you were talking about the refinery in in you know, in the for for the for Venezuela. We you can't provide a port for Russia, China, you know, it you know, it doesn't matter who. It's not going to happen. And And I don't think they realize that. I don't think that there's any kind of you know, the two-state solution was never on the table from a from a from a national security perspective. Mhm. My you know, and that's until you crack that egg, what do we do? You know, we would have to be in charge of the port. Yeah. Which is in a weird way Trump's idea. Yeah.
[40:31] It's you know, it's which is really peculiar, you know? So, I'm not endorsing it, but the the the the thing is is we would have to be in charge of it or someone would have to be in charge of it where it doesn't allow a port for our enemies. Yeah. You know, and you know that how that's those conversations go. It's like, "No, it's a hard stop. Next next agenda item." You know, you know, it's not even a discussion. It's just over. And you know, there there are places around the world, like for example, Costa Rica. Costa Rica does not have a military. It just doesn't exist. There's no Costa
[41:01] Rican army. There's no There's no Costa Rican you know, Air Force or or Navy. They have a national police force and they have a Coast Guard. And the Coast Guard all it does is it rescues people in distress and it does drug interdiction. That's it. So, I suppose I suppose in a perfect world you can negotiate something where you've got you know, a a 20-year treaty or a 100-year treaty or whatever where there's you know, some
[41:31] kind of disarmed Palestinian independent Palestinian state in Gaza. I I I agree with you that that we probably moved beyond a two-state solution. It's probably if it's going to be anything, it's a three-state solution because the the one-state solution, there's already one state and it doesn't work. It doesn't work. And so, you need to have you need to have independent entities in the West Bank and Gaza.
[42:02] Yeah. Yeah, and it you know, maybe float the Egyptian navy over there and have that >> Yeah, exactly. They're a they're a reliable ally. Those Exactly. Yeah. They're doing that with Libya right now. Exactly right. You know, we're not able to get petrol in and out of Libya. Imagine. Imagine. And it's only cuz the Italian Air Force is doing overflights to keep the honest people honest. Yeah, and that's it. So, it's like, you know, we we we we we love the Egyptians. We trust the Egyptians, but the Italians, you know, I got to make sure that they're guarantee it. But I appreciate taking
[42:33] the time. I didn't I don't want to I know I know you're a busy >> talk to you. It's a pleasure to chat with you and I and I appreciate it, you know, getting your eyes on on this meeting in at the Vatican. It means a lot. Thanks so much, buddy. My pleasure. Good to see you again. Good to see you as well.