[00:00] This question's like kind of in a side, but you mentioned uh before trying to vet what an asset says to make sure that they're they are doing exactly as they say, and of course that the information that they're giving you is true if that's the case, but is there operations officers that lie about the intelligence that they get to build a career for themselves? >> Oh my god, we spent so much time on that in in training. The The answer is yes, unfortunately. Um that leads to a very quick firing.
[00:31] Um there are two things that case officers There are three things that case officers sometimes are caught doing. Sometimes you will work for a total [ __ ] who says everybody needs to get five pieces of finished intelligence or you don't meet um threshold. Okay, well some months I'm going to get like 10 or 12, and some months I'm cultivating new agents and I'm not going
[01:01] to get any. And they're not saying you need to average five a month, you need five a month. So what that does is it encourages people to just make the [ __ ] up and write it up as intelligence. Maybe they'll pull it out of some obscure newspaper, which happens, or you have a meeting with an agent, he gives you a a a an amazing plethora of intelligence reports, and you just keep five in reserve for
[01:33] next month. If it's not too terribly time sensitive, you give him the five that they need right now, you save the next five for next month. That's intellectually dishonest. And another one that people get caught doing, and this is something I never ever understood. Depending on the station chief, you're allowed to spend like up to five bucks at a at a cover stop, an SDR cover stop, all the way up to 20 bucks at each cover stop. It just depends on who happens to
[02:03] be the chief. Well, sometimes people will make up receipts or they'll save receipts and then just put the money in their pockets. So, what would possess you to try to steal $20 from the CIA? Is that really Is it worth being fired to steal $20 from the CIA? I just never understood it. >> Well, does that say something about the personality type that's recruited for case officers? >> Yes. Yeah, that's exactly what it is.
[02:35] You know, we got I I was in one assignment and and there was some big like senior senior enemy leader coming. We heard he was staying in this hotel. It was like a boutique hotel. It had a bar in the in the lobby and he was bringing in this giant contingent of intelligence officers with him to protect him. So, our boss said, "You know, if you if you want to
[03:06] try to get in on this, you should go to the bar because we heard that these guys are hanging out at the bar." I'm like, "I I really don't want to go. It's not my area of expertise. I don't speak the language. I don't really care about this country." And um and my wife, who is also a CIA officer, said, "No, you really should go. You know how they are. If you don't go, they're going to criticize you." So, I go. The bar was smaller than I expected it to be, but literally every seat was taken by a CIA officer.
[03:38] I was just like, "You guys." I turned around and walked out. And then the next day, they were all bitching because the station chief, after the fact, had found some obscure rule that unless you are conducting an operational meeting they won't pay for alcohol. So, people are ordering these $20, you know, espresso martinis multiple espresso martinis and
[04:08] everybody's out of pocket $100 because that wasn't an operational meeting. You're just hoping that somebody from that delegation happens to walk into the bar and sit and order drink and then you, you know, you all beat each other up to see who can talk about conversation with a guy. Oh man, I was so glad I didn't stay. Bunch of bums. >> To be fair, they did tell you to go to the bar. >> They did. It was bad leadership is what it was. >> And something else you mentioned when you were talking about the use the example of like running an SDR on China like eight-hour SDR with infrared
[04:39] cameras and it just got me thinking like you you mentioned this very briefly. We kind of ran out of time in our last interview where you said something along the lines of like, you know, gone are the days of just being able to cross borders and alias and do a brush pass because >> with with facial recognition software and AI. I actually posed this question to a current CIA officer. I said, how do you guys cross borders? How do you get through airports? Like in different in different names and he said, we don't know yet.
[05:11] Still struggling. Yeah, the technology is developing so quickly. They just can't keep up with it. >> So, man, that that a lot of things are running through my head right now, but something I just thought of, I heard from one of the science and technology people I gave an interview that the agency is involved in or dabbling in VR and AR type stuff. >> Oh, yeah. >> She didn't want us She didn't say what. But what would you like what would you imagine that that's about? >> Oh man. Um I don't know cuz I've been out a long
[05:43] time, but I will tell you that the DS&T sorry, the the Directorate of Science and Technology, which is one of the four directorates at the CIA. When I was there, it was almost an afterthought because mostly what it was responsible for was disguises and um you know, briefcases with secret pockets in them and you know, supporting operations. Now, they are so sophisticated and so far advanced working with the
[06:14] likes of Palantir and Elon Musk's different companies and AWS and all these like cutting-edge, you know, Nvidia, all these cutting-edge tech companies. They are so far advanced that instead of doing the silly concealment devices and disguises, they just pawn that off to, you know, to, you know, individuals or or makeup companies and and and they do the big ticket items
[06:45] now. I would say what the DS&T is doing with things like virtual reality are closer now to what DARPA is doing on futuristic tech than what they ever did in the past at the CIA. >> So, what would you say as an example, like what would a big ticket item be in that case? >> Man, I you know what? I I couldn't even venture to say it. I I don't even know. It's become so sophisticated. I sat next
[07:16] to a guy for years. Awesome guy, terrific analyst. And he always had a thing for tech. We used to joke about it cuz we were all young, we were all in our 20s, we're all tech-savvy. Now, he's the CIA's Chief Technical Officer. SIS 4. He could be the director if the president wanted him to be. And I remember saying to a buddy of mine when when our friend was promoted, I was like, "Man, he really made it like to the very top." And my friend said, "It
[07:46] was It was the tech." You know, he I'll tell I'll tell you what he did. Just as a favor on his day off. Um he made a computer program to allow our Middle East analysts to make family trees of the royal families in the countries that they cover. Right? No such software existed. There was no such thing as, you know, family tree maker or genealogy.com. There was no such thing as.com. I mean,
[08:17] we're talking about pre-internet days. And he took 3 days off on his own time and made this program the software that everybody in the office used. And I was like, "Wow, he really knows a lot about tech, huh?" And then two or three years later, they invented the internet or they didn't invent it then, but they they released the internet to the general public. And he just jumped right in and really really made something out of himself. So, he's in charge of all this stuff now. Yeah. >> Did you ever have an experience with DARPA? >> Never. I was never cleared to even know
[08:48] what it was they were doing over there. They're so far advanced. >> Right. And that's what they say. They say uh they say DARPA's 20 years ahead of what we can see. >> Mhm. >> And so I would think that is the agency? >> Yeah. One of the things I learned early on in the agency though is that it is far cheaper and far easier to just buy something that's already been invented than it is to develop it from scratch.
[09:19] That was before 9/11. Post 9/11, money's not an issue at all. And so DARPA's doing it, NSA's doing it, CIA's doing it. And then they're with with In-Q-Tel, they're financing it uh in the public sector. I'm sorry, in the private sector. So, the sky's the limit, man. It really is. I can't even imagine the Russians spending that kind of money on tech. Maybe the Chinese do, I don't
[09:50] know. They've got the money. But since 9/11, we've gone we've gone whole hog in tech development. >> Chinese could always just steal it from us, I guess, right? >> it from us. Yeah. Yeah, just like the Israelis do. >> We'll talk about that. >> Don't get me started. Oh, we'll talk about the Mossad. >> Mossad. Don't worry. Um, In-Q-Tel is the the it's openly the CIA's venture capital firm, right? >> Correct. Yeah. >> And they're I want to say invest they invested in Palantir or >> They gave Palantir their first it was like a million and a half to get
[10:21] off the ground. Very first investment. And now look at Palantir. Just this year for the first time they have more than a billion dollars in revenue. So, it's it's a success story. >> So, Palantir does commercial stuff now, too. It's not just DOD and government contracts. >> It's a stand-alone profitable tech company. >> Right. So, they're selling to civilians, so to speak. But, um, I remember when I remember hearing when Palantir first came out that people at the agency didn't like it. >> At all. >> And maybe they gave them a trial run or something. They were like, "Fuck this.
[10:51] We don't want to use this." Do they use it now, you think? >> Yeah. >> What is it What would they use it for? >> Oh, all kinds of stuff. Mostly Well, I you know what, I probably shouldn't say. I probably shouldn't say. >> Would it be along the lines of targeting? >> Yes. Yes. You know, this this metadata has to come from somewhere. Right? So, like with I was a beta. And remember, I was a beta was 23
[11:21] years ago. Where we're just laying out papers on the ground and trying to connect the dots. It's way more sophisticated now. You can't get away now. You just can't get away. So, rather than have analysts pouring over this stuff and you just hoping that your analysts are really, really smart. AI does it all. They do all of it. And it makes it much easier. That's why,
[11:52] you know, that's why in the Obama administration, John Brennan had the Tuesday morning kill list meetings. Because the tech got sophisticated enough that you could just write up a list of people that you want to kill that week. And you dish out the assignments. The teams go out, they kill everybody that's on the list, and then they meet next Tuesday. And get that kill list. And you just do it week after week. Well, if you're not having to devote armies of targeting analysts uh to to finding these guys, if if your
[12:22] computers can find them just based on their, you know, email messaging, text messaging, whatever, metadata. There. Your job's easy. You just fire a missile from the drone or you drop a guy in that does a close-in shot. And then you get back on the helicopter and fly home. I hate to sound cynical like that, but that's just the way it is. >> I think that's uh just calling it how it is. What uh what year or years was that was
[12:54] Brennan doing that Tuesday morning kill list? >> He started in '09 and kept it going. I have no idea if Donald Trump kept it or Joe Biden kept it or revived it. But it was something that they were very proud of in the Obama administration. They were just going out whacking everybody. >> Yeah, well, no but nobody dropped more missiles from drones than Obama did. >> No, nobody. Nobody. And you know, somebody said, I I naively said, you know, the oversight committees need to
[13:25] be on this. And then a friend of mine said to say what in their re-election campaigns? We need to kill fewer terrorists. If I'm re-elected >> That'll be a good one. >> America in the 21st century. >> And you and you and John Brennan are not the biggest fans of each other, right? >> No, sir. >> Why not? >> John and I have always hated each other.
[13:58] I never liked him. I never trusted him. I believe that he is the archetypal sociopath. Somebody just by dint of his sociopathy has been able to rise to the top. Yeah. And we go back to 1990. I mean, I've known John for what What is that now? 35 years. Never liked him. Never trusted him. Never respected him. But he had a rabbi in George Tenet.
[14:28] And and the next thing you know, he's at the top of the heap. It was John Brennan who literally put me in prison. John had a John had a Nixonian obsession with national security leaks except when he was the one doing the leaking. And now it's come back to bite him in the ass. Uh and we can get into that if you want, but after I blew the whistle on the torture program um and John became the Deputy National
[15:00] Security Advisor for counterterrorism in Obama's first term. He went on to be CIA Director in the second term. John asked the Justice Department to secretly reopen the case against me. The Bush administration said I had not committed a crime. They closed the case. I had no idea that my phones were tapped, my emails were intercepted, FBI guys following me everywhere. And then John wrote a memo to Eric Holder, who was the uh Attorney General at the time. And he said, "Charge him with espionage."
[15:30] And Holder wrote back and said, "My people don't think he committed espionage." And then, Brennan wrote back and said, "Charge him anyway and make him defend himself." So, they arrested me, charged me with five felonies, three counts of espionage, waited until I went bankrupt, and then dropped the espionage charges. So, I ended up taking a plea to a lesser charge. I did 23 months in prison. And and it was because I had revealed the CIA's dirty laundry and this illegal, immoral torture program.
[16:03] And now it's John's turn to be on the hot seat. John and all his cronies like Jim Clapper and Jim Comey and Hillary Clinton and all these other ones who thought they were untouchable, now they're going to have to answer for their actions. >> So, before we come back to that, uh I think it was in 2005, Brennan was appointed CEO of a company called The Analysis Corporation. >> Mhm. >> Wasn't this the company that was stood
[16:35] up for senior intelligence service officers to use as like a tax pass-through before they went to [ __ ] Pizzagate? >> one of two. Um The Analysis Company was one. It was based in in Arlington, Virginia. And the other was called um Abraxas Corporation. It's funny because The Analysis Company was where all the SIS, Senior Intelligence Service level analysts would go, the retired analysts. And Abraxas was where the retired ops guys would go. And they were legitimately set up just as LLC
[17:06] pass-throughs, right? So, people could go smoke cigars and drink coffee and tell stories with their friends and hang out all day. And then, lo and behold, they started making money after 9/11. Abraxas was bought by I think it was IBM for well over a billion dollars. All these guys got not just rich, but they got like, you know, Mega Millions Lotto kind of rich. And then And then the the analysis company, it's funny, you know, everybody it seems like everybody who's left the
[17:37] Directorate of Intelligence has tried to do private intelligence, either as a singleton or working for one of these these companies. And it never succeeds. Right? Cuz pretty much anybody can do analysis if you're an expert enough in in a in a topic. So, why would you pay millions of dollars for these CIA cronies to to write you a paper when you can just hire some professor and give him five grand and he can do it for you. He's as much an expert as they are. Cuz they don't have access to
[18:08] classified information anymore. And even if they did, they couldn't give it to you. So, it didn't work. He was also on the board of It was like BAE Systems and there were a couple of Beltway Bandits and defense contractors. You know, 60,000 here, 100,000 there. And you put together a pretty good living. >> Mhm. So, can you explain to people what private intelligence is? >> Oh, sure. I actually did it for for several years. Um
[18:38] Private intelligence really is is what it sounds like. You're doing exactly what you did at the CIA, whether it's analysis or operations, you're just not using classified information to do it. And I'll give you an example. Um I got a call from a Cypriot billionaire one time. And he said that he had one daughter, just one daughter, who was going to inherit all of his wealth, and she was engaged to this bum, this Greek Cypriot guy who lived in
[19:09] London. And he said, "I don't like this guy. I don't want this guy anywhere near my money or my daughter, and I need for you to find out as much about him as you possibly can." And I said, "Okay. So, uh what's my budget?" And he gave me a number. I flew to Cyprus. I I bribed a police captain uh to to give me all the secret police files.
[19:40] I flew to London. I did surveillance on this guy's building. And finally, it took me about 6 weeks of working full-time. And I I got back to the billionaire, and I said, "Yeah, he's a bum, and he's cheating on her." So, I said, "First of all, he's been stealing money from her. And he used the money to buy some warehouse in London, and I had satellite pictures of it from Google Earth or Google, yeah, Earth. And uh I said,
[20:10] "He's gone in with with some partners. There's like an Armenian guy and a Turkish guy, and they all went in. They're losing money, but they used your money, I said, to buy the place. He told your daughter it was for something else, and then he just took the money and bought this warehouse. So, that money's gone. He's trying to buy a mansion in London because he thinks as soon as he gets married, he's going to live happily ever after. It's all about the money." And I said, "And besides that, he has multiple drug arrests." He's like, "What?" And I said, "Yeah, he smuggling.
[20:42] He was smuggling drugs from Israel into Cyprus. He got caught, got arrested, paid off some judge, so he was never prosecuted. Um the Brits think that he's smuggling drugs there. So, the old man went to his daughter, and he he told her, "You're being scammed." So, that's operationally private intelligence. Private analysis is different. It's actually a lot more fun. So, I went into business for myself in the years between when I left
[21:12] Deloitte & Touche or the year and a half between when I left Deloitte & Touche and I went to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. And I picked it up again when I left the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. So, one of my big I I had three big clients. I had the ninth largest mutual sorry, the ninth largest hedge fund in the world. I had a mutual fund and I had the largest mining company in the world. And then I did I did a contract for an oil company as well. So, they would ask
[21:42] very, very specific questions. Who's going to win the Romanian municipal elections in September? I'm like, "Ay, ay, ay. I don't know anything about Romania. So, where do you go? You go to LinkedIn, right?" I'm Orthodox and everybody in Romania is Orthodox. So, I send connection requests to every every body who looks interesting, who happens to be Orthodox in Romania. It's like 60 people and I say, "Hey, I got this question, you know?"
[22:14] One guy gave me private polling data. So, I said to the client and I said, "It would help me in the in the analysis, it would help me if I knew why you cared who is going to win the municipal election." And they said, "Sure. We're thinking of buying a silver mine and the silver mine is underneath a village. And to mine the silver, we have to destroy the whole village. So, if the socialists win, they're not going to let us do it. And if the conservatives win, they'll
[22:45] just relocate everybody and we'll just destroy the thing and take the silver." And I said, "Well, the polls say the conservatives are going to win." And so, they bought the mine at the pre-election price. The conservatives win, they move everybody out of the village, the company destroys the village and takes out billions of dollars worth of silver. Another one was This one was kind of funny. Ayayay, this company they buy an oil field um or they they didn't buy it, they leased an oil field, but they leased it
[23:16] for like 99 years in Oman. And it's right on the border with Yemen. And none of them had any idea at the time that Al-Qaeda controls the border of Oman and Yemen. And you're not going to be able to get anywhere near that oil, not within 50 miles of it. So they they wanted to know um if the Omanis if they approached the Omanis and offered to pay for the Omani military to force Al-Qaeda out, would the Omanis do it?
[23:47] Or should they just walk away from this oil lease? So I went to Oman, I talked to the Minister of Oil, and the Deputy Minister of Oil, I talked to the Deputy uh Intelligence Service Director, and I I kind of knew all these guys. Like we had met, we weren't like buddies or anything, but we had met. So when I asked for the appointment through the Omani Embassy, they said, "Yes, yes, come and come and you know, we'll have a conversation." So I went back to the company and I said I said, "They're going to gouge you, but they'll push Al-Qaeda out of your
[24:18] oil field." And so they were able to drill for the oil. That's what private intelligence is. >> So when you tell stories in that context, it just it it makes it seem like you're That makes it seem you're like a high-speed private investigator. >> That's really what it comes down to. Yes. >> Are you familiar with Black Cube? >> No. Nope, don't know that one. >> They're uh They're a private intelligence firm that is staffed by uh they're an Israeli private intelligence firm that is all
[24:48] ex-Mossad guys. Um and they allegedly uh I think David Boies is the head attorney on the Epstein >> Oh, sure. >> Allegedly David Boies used it on someone. >> See, the Israelis have no compunction at all about violating any law that gets in their way. And then they say, "What are you going to do about it?" >> Yeah. Uh we'll get there in a second cuz I want to I want to ask you so you mentioned um private intelligence. You're not using
[25:20] classified information to do it is what you said. >> Right. >> Um but what about what about when the agency works with private intelligence firms? Because I I read um Leon Panetta's book, who was CIA director in the Obama administration as well as Secretary of Defense. But he he mentions um he starts talking about he's like one of the first things I did was shut down this program that was I forget how he described it, either controversial or unnecessary or something like that, but he gave no detail. And I was like, "What the hell's he talking about?" So, I look it up and it was the it was a
[25:50] Blackwater assassination program to go after targets globally. And long story short, he ended up outing Erik Prince to uh the House Intelligence Committee by name. Erik Prince was operating, I guess, as a non-credited 201 file. >> That's why Erik Prince lives in Dubai now and not in the United States. >> So, I guess my my question to you then is like I had no idea and also Blackwater was involved in stealing secrets. Like they had a network of spies. When you think about Blackwater, do you think about boots on the ground, military contracts? People know that they ran the GRS program for CIA, but
[26:21] like what how how did how would a CIA how would the CIA work with a contractor like that? >> The first thing you do is the contractor appoints all former CIA people to its board of directors. And then you make the former head of the Counterterrorism Center, Cofer Black, your vice president. And then you hire all of Cofer's buddies to be the head of your different divisions. So, is it CIA? Not really. It's quasi CIA. Everybody's from the CIA. Everybody's
[26:52] getting rich, right? Because remember post 9/11, money was literally not an issue. I I told you in our last conversation that I don't know, four, five, six days after 9/11, I went up to Cofer Black, again, the head of the CIA's Counterterrorism Center, and I said, "Cofer, I have an idea for an operation I want to pass by you." And he put up his hands and he says, "Whatever it is, just do it. I have so much money I can't possibly spend it all." And so I did it. So, you know, when when Erik Prince goes to
[27:23] the CIA and says, "Yeah, I'll do all these things for you. We've got assassination squads, we've got interceptors, we've got boots on the ground, we'll do anything you want. I want a billion and a half dollars." And then the CIA wires it the next day. Then you can do whatever you want. But the thing is, is how do you control people who don't actually work for you? You can't. And you risk them going rogue, which of course they do, because it's their nature. If you're being If you're being contracted to run an assassination program,
[27:53] you're going to go out there and assassinate people. Well, everybody's human and you make mistakes. And you convince yourself that, you know, Ahmed Schmahmaed is a really bad guy. And actually, nah, it's a cousin with a similar name, but you just put a bullet in this guy's head. Uh okay. You write a check for 100 grand to his widow and just move on. And that's not cool. It's a It's a crime. You can't just go around murdering people because you think they might be a bad guy. And so Panetta, I never really liked Panetta. Just cuz he's not a nice guy.
[28:26] But um but Panetta was right to shut that down. >> Okay, so um what are the what are the legalities then of a Blackwater team going out to hit somebody as if a ground branch team would. It's Is it like I think Title 10, Title 50. >> Right. >> One's military, one's CIA. Can't remember which was which. >> Actually, the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals just ruled on this. I'm going to say 3 weeks ago, 4 weeks ago.
[28:57] Um because that's that's a legitimate legal question that you're asking. What it What are the legalities? It's never been tried before. Right? Like the CIA has permission through the amended version of Executive Order 12333 to kill anybody in the world who poses a clear and present danger to the United States. Okay? And the CIA is going to decide who's the clear and present danger. And they're not going to tell you cuz you're not cleared, right? I'm not cleared.
[29:28] You We're just going to have to take their word for it. But they have the legal authority to kill people through 12333. Then they hire these contractors. Like well, we have GRS, we have we have ground branch and marine branch and air branch and we have all these these teams that are out there killing, kidnapping, blowing up, you know, whatever. But they're not agency personnel. They just work for these private companies like Blackwater.
[30:00] So, is that legal? And the the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals said, yes, it's legal. So long as they have a written contract they are acting on behalf of the CIA and the CIA has presidential authority to carry out these operations. Mhm. That was just decided. And actually, I got a call from one of the attorneys in the case and he said, I have no idea why nobody in the media gives a [ __ ] about this decision. And so I I told him I would write something. But there's
[30:31] nothing out there. Nobody paid any attention to this decision. And it it The reason I paid attention was because um it was Abu Zubaydah who was the plaintiff in the case. Abu Zubaydah said these guys tortured me and I want to sue them. And the court was like, "Yeah, sorry you got tortured, but they were acting on behalf of the CIA and the CIA was legally permitted to torture people, so you're [ __ ] out of luck." >> Oh, wow. Okay. There's a lot of places to go there.
[31:01] First of all, you you you mentioned that you went to Cofer with an idea for an operation. Can you say what that was? >> It was dumb. Um Our our orders after 9/11. I mean, in in the days after 9/11, literally everybody was working on Al-Qaeda. Everybody in the counterterrorism center. I'm talking thousands and thousands of people. And then, once we got our bearings, I'm going to say a couple of weeks after 9/11, we got our bearings and
[31:32] authorities were divided up. I went back to my home base, which was, you know, 17 November. And so our standing orders from the White House were to destroy every terrorist group in the world that meant Americans harm. And so we started going back through, you know 35-year-old files looking for leads and I found a couple in the unlikeliest places, like Switzerland
[32:03] and Milan. You know, terrorists get old and retire, too, as crazy as it sounds. I told you the story about Bruno, the Sacha Baron Cohen film. People get old and they're like, "Eh, I'm tired of this terrorism stuff. I'm just going to retire." >> You didn't tell the story about Bruno. You told the story What what I thought of is when you went to that old man who had who was working on a bank at the time. He was the one that witnessed the murder, but you didn't tell the story about Bruno. >> I didn't? >> I I don't think so. >> I get a call from Sacha Baron Cohen one night
[32:33] and he says, "Hey, I don't I don't you know my characters, but" I said, "Oh, yeah." I said, "Listen, Borat." I said, "I almost pissed myself in the theater." It's still the funniest movie I've ever seen in my life. So, he said, "Well, I've got this character Bruno." I said, "Yeah, yeah, the the gay Austrian fashion correspondent." He said, "Yeah." So, he made me sign a non-disclosure agreement. And um he said, "Literally nobody's in on the gag except um Pam Anderson." Literally no one else in the film was in on the gag.
[33:04] Well, except uh that was in Borat, except Borat's assistant. So, anyway, um he said, "We can't let anybody know that it's me and that I'm in character." And I said, "Okay, so what can I do for you?" And he said, "We're going to go to the Middle East. I want to get in front of bonafide terrorists." he said. I'm thinking Hezbollah or Al-Qaeda. And I want to show them Polaroids of men
[33:36] having anal sex, like hardcore anal sex. And I want to ask them if this is a form of torture and should these men be sent to Guantanamo." >> Oh, [ __ ] god. >> So, I said, I go, "Oh, that's a that's a bad idea." Yeah, and I said, "You know, just as a general rule, you really shouldn't mess with the religious types." I go, "They'll kill you, they'll kill your crew, they'll go out onto the street and kill people who remind them
[34:08] of you." And he said, "Well, I've got to make it totally believable." So, so we met a couple of days later and I said, "I have an idea." Well, before that he said he wanted to he wanted to film it in Syria. And I go, "Yeah, that's that's not a good idea, either." And um I said, "I know I know the Libyan ambassador in Washington, and the Libyans are
[34:38] trying really hard. This is a year before Gaddafi was killed. I said, "The Libyans are trying really hard to sort of, you know, integrate and get with the program with the West. And, they're always asking if we know of any films that might want to film in in Libya." He said, "Can't do it." He said, "As a Jew," he said, "I just I would fear for my safety in Libya. I can't do it." And I said, "Well, I said, "Syria really we shouldn't mess with, and Lebanon you can't do." I said,
[35:09] "We could do Morocco. That's easy. There's all kinds of films in Morocco, or even Algeria." And he's like, "No, I I kind of have my heart set on on Syria." And I said, "Well, I know the Syrian ambassador. So, let me just raise it kind of off the record and see what his reaction is." He goes, "No, no, there's a Syrian consulate in Newport Beach, and I'm going to go down there next week." I I go, "No, no, let me do what you're paying me to do, and I'll take care of it." Couple nights later, I'm laying in bed, I'm reading a book. It's late, like
[35:39] 11:30. And the phone rings. And I look, I said to my wife, "It's Sacha Baron Cohen." At 11:30 at night. So, I said, "Sacha, how are you?" And he says, with that thick British accent he has, he goes, "I think I [ __ ] up, mate." And I said, "Oh, don't tell me you went to that Syrian consulate." He goes, "Yeah." He went to the Syrian consulate. He goes in the the first door. He goes, "The consular officer sees him, comes out from behind the bulletproof glass and says, 'I know who you are, I
[36:11] know what you do, and you are not welcome in Syria.'" I said, "Damn it. Okay." I said, "We have to figure something else out." So, then I went to meet with him. So, I said, when I got there, "I have an idea. I said, "I I strongly that we should stay away from the religious types. But, there are bonafide terrorists, almost all of whom are in Damascus, who have retired. Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, PFLP General Command, Democratic Front for the Liberation of
[36:41] Palestine, Abu Nidal Organization. I said these guys were bad guys, like hijacking airplanes and blowing up airplanes and shooting up airports and working with Carlos the Jackal. I mean, these were bad guys. And he said, "Well, how do you get a get a hold of them?" And I said, "I'm going to guess that they're listed in the Damascus telephone book." So, I went to the Library of Congress. Of course, the Damascus telephone book is in Arabic.
[37:12] I go to the Library of Congress. They have a copy of the Damascus telephone book. And I find four of these guys. They're all like in their 70s and they don't do anything anymore. They just they're just retired. They drink coffee and smoke cigarettes and pass the day. So, I called them. And I said, "We're doing a documentary about the Middle East peace process and about the role of, you know, freedom fighters and activists." And I made all this [ __ ] up. And they said, "Yeah, that they would be interested in appearing in a documentary like that." So, I called Sacha and I
[37:43] said, "Bingo, we got four of them." And he said, "Okay, well, now we have to find a place to film." He said, "How about Amman?" I said, "Amman's a great idea, but I said, "The Jordanian Intelligence Service is one of the best in the world. And they're going to be on you like white on rice. So, we have to bring the Jordanians in on the gag." He said, "Absolutely not. The Jordanians can't know that it's him and that it's a comedy. They have to believe that this is a legitimate documentary being done by an
[38:14] Austrian journalist." I said, "Man, this is a bad idea." I said, "Sacha, look at it this way. If the Jordanian intelligence service sees four bonafide terrorists all flying to Amman on the same day to go to your hotel room you're done. And he said, "I'm going to have to risk it. Nobody can be in on the gag." So, he and a cameraman flew to Amman the day before I did.
[38:45] And he told me the next day when I arrived, they land and they get off the plane and they're walking out like to get a cab, and there's a guy standing there with a sign and it says Sacha Baron Cohen. And And so he says, "I'm Sacha Baron Cohen." And the guy says, "Oh, the car is waiting for you." So, he goes out and there's this limo and they get in the car and he says to the cameraman, "John got us a limo."
[39:15] I'm not a freaking secretary. I didn't get him a limo. So, they're driving through Amman and he said it occurred to him that maybe John didn't get him a limo. So, he says to the driver, "Where are we going?" And the driver says, "The Royal Palace. His Majesty is a huge fan." And he said, "These enormous iron gates open up and they pull into the Royal Palace grounds and here's the king." And he's standing with the director of the Jordanian intelligence service.
[39:48] So, he gets out of the car and the king says, "Sacha Baron Cohen, I am your biggest fan." He said, "Borat, genius. I didn't think I could make it through." He said, "Anything that you need while you're in Jordan, you talk to this man. He's the head of the Jordanian intelligence service. He'll take care of anything you want." And I said, "I told you. You hadn't even landed in the country and they knew that you were doing this. That's how good they are. So, they were
[40:19] blown, the cover was blown. Then they go to the hotel. So, the plan was to get these guys into a room, show them the Polaroids, and he wanted them to lunge across the table to strangle him, to beat him. So, I'm sitting behind the camera. He's at the table interviewing these guys. And he's very effeminate in this
[40:50] character. So, he pulls out the the Polaroids. And again, these are like hardcore gay, you know, anal Polaroids. And he lays them out. And uh he says, "Is this torture? Do these men they're torturing each other? Should they be sent to Guantanamo?" And these guys are old, so they're like they have their their trifocals on and they're like one of them picks it up and he goes like this. He goes, "Oh,
[41:21] not good. This haram. Not good." And the other one he hands it to the other one, "Ah, no, no, no. This not good." And they just set it down. And they just look at him. Like, "Damn it. Nothing's happening." So, I'm waiting and the cameraman told me beforehand, "If they react and they lunge at him, don't move cuz we want the fight on camera." And then they're like, you know,
[41:51] looking around, light up another cigarette. He brings out more pictures. They were like, "This not Islam. Not good." And then that was it. So, we finished the scene and the guys leave. He paid them. I think he gave them like a hundred dollars each. And um and I said, "Well, that was a bust." And he goes, "Yeah, they didn't they didn't give a shit." Uh I said, "No." Cut the entire Jordan part out of the movie, the entire thing. And then, ironically,
[42:23] they went to Jerusalem, I flew home. It was in Jerusalem that Yeshiva students beat the [ __ ] out of him. And it was the only time in filming that he dropped character. He went to the to the Western Wall, you know, like the holiest site in all of Judaism. And he was wearing a leather vest with no shirt, and he's hairy like a gorilla, right? So, he's got this leather vest with no shirt. He has pink hot pants, like ladies hot pants, and leather boots that come up over his knee. And he goes
[42:55] to the Western Wall like this. And this rabbi saw him, and then the Yeshiva students were just on him. They beat the [ __ ] out of him. He had black eyes, his face was swollen. They had to stop filming for a week for the for the swelling to go down. And he's on the ground, they're kicking him, they're stomping him, and he he was saying, "I'm an actor, I'm an actor. It's just a joke, we're filming a movie." They didn't care. They didn't care if it was a joke, and he was an actor. >> No, you you mess around in certain parts of the world, and
[43:26] >> It was daring and gutsy, and I've said in in previous interviews, I concluded that the guy was a genius, and I don't use the term lightly. He was a genius, a comic genius. First of all, who would think of of something like this? Even if it didn't work in Jordan, who would even think of something like this? And then, you know, you go back to Borat. And it really holds its comedy. It really Who would think to do that? Where there are governments issuing condemnations of of a movie.
[43:58] You know, he's driving past the the embassy of Uzbekistan, and he's like, "Fuck you, Uzbekistan!" And they take out a full-page ad in the Washington Washington Post. They say, "We condemn this film. We're proud people of Uzbekistan. Come on." >> Genius. >> You can't not laugh. >> No way. >> So, what makes the Jordanians so good? >> Uh the net the necessity to survive. Fully 50% of the population of Jordan is Palestinian. They are Palestinian refugees and the descendants of
[44:28] refugees. And we know that because if you're Jordanian, your passport is green. And if you're Palestinian, your passport is black. And never the two shall meet. So, in 1968, there was a Palestinian uh terrorist group called Black September. And their goal was to overthrow the Jordanian monarchy and make Jordan the new Palestine. They were fighting literally on the steps of the palace. That's how close they got. And the Jordanians were able to beat them back.
[45:00] And the Jordanians don't want any more trouble. And so, they had to develop arguably the best or second best intelligence service in the Middle East just to protect themselves. We train them, Mossad trains them, the Saudis train them, and I mean, they're they're great. Truly great. Yeah. >> Is there anything that stands out that they're really good out as far as like are they really good at ops or analysis
[45:31] or they just well-rounded? >> They don't even so much care about the analysis. It's all about ops. You know, look at it this way. They've got They've got all these factions, all these Palestinian factions, on top of having the the PA, the Palestinian Authority, and Hamas with representatives there. And every other Palestinian group with representatives there. You know, the Quds Force and you know, this one and that one and Islamic Jihad and everybody's there. And they have to allow a simmer
[46:02] because everybody's going be bitching about the Israelis. But they can't let that simmer turn into a boil that actually presents a threat to their own stability. So, it's a constant balancing act. And the only way that you're able to pull off a balancing act like that is to infiltrate every one of these groups. Mhm. And then you really need the economy to be good enough so that hungry people don't get angry. >> Did you ever does the CIA do joint ops with the Jordanians?
[46:34] >> That's That's a question that I'm not permitted to answer. I will say I was at a facility once at a facility once with the Jordanians and um it was in a very, very rural area of the United States. And uh I'm standing with There was a captain from the Jordanian intelligence service. And a And a deer walked by. And he says to me Hadha ghazal? Is that a gazelle? And And the funny thing is they only
[47:04] have gazelles in the Middle East. So, any kind of deer is a gazelle in Arabic. So, I said, "Yeah, it's a it's a gazelle." I said, "We have millions of them here, too many." He says Is tasty? I said, "Oh, yeah. Makes a nice Makes a nice stew." So, I mentioned to the to the lead guy, I said, "I I think maybe we should shoot one of these deer." So, I think these I think the the Jordanians want to want to eat one. And he goes, "Cool."
[47:35] 5 minutes later you hear