MBS and Netanyahu asked Trump to attack Iran, according to John Kiriakou, who gives the joint approach as the origin of the 2026 war and treats it as the fact that makes the surrounding Saudi diplomacy inexplicable.
The reported approach
Kiriakou was asked about news that Saudi Arabia had said it would help the United States in efforts to change the Iranian regime. He confirmed it: “The news that you’ve seen that Saudi Arabia said that they would help us in regime change operations is true.”[1][2]
He then supplied what he regarded as the more important fact. “Over the last couple of years, Mohammed bin Salman uh uh Al Saud, the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia, actually worked very hard to improve Saudi relations with Iran. But as it turns out, it was Mohammed bin Salman and Benjamin Netanyahu who went to Donald Trump and asked him to invade Iran or to attack Iran.”[2]
Kiriakou’s reading of it
The contradiction between the rapprochement and the request is left standing rather than resolved. “So, I’m not sure what kind of game MBS is is playing. It’s a dangerous one,” Kiriakou says.[2][3]
On the object of the war he is unambiguous, and treats it as admitted rather than inferred: “The goal is indeed regime change. Donald Trump told us to our faces a couple of nights ago the goal is regime change.”[3]
What follows from it
Kiriakou’s objection is not that the aim is concealed but that it is unachievable, and he moves straight from the admission to the record: “the United States is very very bad at regime change operations.” That judgement is developed at length in his account of the difficulty of getting out, where the twenty years in Afghanistan and nineteen in Iraq serve as the measure of the cost.[3][4]
Elsewhere in his commentary on the same war, Kiriakou identifies Marco Rubio as the official actually driving the policy inside the administration, with Netanyahu alongside him — a structure in which the two men who asked for the war were, in Kiriakou’s account, pushing against a national security establishment that largely did not want it.[5]
The most unpredictable leader in Saudi history
Asked what to make of a reported Russian–Saudi conversation during the war, Kiriakou began with the man on the Saudi end. “This is Mohammed bin Salman. I mean, the guy is just the most unpredictable uh leader or deputy leader in Saudi history.”[6][7]
The unpredictability was not, in his account, a reason to close the channel but a reason to keep it: “You might as well keep the the lines of communication open. Like, maybe maybe the Russians can say something to the Iranians while the Saudis say something to the Americans and we can all back off this thing.”[7]
He was separately unable to reconcile the reports that MBS had encouraged the attack with MBS’s own prior policy, judging that the disclosure did Saudi Arabia no good and that the underlying decision made no sense: it had been MBS’s initiative to normalise and improve relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran in the first place. “So, why why attack? I just don’t get it.”[8]