[07:10] into the enhanced interrogation program and interrogated someone I may not name, but who was one of the top, believed to be one of the top people in Al Qaeda. Enhanced interrogation wasn't good for anyone in the end, was it? I could never even convince my mother to believe what I said. And no one, the average person simply doesn't believe what they feel like believing. And we'll think that it is a sign of wisdom to reflexively disbelieve whatever a CIA officer
[07:43] says, which is silly. Contrary to that conventional view, the CIA has never been in the business of interrogation, doesn't do them historically, has no background, training, it's not part of the mission. And we didn't do it. Now there are exceptions to that. During the Vietnam War, the CIA was involved in interrogations. After 9-11, the CIA, of course, in the enhanced interrogation program, that became a big time focus of our energies. Well, the CIA was not either in the business of interrogation or of enhanced interrogation,
[08:21] which is, of course, the euphemism taken directly from the Nazis, literally, literally, of torture. I can give you a long, detailed history of our involvement. One of my first jobs in the agency, and perhaps the most controversial one, was I was an assistant to the head of what was called the Central American Task Force, and that was the part of the agency in the United
[08:52] States intelligence community that was leading our effort, frankly, to overthrow the Sandinistas and to support the Contras. And in that mission, and during that time, the CIA was accused of having trained, what, insurgents in El Salvador to garot nuns and for the Contras in Nicaragua to
[09:27] do the same thing. And that actually is not true. We were trying to stop people from garotting anybody, but that did involve us and associate us with people who were doing terrible things. And it was a sordid situation in general, but we actually didn't do torture, which, once again, no one will actually believe. But that was in the early-mid-80s, earlier in my career.
[10:01] And then life went on, and the agency had no, to my knowledge, certainly no staff, no training, no approach, no mission to do any of these things. And then after 9-11, after September 11, 2001, very quickly, within a matter of weeks, the U.S. government, in particular the CIA, found itself with increasingly large numbers of detainees, largely people who were taken prisoner
[10:32] on the battlefield in Afghanistan, but not only. And the mission of the CIA is to obtain intelligence. And an enemy combatant or a terrorist or someone who is shooting at you or involved in a group that you don't like probably has intelligence that you want to find out. And so the assignment was, well, okay, who collects the intelligence? It's the CIA. And so then the issue was, well, how do we do this? And the instructions came
[11:06] pretty explicitly from, frankly, the office of the vice president. This is what you will do. And that's how the CIA came to be involved in, quote, enhanced interrogation. But as you pointed out, CIA had no mandate to interrogate. That's right. The FBI does, and they're very good at it. The U.S. military does, and at least has formal training procedures, parameters, and protocol standards and so on. But the CIA did not.
[11:37] You learn practices and standards and protocols and where the red lines are especially. You play as you practice, you fight as you train, and you interrogate as few as you're taught how, or if not, then you wing it and all hell can go crazy, go happen. Now, whether it was literally Dick Cheney or someone from his office, or as is certain, the small number, and we're really talking a dozen people even. It's restricted even to fewer than those of neo-conservatives in the
[12:15] Bush administration, largely from the office of the vice president and in the Department of Justice. I was not a firsthand witness to the very top exchanges, but I know how this happened. We found, we, the CIA found itself with detainees. And in fact, George Tenet specifically said he needed to brief the president to get the president's signature. And Cheney said, you brief me, I'll brief the president.
[12:45] Wasn't until the release of the torture report that any doubt was even cast on the notion that maybe Cheney never briefed the president. There's always been, historically, there's been this competition between the FBI and the CIA. And many of us, formerly with the CIA, it's hard for us to compliment the FBI. But if there's one thing the FBI is really great at, it's interrogations. And they've been doing it since the Nuremberg trials. They're well-trained,
[13:18] they have decades, generations of experience. And you compare that to somebody in the office of the vice president just picking up the phone, calling the CIA and say, start doing interrogation. That's literally the case. That's not reductive. That is not inaccurate or unfair. That's pretty much how it happened. We, the intelligence community, which is really the CIA and the military, special forces, we found ourselves with these detainees. And it's a legitimate objective and requirement. How are we going to obtain the intelligence from these people?
[13:52] Okay, that's fine. Well, John or I, we elicit, we talk, we might, we know how to question. I mean, that's all relevant, but that's not an interrogation. Dorff Tendon, as John, I think, started to explain before, said to the White House, we aren't doing anything without clear guidance. We are not going to break the law. We do not break the law because, and deputy directors of the CIA quoted these conversations that they had had and the tenet it had to me. They said,
[14:23] we, and this is, and John will not, I'm sure, and this, we, the CIA are always left given the dirty job and that left holding the bag. And we're the ones who end up suffering the way John did, or a lot of my colleagues were indicted, et cetera, et cetera. So that's not going to happen. We follow the rules. We follow the law. What guidance do we have? And the office of the Vice President, Shane, he said, absolutely, you're absolutely right. Dad, Gummett will get you the
[14:53] guidance. And they then went to the Department of Justice and they spoke to two political hacks, one of whom is still a professor, shockingly, at Berkeley, John, you, and the other guy's name still is in my mind, doesn't matter. And they said, we need guidance. And so the guidance became, was a memorandum which has since come to be called the torture memorandum. When Cheney's office is looking for guidance, they, I'm assuming they, they, they picked the
[15:24] guidance that they went to. So they must have, to provide the guidance, they want it. They must have known that John, you was going to give them exactly the guidance in exactly the words that they want. Absolutely. The OVP office, the Vice President went back to Tenet and they said, here's the guidance. And Tenet said, this is cleared by the Department of Justice. And, and they said, absolutely, this is all kosher, it's legal, blessed, whatever, you know, metaphor you want to use or analogy. And Tenet goes, okay. And this, I don't know for a second.
[15:56] Cheney went in to speak to President Bush and said, here's the guidance we're giving to the CIA on how to conduct interrogations. And Bush asked the correct appropriate question. He said, has justice approved this? Has this been cleared with the Department of Justice? Oh, yes, sir. The Bush then went, okay. And that came to the guidance. And the way that came down to me, and this is verbatim, this is firsthand, this is my life. When I was brought
[16:27] into the interrogation, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, the fellow who was to brief me, I found in the hallway in the counterterrorism center. It took me two hours to find him because he was running around. I was running around this and that. I said, you know, I've been assigned to this operation. I'm going out to the field to take part in interrogation with this fellow. I was told to see you. And he said, and these are, this is one of those moments, like we all, if we're old enough, we remember what we were doing when Kennedy was shot or when the space shuttle blew up or when the Red Sox won the World Series and this, this sort of thing.
[17:03] We're standing in the CTC. So the hallway was sort of the divider cubicle things, you know, John, you know what I'm talking about? Because it's a large bullpen, but it was against the wall. And so we're standing close and it hooks me in the chest as he talks. And he said, you will do whatever it takes to get him to talk. Do you understand? And I physically recoiled. And I
[17:34] said, this is verbatim. And I said, we don't do that. I said, well, we do now. And I thought, holy shit. And I thought, I said, well, I want just, I said, well, we'd need at least a presidential finding to do something like that. Now, a presidential finding is a term of art. It's only for the most sensitive operations in the intelligence community, and certainly the CIA, which means that you have to have the direct approval authorization and order of the president
[18:05] of the United States signed by him. I was familiar with findings from my career, but no finding had directly come to me in my assignment. I was part of an operation that had findings, you know, and so on. And so I said, we would need it. At least, you know, I'm a pretty experienced officer at this point. I'm 20 years into my career almost. And I said, we would need at least a presidential finding to do something like that. And he sort of goes, that sort of sells
[18:36] fast, satisfied and passes chest and pretends to have like an envelope. And he says, we haven't quote, we are covered. And I thought, Jesus. And what he was referring to was what has come to be called the torture memo that we just mentioned a couple of minutes ago. He's pushing torture. You're resisting. Are you aware at the time as you're having this conversation, what he's pushing? Oh, never in any conversation I had was the word torture used ever.
[19:06] Understood if a dirty, dirty word. I use the word torture at some point, but no one ever because we don't torture. We interrogate. But were you clear on the 800 pound gorilla in the room? It was instantaneously clear to me what we were talking about. And I thought in that millisecond, I realized quite consciously, this is not ex post facto, justification, rationalization, recreate a recollection. This is exactly what I thought at the time in real time,
[19:37] what I just said to you. And I said, my thought was this is the greatest, the most significant moment, the decisive moment in my career, my career, I think in the history of the agency, and one of the significant moments in American history. I was explicitly conscious of that at that moment. No question about it. I was. Our colleagues of mine were not, and not that they were being duplicitous, but they were either less experienced or didn't have the same background
[20:13] I had or some others were not, but some other colleagues were as aware as I did. Did you see it coming? Oh, no, it came completely out of the blue. We've detained someone we believe to be a member of Al Qaeda. And we want to find out information. This is sure this is exciting. This is great. This is important. That's what you wanted. You want to be one of the people doing significant things. Well, that's fine. But then you will do ever it takes. That was
[20:44] physically actually, and literally, it was stunning to me then it remains stunning. Our colleagues sincerely believe this. But the conversation went on. I said, well, Jesus, we need at least to find it. He says, we have it. This is literally what I thought. I don't give a shit if the president orders this. The president doesn't get to order this. Oh, but then I thought at the same time, okay, I'm the equivalent of a Lieutenant Colonel. I've been briefed for
[21:14] two minutes. And I have been informed appropriately, properly, that the president, the vice president, the director of the CIA, the attorney general, the office of the general counsel of the CIA, all have deliberated, decided that this is legal, appropriate, necessary, and so ordered. So who the hell am I, a two minute briefed Lieutenant Colonel to challenge the weight of the entire process of an institution to the United States government,
[21:45] which I had known and taken in most cases, accurately to believed upheld the law, the law embodied principles. And on the whole was a not just a technically legal, but a seeking to embody a corpus of principles in my whole life down to my level and up to the
[22:20] president. Instantaneously, I'm going to say, no, this is all wrong now. I mean, the burden on any individual is almost unbearable to anyone. And this, which is why you're talking to two of the probably, I don't know, five officers, whoever said, what the fuck, you must disobey an illegal order, you must otherwise you are breaking the law. The overwhelming majority of my colleagues are honorable, principled men and women, there's no question. But circumstances can be impossible.
[22:54] And even if you can see clearly, it takes a Charles de Gaulle and there's only one de Gaulle per century, you know, and per country to be able to challenge the weight of those moments. And even if you want to, you know, John and I weren't quite the, this is not quite a perfect analogy, but imagine you're a German soldier and you're assigned to some camp and you're told anyone who comes out you shoot anyone who goes in you shoot. And if you don't do that, we shoot you.
[23:26] That's the order. Okay. And you're standing at the death camp. What are you going to do? You think this is hideous. I can't allow this to happen. Well, your choice is either you will die or, or you become complicit. So it continues to get worse. The spiral continues downward. So I said, and this is all in the first three things. And we haven't, you know, I haven't gotten on a plane or done anything yet, right? There were two minutes into my involvement. But I was quite explicitly conscious of all this. So I said to my, I thought, I don't care if the president
[24:00] orders this, the president doesn't get to order this, he can't do that. But I thought, okay, you know, I can't challenge the entire, jump up and down this instant and challenge the whole, you know, this second. So I said, well, suppose something happens that I consider unacceptable. And he looks at me with disdain, then he says, well, if something happens, you don't like, you step out of the room. And if you step out of the room, you didn't see anything happen. And so nothing happened, right? And I thought, Jesus Christ,
[24:34] this is just insane. This is, this is becoming, this is Kafka. This is, this is insane here. And so then I said something the case officers don't normally say. I think John will probably smile at this. Because at this point, I had been informed that the lawyers had been involved in this, you know, and, and when something gets to the, an operations officer, it's all theoretically, in most cases, almost always, it's been staffed out and the whole sort of thing. Then I raised the question to the case officers don't normally think about it. I said, well,
[25:05] what about the Geneva Convention? Oh my God, how many times did I say that in 2002? And, and the guy looked at me and this is the, became the title of the first chapter of my book. And he says with the stain, he goes, well, which flag do you serve? My thought was, well, up yours buddy. But it was clear that the conversation was not going any further. So I went fine. The conversation ends. The first thing I did, highly unusual for me, because normally this, well, normally this circumstance had never occurred to me.
[25:38] I immediately, from that conversation, went to find the, I don't remember if it was the Converterra Tarzan centers or the Middle East, Near East divisions, because I was involved with them, lawyer, the officer general counsel for the office, and I, whom I knew. And I, and I walk in, usually you want to avoid lawyers, because their job is to say no all the time, you know. And so I closed the door, highly unusual in the agency, closed their conversations very sensitively. And I said, listen, what is the definition of torture? And then he gave me the
[26:14] thumbnail operative definition, which served for case officers in the field, which is derived from John Hughes torture, Miranda. And he said, if a measure of used in interrogation does not cause vital organ failure and or death, and I distinctly remember the, the phrase and or, the ridiculousness is this, you know, so if a measure does not cause vital organ failure and or death, it is not torture. And I was, I couldn't believe my ears. And I said, okay, so if I whack
[26:51] you in the head with a baseball bat, and you come to that's not torture. And he goes, no. And I said, if I break your arm, it will heal. So that's not torture either. And he goes, that's correct. Is it vital organ failure and or death? And I thought that is just the stupidest, most insane thing I've ever heard. But those were the instructions, that that was the guidance. And it was not for you to question where their guidance came from? Well, I had asked, you know, and I've been told that it came from, come from the president.
[27:24] And I thought, holy smoke, that's how I was first brought into the operation. And then I thought very clearly, did I think at that moment, I thought, well, this is, this is absolutely without question. The great moment of my career, when I have to decide when, when do you say no? What do you do? What, what is one to do? And I thought, when, okay, what am I going to do?
[27:54] And, and I talked to the lawyer. And then I found an officer who had been involved in interrogations. And I spoke with her, she's a very good officer. And I, and I just thought, well, holy smoke, you know, we, we have someone really important. It is important we find out information from this guy. But how can I do this honorably? And what will I do? What will I do? And then, then I flew off to do it.
[28:26] When you expressed reticence, Glenn, did you end up with any career back? And the reason I ask is because when I was first approached, I've never gone public with who I went to see. But I went up to the seventh floor and spoke with somebody and he told me, run screaming from the room. This is a terrible idea. It's going to wreck everybody. When I said that I didn't want to be involved, the leadership of the counterterrorism center decided that that was worthy of punishment.
[28:58] Here I had just come back as Chief of Ops in Islamabad, led this capture and was passed over for promotion. And when I went into Deputy Chief CTC's office for my feedback, my panel feedback, because I was absolutely stunned that I had been passed over for my 15th. He said that the consensus was, and these were his words, I had demonstrated a shocking lack of commitment to counterterrorism. But I wonder if this was also a drag on your career, you didn't jump right
[29:32] into this with both feet like they wanted everybody to do? I think the answer is no, but that's because I had other problems. There are other things happening in my career and personal life, which are really, really dramatic. But it is also clear, I've only been able to piece together after I left the agency. In real time, there were forces at play upon me and my operation and the larger issues that I was not completely aware of.
[30:07] I had enemies on substance and on personal level, overlapping but not identical sets, that affected my success or lack of success in working the agency and to handle this operation as I wanted. And that's always the case. There are always various power centers and conflicts, personal and office-based. But there were forces that were quite hostile to
[30:43] my approach, various approaches. And they were sincerely opposed. They were not just out to get me, but because I opposed them, then they wanted to get me because I was creating headaches for them on the operation. And that's in a really brief nutshell is I came quickly. I was the only person who had ever met with this person. I was meeting with him for 17 hours a day every effing day. And I came to conclude that pretty much everything that we had assessed about him was
[31:16] wrong. Holy smoke. And you don't just show up and say, okay, you guys, the 12 years of work that 17 different officers have done and the three rooms of files on this and the assessment of the sub-office of the CTC and CTC is general and any also concurring, all of you guys are wrong. I'm the only guy who's right. And so you have to change everything you've done. I mean, you can't really do that. One of the things that an officer has to learn is how to work
[31:47] the director of operations and the agency. And so at first you say, well, the date recorded for a certain meeting was not June 16. It was June 23. And you get them to accept that. And then you say, well, you know, his middle name is actually Abdul instead of Muhammad or whatever the hell it is. And you get them to accept that. And then they start saying, well, hey, you know, Carl, actually, he's, you know, he's on the ball on this. And then you start to get credibility. And then you get an ally who's not directly in the chain of command who says, you know, our assessment can concur as with Glenn and, you know, case
[32:20] officer Carl. And so then you can change maybe how a certain report is disseminated or recorded or questions that you will ask. And then you start to own the operation and to shift perceptions and reality. But you can't just go in and say, you guys are all totally messed up. In my case, the assessment was that he was one of the top guys in Al Qaeda. And I accept that. I mean, there was a room full of reporting that had led to this assessment. And I knew my colleagues to be diligent, knowledgeable, honorable, and to
[32:56] challenge our assumptions as a part of our routine. That's, so I had faith in our assessment. And I went out and I started to talk to the guy and, you know, on and on, and I started to find little consistencies and then larger wins. And I concluded that, you know, we had detained the man we wanted to detain. And he was, which was not always the case. Sometimes, you know, they wanted to render, to kidnap Glenn Carl. And they did. But there's some other person named
[33:33] Glenn Carl, who's actually, there actually is an astrophysicist in California someplace named Glenn Carl. And that poor guy was, you know, put a bag over his head and taken away because he's the same name that I do. That was not the case in my operation. The person we wanted was the person we got, but he was not the person we thought he was. And I am convinced, you know, I'm confident that my assessment is correct. But you do get into some subjective assessments.
[34:06] Just for clarity sake, what did you think he was before you realized he wasn't? Well, what the agency had assessed him to be, which is one of the very, very most senior officers of Al Qaeda, one of the top, top several people. Which he was not? No, no. What was he instead? That's where the big arguments and the murkiness comes from. I'm pretty confident that he was in the circumstance similar to the owner of Corner Variety Store,
[41:22] operation. Well two things happened I mean because it was a a surge assignment it was not a permanent duty assignment I was not you know I was assigned in France for four and a half years for this I was drafted because we needed people to do urgent tasks and someone had to fill them. So and it was also you know I was told I had to leave within 24 hours of being notified of the operation I would be gone for a minimum of 30 days possibly 90 days or longer I couldn't tell
[41:57] my family where I was going or have any communication with them at all so all very exciting but this is not an easy life for most people in my personal circumstances I had a my wife at the time had nearly died she just come out of a coma I had been told just a couple weeks before one night in the hospital we will know in the morning if your wife has survived she survived but she had real
[42:33] all sorts of challenges and because we had at that time seven and five year olds and I was essentially a single parent because I either had a hospitalized or a largely incapacitated spouse to leave for four months someplace with little kids from my wife in all ways couldn't really take care of this is a these are you know everyone has their challenges and
[43:05] so the agency is as compassionate as an institution can be and it won't send you away forever and so you're rotated out after you know number of months so that was one certain one thing the other was these people I've alluded to who I clashed with on any number of professional issues on this operation wanted to get rid of me to and have someone who was more amenable to their perspective I also thought it was time to make a move that way myself so everyone sort of agreed that it was
[43:40] time for me to to leave and so I left you know it's a place but you know by the good guy that was not unusual um and I wasn't removed I didn't move myself for you know in principle it was sort of an organic process that happens with temporary duty officers when enhanced interrogation came under the microscope finally were you dragged into to testify I never testified before a public panel I was interviewed by any number of the investigating committees you
[44:21] know there's congress there's the counterintelligence staff there's the inspector general's office and all of them are trying to make sense of things and a number of them spoke to me at different times sure yeah what was going through your mind as suddenly because you had had your doubts you had been dragged along to a degree that must have felt really incredibly conflicted in any number of ways no I don't think I ever felt conflicted which possibly sounds like a contradiction from
[44:51] what I said but but I didn't I have always felt um pardon the self-praise here I've always been very proud of how I handled the operation what I did um where I where I drew lines and where I compromise and how I try to get things right and I think that I handled it as well as one can one one could very fairly say um you should resign at principle and that's the end of that I didn't and I don't think that I think I did the right thing by trying to get it right
[45:25] so I never felt conflicted about it I didn't feel you know I was worried that everyone myself included involved in this program would go to jail for having been involved in torture because this clearly was illegal it was just no doubt to me whatever you know people I admire have said in public that oh this is all legal and we didn't torture you know well that's because no one wants to be convicted as a war criminal that's the only sensible explanation but there
[45:58] is one other explanation that's not correct that's one of the other one is that um and it's been a fascinating psychological experience uh to observe I saw I described in in positive terms drones and my colleagues and I and I mean that sincerely but I I was at the time stunned to find that as soon as um we were informed that the president and the department of justice had decided that X is legal and we never engage in torture instantaneously and in complete sincerity
[46:37] at least half of my colleagues went like this and said oh good everything's fine now and they were totally sincere about it and I thought oh my god what what how can you do that it's a fascinating psychological phenomenon that they sincerely accepted that the paradigm had been defined from in a way that they thought was appropriate they're the acceptable way that life should be perceived and conducted um because the agency's good the u.s are good guys and we don't break the law and that was
[47:07] it and these are bright people but they sincerely believe it it's a very similar phenomenon I had found concluded to what we are all experiencing in the threat to our democracy with the Trump phenomenon there are dozens of millions of fine people who are in most ways rational people they're these are normal people they aren't nutjobs who vote for Donald Trump who clearly
[47:38] is a fascist I was I think the first person this is my great claim to fame in my life I think I was the first person in public to say that he was approached by manipulated by and probably working with Russian intelligence and and yet you know people I admire sincerely think that I'm a communist now because I oppose the guy and and it's the same thing in the agency with johnson my colleagues who who still buy into into this whole different paradigm it's it is
[48:12] Kafka I don't know if you've ever read the good soldier schvike I highly recommend it it's a classic it was written by gunner hushek in world war one it was a he was in the austrian army he was killed during the war before he finished his book but he it's it's gray and green um our man in the vanna um and catch 22 and and yet that's the crazy world we're sincere people do nut job stuff
[55:33] is unusable it raised legal questions substantive questions blah blah blah and stop recall take out and that was that totally shut down all the stuff hugely controversial because the people who were the proponents of it started to jump up and down with hair and the fire saying that we were all compromising national security by being marguesa queensbury it's interesting with you know there aren't a lot of people who have done been involved in this stuff there are so many aspects
[56:03] of the culture of the director of operations of the counter terrorism center of the enhanced interrogation program of the director of operations that inform how one perceives and one expresses events and reactions that it is a throwback but but pleasant to see would have john on the screen because there aren't a lot of people who have lived in this strange universe
[56:34] it's it's sort of it's I don't know the rewardings that the word it's nice to find somebody who knows what i'm talking about but you know there have always been simplifying a bit two schools of thought that I've touched upon those who think that the enhanced interrogation isn't tortured makes sense and we need it and it's an it's an overlapping set if not identical set those you believe that the terrorist threat is existential for the united states and the western civilization
[57:13] global and that the jihadists are all part of this vast coherent coordinated network so that jamaa slum in Malaysia and lashkar e tiba in cashmere and al qaeda in sudan and then in afghanistan and then in iraq are all part of the same of issue
[57:44] so to stop means that you're surrendering and we'll be destroyed there those who will continue to think that and then opposing them and I at first was agnostic because I hadn't done as my thing terrorism and I came to be one of the strong advocates because of my function in the national intelligence council of those who said well yeah there are people trying to slip my throat and rape my wife and we obviously have to stop them but a member of the
[58:15] Islamic the jikam is the group islamic the combat on our count the Moroccan Islamic combatant group I forget the what we call it in English is jihadists they are murderous they are but they are not al qaeda they share a theology but they are different it's not one problem and so therefore you have to look at a much more organic and textured approach
[58:49] to counterterrorism and that fight I thought would be you know I'm I'm absolutely certain that my party is correct but even after uh obama served his years in the agency the dominant framework remained the first of those two which is a really simple minded and ultimately self-destructive
[59:20] approach thanks again glenn for sitting in today it's important to remind ourselves and the audience that in the end decency one out though plenty of otherwise good people went along with something that was downright evil there were and there still are people with real moral character out there fighting the good fight and more than ever that fight is necessary in the next episode we'll pick up our story again what makes this spy tick we're getting close to the moment of truth
[59:50] please don't forget to like review comment on and share the podcast we thank you in advance for doing it until next time i'm john kiriyaku dead drop is written by john kiriyaku and alan cats cost art and touchstone productions produces the podcast and john kiriyaku alan cats and nick mechanic are its executive producers this podcast it's a cop still using the tournament with an