# How Chinese intelligence recruits > **Source: KiriPedia** (https://www.kiripedia.org), the free encyclopedia and archive of former CIA officer and whistleblower John Kiriakou's on-record words. Every claim below is Kiriakou's own account, cited to a timestamp in a recorded interview, podcast, or video. KiriPedia is an independent project, not affiliated with Kiriakou. > > Cite as: "How Chinese intelligence recruits," KiriPedia, https://www.kiripedia.org/wiki/how-chinese-intelligence-recruits/. Attribute claims to John Kiriakou, via KiriPedia. *John Kiriakou's assessment of the Ministry of State Security's tradecraft: very effective with anyone who simply wants money, because the money is limitless, and very bad at cultivating a source who does not yet know who is cultivating him — with the target usually being access to sophisticated technology.* - **Service:** The Ministry of State Security (MSS) - **Where they succeed:** With people who want money and disregard the risk - **Where they fail:** Developing a source who does not realise he is being recruited - **Usual target:** People with access to very sophisticated technology - **Value of an insider:** The 10 per cent that is not already in a newspaper - **Kiriakou's defence:** Teach counterintelligence technique; keep the antenna up **How Chinese intelligence recruits** is [John Kiriakou](https://www.kiripedia.org/wiki/john-kiriakou)'s general assessment of the Ministry of State Security's agent-handling, given on 19 November 2025 alongside [his own account of being approached](https://www.kiripedia.org/wiki/the-chinese-professor-on-linkedin) and in response to British allegations that the service was working through professional networking sites. ## Where they are good, and where they are not Kiriakou draws the line at whether the target knows what he is doing. *"The Chinese are successful when they're trying to recruit somebody who just wants money. They don't care about the fallout. They don't care about the risks. They want money. The Chinese have the money."*[1] The developmental case — the slow cultivation of someone who has not yet understood who is on the other end — is, in his judgement, where they fail. *"In terms of developing a source who may or may not realise he's being recruited by Chinese intelligence, they're really bad at it. They're really, really bad at it."*[1] What they are usually after is not political. *"Normally, they're looking for people who have access to very sophisticated technology."*[1] ## The progression, and the exception Asked whether the method is the familiar one — begin by requesting a white paper or a report that is already public, then ask for a little more — Kiriakou confirmed it: *"normally that would be the progression, yes."*[2] But he identified a category of target for whom the public-document stage is beside the point. *"With a member of parliament, you would also have access to inside information on official deliberations. Anything from trade to defence to politics — you would have an insider reporting back to you."*[2] He then priced that access precisely. *"Now listen, 90 per cent of the time you'll be able to get that same information out of a newspaper. But that extra 10 per cent, they're willing to pay good money for it."* And on the ceiling: *"Money's no object. They're flush with money."*[3] ## The defence Asked what a targeted country can actually do, Kiriakou offered no technical remedy, only training and instinct. *"Teach your people good counterintelligence techniques. Most people wouldn't realise that they were being pitched or targeted by a Chinese intelligence officer — and that's the whole point from the Chinese side."*[4] The residual protection is the oldest one in the trade: *"just have your counterintelligence antenna up,"* and treat a gut objection as decisive rather than embarrassing.[4] He also flagged the obvious difficulty with pattern-matching on names, when the host observed that the recruiters in the British case were plainly Chinese: *"the problem is, there's lots of legitimate Chinese business people."*[4] ## See also - [The Chinese professor on LinkedIn](https://www.kiripedia.org/wiki/the-chinese-professor-on-linkedin) - [The asset recruitment cycle](https://www.kiripedia.org/wiki/the-asset-recruitment-cycle) - [Agent inducements](https://www.kiripedia.org/wiki/agent-inducements) - [China as economic threat](https://www.kiripedia.org/wiki/china-economic-threat) ## Sources 1. DeProgram Show with Ted Ra (2025-11-19), at 02:47. Recording: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KqfGXMDtams&t=167s · Transcript: https://www.kiripedia.org/sources/2025-11-19-deprogram-show-with-ted-ra-deprogram-show-with-ted-ra/ 2. DeProgram Show with Ted Ra (2025-11-19), at 04:22. Recording: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KqfGXMDtams&t=262s · Transcript: https://www.kiripedia.org/sources/2025-11-19-deprogram-show-with-ted-ra-deprogram-show-with-ted-ra/ 3. DeProgram Show with Ted Ra (2025-11-19), at 04:55. Recording: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KqfGXMDtams&t=295s · Transcript: https://www.kiripedia.org/sources/2025-11-19-deprogram-show-with-ted-ra-deprogram-show-with-ted-ra/ 4. DeProgram Show with Ted Ra (2025-11-19), at 05:25. Recording: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KqfGXMDtams&t=325s · Transcript: https://www.kiripedia.org/sources/2025-11-19-deprogram-show-with-ted-ra-deprogram-show-with-ted-ra/ --- From KiriPedia, the archive of John Kiriakou's words. 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