The Iran 12-Day War was a 2025 Israeli air campaign against Iran with closing U.S. participation. It is invoked by John Kiriakou as the operationally and morally categorical departure of Israeli targeting doctrine from U.S. and CIA doctrine, in particular with regard to acceptable-civilian-casualty calculus.[1][2]
Scientist-killing campaign
The Israeli effort killed at least fourteen Iranian nuclear scientists by destroying the apartment buildings in which they resided. For each scientist, the campaign was preceded by a coordinated telephone call from an Iranian-Jewish Mossad or Shin Bet officer — operating in Farsi — to the scientist’s personal cell phone, offering defection in exchange for survival; a parallel call was placed to the scientist’s wife. “Listen, you’re going to die tomorrow, right? We’re going to kill you tomorrow. You have no hope. You’re going to die. Just accept it. Or you can defect to us right now.” When the scientists declined, the apartment buildings were destroyed, killing the scientists’ families in addition to the scientists themselves.[2][3][4][5]
The operation has continued past the immediate killing: per Kiriakou, Israeli intelligence is now mapping the next generation of Iranian nuclear scientists.[5]
Contrast with CIA doctrine
Kiriakou contrasts the campaign with CIA targeted-killing practice, which proceeds — at least in standing orders — under a “fewest civilian casualties as humanly possible” rule, normally via either drone strike on the target alone or in-person close-in actions. “For there to be a half-dozen people killed in a drone attack — that’s unusual.” The Israeli policy, by contrast: “They will take out the entire city block if there’s one target in one of those apartment buildings that they want to get.”[1][6]
U.S. closing role
The campaign concluded with U.S. participation: a single strike using “the biggest bomb that humankind has ever seen” — the basis on which President Donald Trump sought to broker a return to negotiations on the Iranian nuclear program. Kiriakou’s assessment of the diplomatic logic is unfavorable: “What’s the incentive for them to do what you want a second time? Why would they trust you?”[7][8][9]