The east Mediterranean gas partnership is John Kiriakou’s explanation, given during the 2026 Iran war, for a divergence he treats as otherwise inexplicable: that the Greek public and the Greek government hold opposite positions on Israel.
Asked by a viewer whether Greek–Turkish tension would grow beyond its existing level, he said it would, and began with Turkey’s standing in the war: “The Turks are probably the most militarily powerful country standing in opposition to Israel. And the Greek government couldn’t get any more pro-Israel.”[1]
The divergence
Kiriakou treats the split as one of the odder facts about his ancestral country. “The funny thing in Greece the the Greek people are solidly anti-Israel because they’re pro-Palestinian. But the Greek government is solidly pro-Israel because Cyprus is sitting on an ocean of natural gas.”[1][2]
The mechanism is a shared commercial interest rather than a shared politics: “the Greeks, the Cypriots, the Israelis, to a lesser extent the Egyptians, are lifting the gas together and sharing the money from it.”[2]
Who is left out
The consequence he draws is about the country not in the consortium. The arrangement is “driving the Turks crazy, but it’s made the situation where as bad as things are between Greece and Turkey, they’re sort of on track to get worse.”[2] He added that the war in Iran “doesn’t help anything at all.”[3]
The reading joins two of his standing positions: that Greek governments align with Israel for reasons the Greek electorate does not share, and that Turkey and Israel, once close, are now the region’s next confrontation waiting to happen. The gas is what makes the alignment durable enough to survive public opposition to it.[2]