John Kiriakou says Iran had proposed charging ships as much as $2 million each to transit the Strait of Hormuz — payable in yuan rather than dollars, a direct challenge to U.S. economic control of the region and its oil traffic.[1] Days after Donald Trump said the United States would take over the strait, the U.S. Navy announced it had done exactly that: it had taken control of the strait and closed it. Kiriakou calls this a reversal of decades of U.S. policy, which had always held that the strait must remain open — now, he says, it is the United States ensuring the strait stays closed.[2]
A narrow, vital chokepoint
Kiriakou notes the strait is only 16 miles wide at its narrowest point, with ships required to stay barely on the international side of the line marking Iranian territorial waters — leaving them vulnerable to fast boats operated by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.[3] Some 60 per cent of the world’s oil flows out of the Persian Gulf through it, and the narrowness is the whole point: “it’s easy to block the Strait of Hormuz.”[4] He says the strait’s importance goes beyond oil: 65% of the world’s fertilizer supply passes through it, and without that fertilizer the world cannot adequately feed itself, given that Ukraine — the “world’s breadbasket” — cannot produce enough wheat on its own to make up the difference for a fertilizer-starved Africa.[5]
What he would do in Tehran’s place
Kiriakou’s strategic judgement is unambiguous and he attributes the original insight to Bob Baer, who wrote about Iran’s ability to retaliate covertly and shut the strait “25 years ago. He was correct then… he’s correct today.” His own view follows: “the Iranians can shut the Strait of Hormuz. If I were the Iranian leader, I would shut the Strait of Hormuz.” The reasoning is asymmetric: Iran will not win a sustained bombing campaign, “but over the long term, you know, they live there. It’s their neighbourhood, and they can inflict real economic harm on the West.”[6][7][8] Earlier he had framed closure as the single lever Tehran holds — the thing it would do, “presumably with Russian and/or Chinese consent,” if it needed to pressure Western economies.[9]
He also treats it as the outer edge of escalation rather than the whole of it: beyond closing the strait, which would severely harm the global economy, lies striking American and European interests around the world, and global destabilisation.[10]
The 1980s precedent
Kiriakou’s reference point is the reflagging and escort operation of the mid-1980s, which he calls “unprecedented in our relations with Persian Gulf countries.” When the Iranians tried to close the strait, Ronald Reagan “ordered the US Navy into the Strait of Hormuz to escort” every oil tanker through it.[11][12]
He saw one result himself. From a boat in the Persian Gulf he watched the Bridgeton — famous in the eighties after the Iranians attacked and set it ablaze, and then the biggest oil tanker in the world — which was eventually towed into port and took a couple of years to repair.[13][14]
His conclusion is that the same answer is available and may be forced again — “a long-term heavy US naval presence in the Gulf just to escort ships through the Strait of Hormuz” — with one difference that worries him: “in 1985 and 1986 you didn’t have Iranian naval vessels firing rockets at American ships.” Escorting, he notes, “could set us up for being targeted, so it’s a trigger for escalation.”[15][14]
Payment in yuan
Kiriakou recounted an Indian ship paying for Iranian oil in yuan during the 2026 war and being told it was free to pass, alongside a two-million-dollar fee raised in the same exchange.[16]
The American objection was that oil must be paid for in dollars or the American economy would crash; the Iranian answer was “tough luck for you.”[16] The sequel is at Iranian oil sanctions relief, 2026.
The 2026 closure
Iran claimed the closure publicly, and Kiriakou’s favourite artefact of it was a line from the Iranian social-media feed: “we have blocked the Strait of Hormuz. Let the orange pig try to unblock it.”[17][18] Asked a few days earlier whether the strait was formally closed, his answer was practical rather than legal: “I don’t think that it’s formally closed, but I wouldn’t send my ship full of explosives through there” — and what normally happens in such a case is that Lloyd’s of London issues a blanket ruling on the risk.[19]
The market effect was immediate: with the strait closed for two days, oil went from $66 a barrel to $83, and the Dow futures fell almost 900 points.[20] Kiriakou had listed the mechanism in advance — “energy prices will skyrocket because of the Strait of Hormuz” — alongside casualties at American bases scattered across the region.[21]