Asked how the American intelligence establishment treats small nations that break with United States policy, John Kiriakou answered with a case he says he happened to be present for.
Being there
Kiriakou says he was in Ireland a month or two earlier when the Irish decided to recognise Palestine, and calls the question about small-state alignment important and timely.[1]
Ireland, in his description, is a small country and not a member of NATO, and normally the United States would pay it no attention — other than that it happens to be a place where people like to launder money, so Washington works closely with the Irish services on anti-money-laundering operations.[1][2]
What made Ireland act, in his reading, is its own long history with British imperialism, which disposes the Irish to be on the side of the little guy — and in today’s world, he says, that means the Palestinian people.[2]
Two reactions in Washington
Kiriakou reports the split directly from former colleagues. Friends of his at the agency told him the CIA did not care one way or the other. The State Department, by contrast, was apoplectic that Ireland would throw a wrench into the international situation by recognising Palestine.[2][3]
He is careful about what the anger was actually about: nobody much cared that it was Ireland specifically. The fear was that this was the first hole in the dyke, and that other countries would follow suit.[3]
The precedent
Kiriakou says the fear was well founded. Spain announced that it was exploring diplomatic relations with the Palestinians; the Italians were exploring it; and he believes half a dozen other European countries were doing the same.[3][4] He treats this as the direction of travel, and concludes that there is nothing the CIA — or even the State Department — can do to stop it.[4]
Reassessed against the French decision
When France extended recognition in July 2025, Kiriakou used the Irish decision as the measure of how much larger the French one was. The Irish move, he said, “threw a bone to the Palestinians that was really worth its weight and gold”, but its diplomatic effect stopped there: “all that did was piss off the Israelis.” Nor had it been a surprise — “we expected that to happen, because the Irish have been oppressed, you know, throughout their history.”[5]
What made the French recognition different, on his account, was neither sympathy nor timing but standing: a Security Council veto, a G7 seat, and a colonial history in the Middle East of its own.[5][6]