The expulsion of Palestinians from the Gulf followed Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990.[1] John Kiriakou, living in the Gulf in the early and mid-1990s, has described having “a front row seat to this whole thing playing out.”[1] He returns to it as the single event that explains Gulf Arab conduct toward the Palestinians a generation later — and, in his more recent tellings, as something he has never been able to make sense of.[2]
The professional class
Before the invasion the middle class across the Gulf — not only in Kuwait — was Palestinian. Palestinians were the doctors, the lawyers, the professors and the bankers, and in Kiriakou’s account they “made the economies run.”[3] The list is one he recites in almost identical form across a decade of interviews — “the teachers, the lawyers, the engineers, the professors, the bankers” — and he treats the labour history as the point: Palestinians had been doing that work in Kuwait “since the 50s.”[4][5] He also notes what the framing leaves out — that the people expelled “are Arabs and they’re mostly Muslims.”[6]
Arafat’s choice
After the ruling family fled into exile in Saudi Arabia and Iraqi troops set about destroying Kuwait, Secretary of State James Baker went to Yasser Arafat, then leader of the Palestine Liberation Organization, and told him he had to come down on the side of the Kuwaitis. After what Kiriakou describes as very public self-flagellation, Arafat sided with Saddam Hussein.[7]
A second and less-remarked provocation was working on the Kuwaiti mind at the same time. In the briefing Kiriakou gave George H. W. Bush the morning after the invasion, he had to report that the Iraqis had just named a Palestinian, Ahmed Khatib, as occupation governor of Kuwait — a man Kiriakou had met, who he says hated the Iraqis as much as anyone and never agreed to the post, but who in medical school had shared a room with George Habash, with whom he founded the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. The president’s reaction to that piece of biography was, in Kiriakou’s telling, “Jesus Christ” — and Kiriakou’s own was “well, this is going to be bad.”[8][9] He offers it as part of the explanation for how comprehensively Palestinians were then removed from Kuwait.[9]
The expulsion
The consensus among the Gulf royal families, as Kiriakou heard it while living in the region, was that they would expel every Palestinian — and for the most part they did. They were replaced with Filipinos, Bangladeshis and Egyptians, and most recently Syrians. As he puts it, “You don’t have to be Palestinian to be a lawyer or a professor or an engineer or a banker.”[10]
He can date the Kuwaiti decision to a room. Just after the liberation he was invited to the wedding of the defence minister’s son — the defence minister, he notes, later became Amir Nawaf of Kuwait — and the subject came up there. “He said to me, in 12 months there will be no Palestinians in Kuwait. None.” Kiriakou’s objection at the time was practical rather than moral: “How’s your country going to run? Your country can’t run. You can’t replace all the Palestinians with Filipinos and Bangladeshis — they can’t just step into life here and just work like the Palestinians have been doing since the 50s.”[9][4][5]
The twelve-month promise was not kept in full, and Kiriakou is explicit about why. “In the end they didn’t expel all the Palestinians. They sure wanted to, but the US, the UK, France — they all, even the Egyptians, pressured them to back off.” The argument put to Kuwait was one of misdirected blame: “These are not the Palestinians you should be angry with. You should be angry with Yasser Arafat for throwing his endorsement to Saddam Hussein.”[5][11]
Nor did the damage reverse when the cause of it died. Speaking in 2021, Kiriakou described the recovery as “a very slow process” that “never got back to what it was,” eased only once Arafat himself was gone — “but still, there’s just no love in the Gulf, among Gulf Arabs, for the Palestinians.”[12] Four years later he put it harder and in the present tense: “The Gulf Arabs hate Palestinians. They always have.” He grounds the claim in continuing personal contact — “I go to the Gulf with some frequency” — and reports the grievance still live in 2025: “They’re still angry that Yasser Arafat sided with Saddam Hussein in 1990. There’s a price to pay for that.”[13]
Consequence
Kiriakou identifies this grudge as the political precondition for Gulf normalisation with Israel: these countries are willing to open diplomatic relations “because they don’t mind screwing the Palestinians,” something he says Lindsey Graham and Benjamin Netanyahu both understood well.[10][14] The same reasoning is what makes Saudi participation legible to him rather than surprising, though not less galling — “Saudi Arabia, the land of the two holy mosques. It’s incredible to me. But they don’t give a [expletive] about Palestinians.”[13] The Abraham Accords themselves he scores as a double result: “a great victory for Israel and for the Gulf Arabs, it was a punch in the throat to the Palestinians.”[15]
A parallel expulsion struck Yemen. Yemen held a non-permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council in 1990 and voted against the use-of-force resolution; Saudi Arabia responded by expelling millions of Yemeni workers, and in Kiriakou’s assessment the country “has never recovered.”[16][17]
The part he does not accept
Kiriakou reports the grudge without endorsing it, and by 2025 was saying so directly: “I have just never understood this region-wide dislike of Palestinians.” He puts his standing to the question first — “I spent much of my career in the Persian Gulf: Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain for the most part, although I spent some time in the Emirates and in Qatar as well” — and then concedes the cause without accepting it as sufficient: “I get that Yasser Arafat backed Saddam Hussein during the first Gulf War.”[2]
The exception he does grant is Egypt, on grounds of poverty and proximity — “the Egyptians are poor and they’re right on the border. I get it.” For the rest, he expects the opposite of what he observes: “you would think would be beating each other up to see who could do the most for the Palestinian people, and they’re not.”[6]