Pakistani troops for Gaza is a proposal John Kiriakou asked to discuss first on 31 October 2025, prefacing it with the admission that “it sounds nuts, and it actually makes a little bit of sense.”[1]
Why Pakistan is the country being asked
Pakistan is Muslim but “has always kept the Arab-Israeli conflict at arm’s length because the Pakistanis are not Arabs. They’re Pakistanis” — and “they have enough problems” without adding Palestine to them.[2]
The Saudi interest, Kiriakou says, makes obvious sense: “Saudi Arabia and Pakistan are joined at the hip like this. They love each other. And the Pakistanis make up the vast majority of the Saudi military.”[3]
Why he thought it might work
The argument is about who the Gazans would accept. Pakistani soldiers “are Muslims, so they should have the respect of the Gaza Palestinians, and vice versa. They would show respect to the Gaza Palestinians because they understand the culture and the religion.”[3][4]
The sectarian arithmetic also fits. Gaza’s Palestinians are Sunni; “the Pakistanis are almost entirely Sunni Muslims. Handful of Shia, but they tend not to be in the military cuz they can’t get promoted.”[5]
He is equally clear about what Israel would be buying: a Pakistani force “would sort of take the air out of Hamas’s sails, which is exactly what the Israelis want.”[4]
The objections he takes seriously
Put to him that Pakistani troops would be seen as an occupation force doing the bidding of the Zionist entity, Kiriakou allowed the possibility and rested his answer on Saudi cover: “if the Saudis weigh in and endorse it, I think that’ll be good enough.”[6][5][7]
He conceded, though, that Saudi standing among Palestinians is poor. Bahrain, the Emirates, Tunisia, Morocco “even the Sudanese are indeed seen as feckless because they caved and joined the so-called Abraham Accords” — and had October 7 not happened, “there probably would be an Israeli ambassador in Riyadh and a Saudi ambassador at least in Tel Aviv, if not in Jerusalem.” His conclusion: “the Palestinians would probably hang on that.”[8][9]
On whether such a force would fight Hamas, his answer runs through Riyadh rather than Islamabad: “the Pakistanis do as the Saudis tell them to do.” And Hamas, he expects, would simply wait — its fighters carry no identity cards, and a man may be a fighter for two years and a schoolteacher afterwards, biding his time for the call. His model for the double life is a man he met in Afghanistan in 2010 who worked for the Karzai government as an irrigation expert by day and blew up irrigation canals with the Taliban at night.[10][11][12][13]
Why he expects it not to happen
Kiriakou put the probability at “a 40% chance this could happen” — conditional on there being an international peacekeeping force at all, which he doubted.[14]
His reason is Israeli conduct during the ceasefire rather than Pakistani or Palestinian reluctance. The State Department, he notes, had confirmed Israeli atrocities against Palestinian civilians in a classified briefing reported by the Washington Post, and there had been so many that officials had not been able to work through them all. So “why would the Israelis want outsiders, especially outside Muslims, to come in and be the peacekeepers?”[15]
The test he applies is journalistic access. Israel was still refusing to admit American reporters even under a ceasefire brokered by the American president — because, he says, “the mass graves are going to get — are being dug up right now.” From which: “if they’re not going to let American journalists in, they’re not going to let Pakistani troops in.”[16][17]