On a Saturday in August 2026 the head of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council set out what it would take to reopen the Strait of Hormuz: that the United States must never threaten or insult Iran in any language; permanently end the war against Iran and its allies in Lebanon, Gaza, Yemen and Iraq; lift the naval blockade and withdraw forces from Iran’s surroundings; provide full compensation for war damages; lift all sanctions; and release all frozen Iranian funds.[1][2][3] Kiriakou’s running commentary on the first two is two words each — “Okay, good luck” — but he does not treat the list as posturing.[2]
The transposition
What he identifies as the important feature is where the conditions came from: “Those were conditions for reopening the straight of Hormuz used to be Iran’s conditions for signing a nuclear deal… They’ve taken the same conditions that they were using for signing the nuclear deal and they sort of transposed them into the terms for reopening the straight of Hormuz. It’s smart and it puts the United States in a difficult position.”[4][5] The trap he identifies in agreeing is that it wins nothing: “So what happens if we agree to these demands? It just kind of puts us back where we started.”[5]
He judges Iran to be negotiating “from one of their greatest positions of strength since the conflict began.”[1]
The frozen funds
On the money he takes a position against his own side’s politics. The administration had long attacked the Obama-era transfer of $1.7 billion to Iran; Kiriakou gives the history behind it — in the Shah’s final days in 1979 Iran paid $1.7 billion for aircraft and air force equipment, the Shah was overthrown before delivery, “and we just kept the money” — and notes that the same administration is now discussing unfreezing $25 billion to end the conflict.[3][6] His own view is unambiguous, and he predicts the cost of holding it: “my own personal belief is that’s actually the right thing to do. He’s going to take all kinds of it from the Democrats who are going to use this for partisan purposes, but releasing the frozen Iranian funds is the right thing to do. Lifting sanctions against Iran is the right thing to do.”[7]
His objection to the sanctions strategy is that it has already been tried to exhaustion: “We’ve had sanctions on the Iranians since November of 1979. How many more sanctions could there possibly be? Especially sanctions powerful enough to lead to the collapse of the Iranian government. I don’t know of any. If there were such sanctions, we would have imposed them already.”[8]